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Enterprise risk management or ERM is fast ascending the corporate agenda
globally. Its relevancy and popularity as a management technique are abetted by the
changing business practices and burgeoning regulatory requirements on risk
management. ERM is defined as the process of identifying and analyzing risk from
an integrated, company-wide perspective in a structured and disciplined approach in
aligmng strategy, processes, people, technology and knowledge with a purpose of
evaluating and managing the uncertainties facing the enterprise as it creates value.
ERM essentially lays concern for managing the firm's specific risk apart from the
systematic risks.
However, the neo-classical finance theory (NCFT) postulates that managing
firm-specific risk is irrelevant. Nonetheless, this notion is in stark contrast to the
phenomenon of increased acceptance of ERM by industry practitioners. As such,
this thesis attempts to propose an ERM implementation framework to theorize a
model that captures the causal relationships of the risks that are strategically
associated with the firms' business performance and the cost of capital, e.g. risk
premium.
This thesis highlights the notion of managing firms' unsystematic (specific)
risk via an ERM implementation framework that leads to the enhancement of
shareholders' value. The mechanism through which the firms' value enhancement
takes place is theorized by a strategic conceptualization of risk premium model. The
model cites managing the firm's three classes of unsystematic risk, namely tactical
risk, strategic risk, and normative risk. The specific aims of this thesis are fourfold:
(i) to examine the depth of penetration of ERM practices among the public listed
in
companies in Malaysia; (ii) to examine how an effective impiementation process of
ERM will bring about value-enhancing outcome to Malaysia public listed companies
(PLCs); (iii) to analyze the value proposition hypotheses of corporate risk
management as the determinants for ERM practices; and (iv) to investigate the
validity of the theorized value creation transmission mechanism of the proposed
ERM framework via the strategic conceptualization of risk premium model.
The data is collected through questionnaires survey from 128 PLCs on the
Malaysian stock exchange. Variables in the questionnaire are measured in 5-point
Likert's scale. The analyses encompass factor analysis and structural equation
modeling (SEM). Outcomes of the factor analysis provide inputs (the measurement
model) for the SEM analysis. The SEM validates the theorized causal relationships
among the three constructs, i.e. ERM implementation challenge, ERM
implementation intensity, andperceived ERM benefitmeasures: The modified model
incorporates a second-order factor model which presents improved overall
goodness-of-fit values than the proposed model. Apart from that, the analytic also
comprises bivariate correlation analysis of hypotheses testing in relation to the
various aspects of: (i) the value maximization theory of ERM practices; and (ii)
the value creation transmission mechanism of the proposed ERM implementation
framework.
The analysis results conclude the following: (i) that all causal relationships
(structural model) under SEM examination indicate significant parameters; (ii) that
ERM implementation has significant positive associations with value maximization
theories of risk management; (iii) that ERM implementation has significant positive
iv
effects in reducing the firm's tactical and strategic risks with the consequence of
lowering the firm's risk premium.
ABSTRAK
Pengurusan risiko enterpris (ERM) adalah sebuah konsep pengurusan bam
yang mendapat perhatian dalam agenda korporat pelbagai pihak di seluruh dunia.
Perubahan yang sedang berlaku dalam pengendalian perniagaan serta keperluan-
keperluan regulator! menampakkan konsep ERM sebagai satu teknik pengurusan
yang semakin relevan and popular. ERM adalah process mengenalpasti dan menilai
risiko dari perlbagai perspektif dalam sebuah organisasi. la adalah pendekatan yang
berstruktur dan berdisiplin dalam mengatur strategi, proses, sumber manusia,
teknologi dan ilmu dengan tujuan untuk menilai dan mengurus sesuatu yang diluar
jangkaan justeru member! nilai kepada organisasi. ERM member! penekanan kepada
pengurusan risiko yang firma-spesifik selain risiko sistematik.
Walau bagaimanapun, teori neo-classical finance (NCFT) mengandaikan
cara pengurusan risiko firma-spesifik seperti yang dipelopori ERM sebagai sesuatu
yang tidak relevan. Namun pendapat ini agak bertentangan dengan fenomena
menerimaan pihak industri yang semakin tinggi terhadap konsep baru ini. Oleh itu,
tesis ini ingin mencadangkan sebuah pendekatan rangkaan (framework) untuk
memberi penjelasan teori mengenai hubungan risiko yang secara strategiknya dan
dihubungkaitkan dengan pencapaian perniagaan sesebuah firma serta kos risikonya.
Tesis ini mencadangkan penerapan konsep ERM dalam pengurusan risiko
firma-spesifik untuk menambah nilai kepada pemegang saham sesebuah firma
melalui mekanisma yang strategic melalui model kos risiko (risk premium). Model
ini menjelaskan tiga kategori risiko firma-sistematik; yalaii risiko taktikal, risiko
strategik dan risiko normatif. Objektif tesis ini dibahagikan kepada empat: (i)
mengkaji sejauh mana ERM diterima oleh firma tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia, (ii)
vi
meniliti keberkesanan konsep ERM dalam menaiktambahkan nilai korporat firma
tersenarai (iii) menilai hipotesis penambahan nilai korporat melalui periaksanaan
ERM dan (iv) mengkaji kesahihan mekanisma penjanaan nilai melalui periaksanaan
ERM melalui model kos risiko strategik.
Pengumpulan data adalah melalui survei dari 128 firma tersenarai di Bursa
Sahara Malaysia. Hasil dari analisa faktor memberi pengisian kepada analisa
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Analisa SEM membuktikan kewujudan
hubungan 'causal' antara ketiga-tiga konstruk: ERM implementation challenge,
ERM implementation intensity dan perceived ERM benefit measures. Model
penambahbaikan melalui factor turutan kedua {second order factor) memperhalusi
model yang sebelumnya. Selain daripada itu, analisis juga merangkumi analisa
bivariate correlation dengan mengambil kira (i) teori penambah nilai maksima
periaksanaan ERM, dan (ii) mekanisma penyaluran nilai model ERM yang
dicadangkan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan (i) kesemua hubungan 'causal' (model
structural) di bawah ujian SEM menunjukkan parameter yang siknifikan (ii)
periaksaan ERM memberi kaitan yang positif dalam mengurangkan cost offinancial
distress, lowering cost for external financing, improving firm's credit rating,
receiving reward from equity market, reducing informational asymmetries, dan
reducing agency problem; (iii) implementasi ERM memberi kesan yang positif
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QUOTATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT
"To get profit without risk, experience without danger, and reward
without work, is as impossible as it is to live without being born"
- A.P. Gouthev
wei ji
The Chinese word "crisis" is made up of two characters
1 • 7
one is danger , the other one is opportunity
He who knows the meaning of risk management shall have





In an organization, the management goal is to maximize shareholder's
wealth. Toward this end, management operational maneuver typically has been
trying to improve the valuation of the company's shares through delivering strong
company earnings (Matsusaka, 2001). In the process however, managers have to
deal with a single most crucial element in corporate management, i.e., risk. Risk
exists everywhere as far as business engagement is concerned. This is because risk
of adverse consequences are inherent in all business activities. Moreover, dynamic
enterprises inevitably create new risks in their quest to generate value for their
shareholders.
The axiom in finance discipline is that it is only taking on risk that one can
expect an investment payoff that is above the risk-free rate. Unless one is contented
with earning just a risk-free return in his investment venture, one cannot avoid
taking risk. Nonetheless, no one is satisfied with investments that are yielding
merely risk-free returns. As such, when one takes on risk, it is imperative to manage
this risk. A proper risk management process entails the firm to first identify what
risks to take and then accurately quantify and measure them. This will form the pre
requisite for the firm to base its rewards on risk adjusted performances. These
crucial processes of deciding which risks, and to what magnitude are core
managerial functions embodying corporate risk management. Hence, corporate risk
management ensures that all significant risks are understood and therefore,
prioritized. Information on risk obtained as a result of active engagement of risk
management can be organized for an effective decision making in investment,
capital budgeting, performance, and reward evaluations.
1.2 THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT
Historically, risk management has been a narrow insurance-based discipline.
Its activities involved transferring insurable risks faced by corporations to third
parties by way of engaging in insurance contracts. Insurance policies are used to
hedge against pure risk, i.e. those situations that involve only the chance of loss or
no loss such as the occurrence of fire and flood (Vaughan, 1997). Uninsurable risks
are often ignored and neglected. Over time, enterprises' concept of risk
management revolves around handling financial related risks such as liquidity,
interest rate, foreign exchange fluctuation and credit risk. Financial risks have now
been given great emphasis since they are by and large, the most direct and
significant impact on the enterprises' bottom lines. Formulating hedging strategies
using financial derivatives such as futures, forward, option, and swap contracts are
the key functions of relevant managers who are tasked to address those financial
risks. Nonetheless, corporate risk management has since evolved to be more macro
and holistic in nature, addressing risk issues encompassing all aspects in an
enterprise's business activities. Corporations have begun to realize the fast changing
sphere of risk game and its multi-dimensionality. The conventional wisdom of
assessing risks pertinent to the business and the paradigm in managing those risks
have changed tremendously. This is evidenced from the recent insurance crisis
which has prompted firms to look to alternative means of controlling risk exposure
(Thompson, 2003).
The risk game in business is fast changing. Almost anything has become a
risk factor that will have a potent, direct, and far reaching impact on business. For
instance, risks have also emerged from the operations side of business processes.
More often than not, they are as significant, if not more, as those coming from the
financial side of the business transactions. These risks range from anything such as a
computer meltdown, human error or fraud, to a terrorist attack (Thompson, 2003).
This expanded spectrum of risks in the business activities vindicates its existence
through a spate of corporate scandals and financial mismanagement incidents that
had started to be uncovered since the end of 2001. To name a few, these incidents
include the systematic accounting fraud and financial irregularities seen in US
corporations such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco; Italian firm Parmalat; and
Chinese firm China Aviation Oil. Enron, Worldcom, and Barring have since gone
bankrupt. The dangers poised by these risks that were not looked seriously into and
addressed by the traditional risk management efforts are in fact, clear and present.
In effect, it will not be a surprise if some would see these risks as much more
important these days than the financial risks where the likelihood for them to occur
is rather high. Thus, it is high time to incorporate a more dynamic approach in
corporate risk management to heed the new challenges brought by the constant and
fierce changes in the business operating environment.
1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING SECTOR
In the regulated banking fraternity, the drafting of the New Capital Accord
(Basel II) by the Bank for International Settlements, which stipulates banks to also
allocate capital reserve for operational risk, beyond and above the traditional market
and credit risks, signifies a change in risk management mindset in the international
banking industry. The mindset sees a shift from one that merely looks at a short term
transactional financial performance, towards one that sees a broader perspective that
includes operational risk management. Apart from aligning the reserving of
regulatory capital to that of economic capital, Basel II also requires financial
institutions to disclose greater risk information to investors and a more explicitly set
standards for internal risk management processes (Belmont, 2004). The essence of
the Basel II requirements is for banks to invest more rigorously in their risk
management mechanism so as to have a more advanced risk measurement modeling.
It allows banks to self determine the amount of regulatory capital needed for the
level of their risk exposures. Having an effective risk management regime will result
in banks needing a lower regulatory capital requirement and having better strategic
decision making in capital budgeting, capital structuring, and capital allocation
(Belmont, 2004). This ultimately will lead to a better risk-adjusted return on capital
and a value creation process for shareholders.
There are 3 levels of compliance intensity to the Basel II accord. The
intensity levels involve the complexity and sophistication in measuring and
interpreting various types of risk for the purpose of banks' risk capital charge. The
highest level of compliance is the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA),
followed by the Standardised Approach (TSA), and lastly the Basic Indicator
Approach (BIA). In the present local banking scene, Malaysian banks are in the
midst of adopting the Standardised Approach. In comparison, most mature banking
countries in the Asia Pacific region such as Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New
Zealand, Singapore South Korea and Taiwan have generally adopted the AMA
(Starbiz, 2008a). The adoption of AMA option allows banks to use their internal
models to calculate their regulatory capital holdings. This is a form of favorable
treatment by regulators in comparison to the conventional way where regulators
stipulate bank's regulatory capital requirement. According to Dr John Lee, head of
ASPAC financial risk management for KPMG Business Advisory Sdn Bhd, most
local banks are aiming to be compliant to AMA by 2010. If they miss the dateline,
the next target will be 2013 (Starbiz, 2008). Compliant to Basel II regulations is an
effort by the banking fraternity to extend its conventional market and credit-based
risk management program to one that is more enterprise-wide based. The stipulation
and initiatives under Basel II risk management requirements are often seen by the
industry as an approach to implement the concept of enterprise risk management
(ERM) in the banks' organization. They reckon that implementing ERM program is
the answer to an integrated response to the regulatory compliance (Bailey et al.,
2004).
Relative to its peers in other sectors of the economy, the banking sector is
generally a step ahead when it comes to corporate risk management. This is
basically due to the fact that the industry is a highly regulated one which uses money
from the public for its business operations. Nonetheless, a mere meeting of
regulatory required risk management program is by no mean a guarantee to banks'
competitiveness as business organizations amid the stiff and ever changing operating
environment in the industry.
Typically, empirical examinations of corporate risk management activities
would delineate the data collection between bank and non-bank sectors primarily
because of the perception that the banking sector faces distinct classes of financial
risk exposure inherent in the banking businesses, e.g. credit, liquidity, foreign
exchange, interest rate, etc. Hence, the analysis on risk management activities in the
banking sector would normally see the discussion on risk management program like
assets-liabilities management (ALM) which is unique to the banks. Nonetheless, in
this study of enterprise risk management implementation framework, the difference
among public listed companies along the banking and non-banking sectors in the
interpretation of the empirical results are not discerned. This is because the study
defines enterprise risk management implementation framework in a much broader
context to cover all domains of risk exposure facing firms, not just the financial risk
exposure.
1.4 CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT AND MODERN PORTFOLIO
THEORY
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) that originated from the publication of
"Portfolio Selection" by Harry Markowitz in 1952 gives insight into the knowledge
that the expected return of an asset should be positively related to its systematic risk
in assets portfolio investment. Markowitz framework postulates that an asset's
systematic risk is determined by the covariance of its returns with that of a well-
diversified market portfolio. Asset allocation is then determined by maximizing the
risk-adjusted asset return over the investment holding period. We can apply MPT
argument in investment in company shares whereby ownership of a firm's shares is
regarded as investment by shareholders in an asset. Hence, the expected return on a
firm's shares is a function to the firm risk profile. Shareholders will demand higher
risk premium or higher expected return in the shares of firms which are deemed to
carry higher risk. This in turn, will increase the cost of capital for the firms.
To mitigate those firm-specific risk, portfolio theory suggests firm to
diversify its business activities into several sectors of the economy so that the under-
performing of one sector due to its cyclical downturn can be diversified away
through business activities from other performing sectors of the economy (Zey &
Swenson, 2001). Some firms will even go beyond domestic boundary to venture
into overseas markets in the hope of attaining international diversification to
improve corporate performance (Markides, 1994).
While portfolio theory is in favor of diversification, specialization theory
argues that corporate diversification is inefficient. The specialization theory can
account for diversified firms being traded at a discount compared to single-segment
firms as it runs against one of the oldest ideas in economics; that specialization is
productive. A popular explanation for specialization's prevalence is that firms are
plagued with agency problems that allow managers to enter new businesses (from
which they privately benefit) at the expense of shareholders. Other theory suggests
that it is cheaper and more efficient for shareholders to diversify on their own by
holding a portfolio of stocks than for corporate to diversify by entering into other
area of businesses (Doherty, 2000).
The debate on the role and efficacy of risk management function in
corporation is ongoing, e.g. to specialize or to diversify. However, there are a
number of management theories that endeavor to rationalize the practice of risk
management by firm. They include managerial self-interest, taxes, bankruptcy costs
and capital market imperfections as justification for hedging risk (Crouhy et al.,
2000). Nevertheless, the notion that a robust model of corporate risk management
may contribute in reducing firm-specific risk in order to maximize corporate value
for both proponents of portfolio theory and specialization theory has been generally
accepted.
In an age of frequent spates of terrorist incident occurrences, fierce global
competition, economic shocks and corporate governance challenges, business risks
have never been greater. This adverse environment is compounded with an
increasing number of high-profile corporate governance scandals that had resulted in
corporations facing huge amount of financial losses globally. The aftermath of some
had even threatened the solvency of the corporations concerned. A case in point is
the recent United States financial meltdown in 2008 which was triggered by the sub-
prime mortgage crisis that saw the tumbling of giant institutions like the Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and the American Insurance
Group. The consequences of the crisis are far reaching. Although it started as the
"sub-prime crisis" in the United States in 2007, the impacts mushroomed into a full
blown global recession in 2008 and the remnant effects of which can still be felt in
2010. These incidents have highlighted the urgent need for corporate entities to put
in place a strong and effective risk management mechanism within their business
models to ensure minimum loss and business continuity disruption in the event of
similar incidents recurring.
Every risk has financial implications. Those risks that are not properly
managed by the firm will be priced by the markets. Shareholders will ask for a
discount to the firm's share price and creditors will ask for a risk premium to its debt
instruments. Internally, the firm has to allocate more capital to cushion the depleting
effects from potential perils which can affect the capital reserve thus ensuring
operating solvency of the firms. The added burden on the cost of capital in this
context has become a major concern to corporations. As such, the true cost of capital
and the true cost of equity of the firm depend on the understanding of its level of
risk. The proper management of risks faced by the firm can reduce external capital
cost, hence enhancing capital efficiency. It is vital, therefore, to realize that one
important way of reducing the firm's cost of capital and cost of equity is to take a
strategic view of corporate risk management. This strategic view entails corporations
to actively identify and assess the risks in the course of their operations, and then
develop appropriate ways of controlling or mitigating those risks. Along with this
strategic approach, corporations should advance risk management initiatives into a
value-adding business function. For instance, aligning business processes with the
major operational concerns of the enterprises in this way, namely by focusing on the
risk management area, will be critical to ensure the enterprises' success.
The above assertion of addressing enterprise risks entails corporations to put
in place a functional yet dynamic risk management model within their operating
structure. Such a model can be manifested in a concept known as enterprise risk
management or ERM.
1.5 NEW ORIENTATION TO CORPORATE RISKMANAGEMENT
Enterprise risk management or ERM is a new orientation or paradigm to
corporate risk management (CRM). The conventional CRM method involves risk
management technique such as hedging activities by utilizing such risk management
tools as derivative contracts, e.g. futures and options contracts. The conventional
CRM programs typically aim to address specific financial risks such as credit (e.g.
concentration, securitization, credit derivative), market (e.g. interest rate, currency,
equity, commodity), and liquidity (e.g. refinancing) risks facing the firm. Often
times these risk management activities are carried out in silo and in separation by
various parties within the same firm to suit their individual risk management needs.
For instance, apart from officials managing financial risk, chief information
technology officers similarly manage the information technology infrastructure to
make certain that IT risks are minimized whilst corporate lawyers or internal
auditors manage legal and regulatory risks. Nevertheless, it is seldom that these
officials tasked with risk management responsibilities work together to share risk
oversight information. The recent global financial crisis in 2007/2008 which saw the
collapse of many large global companies in the US and Europe has raised questions
regarding the effectiveness ofconventional risk management practices.
Anew orientation to CRM entails expanding the risk management spectrum
and widening its perspective to include other firm-specific or idiosyncratic risk
factors which are strategic to the firm's operations as well as earnings generation.
Examples of these operational risks are legal, political, reputational, volatility,
settlement, profit, and systemic risks, to name a few. Other risk factors strategic to
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the firm canbe identified through risk mapping1 initiatives undertaken from time to
time amidst the evolvement ofbusiness environment. The ultimate goal of this new
orientation to CRM is to enhance and improve riskoversight.
ERM embodies this new orientation to CRM. ERM calls for not only these
expanded spectrum of risks to be identified and duly managed, but also emphasizes
to manage them in a holistic manner where the approach must be integrated and
aligned to the firm's long-run strategic goals (e.g. not to rely solely on derivative
contracts or insurance policies). Figure 1.1 depicts the comparison between the
traditional approach of CRM with the new orientation to CRM which is embodied in
ERM implementation.
Risk mapping is a technique used to identify possible occurrence of events that will negatively
affect the firm. It involves determining the possible frequency and severity of such occurrence. It
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Figure 1.1: New Orientation to CRM Embodied in ERM
From the figure above, ERM can be regarded as a model or technique to
which the new orientation of CRM is embodied in expanding the spectrum of risk
management as well as in addressing additional aspects of firm-specific or strategic
risks that are essential in value creationfor the firms and shareholders.
The conceptual framework of ERM implementation is built upon the
strategic theory of risk premium in generating value for the firm and shareholders.
This value creating theory is deliberated through the strategic conceptualization of
firm risk premium in managing three classes of risk facing the firm, namely the
tactical, strategic, and normative risks identified by Chatterjee, Lutbatkin and
Schulze(1999).
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The Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) are not oblivious to the new
and heightened challenges facing them in today's business environment and
operating landscape. Many PLCs are in fact constantly in search for new models of
CRM to address these additional risks that are either inadequately or not duly
addressed by the conventional CRM mechanism, e.g. through hedging activities
with derivative contracts. For instance, some risks are not transferrable to counter
parties by way of engaging in derivative contracts. Neither can those risks be cost
effectively transferred to insurers through purchasing insurance policies. Examples
are the operational risks mentioned above. By simply ignoring these risks whilst
having the full knowledge of their very existence does not seem to conform to best
practice of managerial accountability and fiduciary responsibility. Due to this
reason, many PLCs scramble to find a solution (new orientation to CRM) in
addressing such risk factors by operationalizing what they deem are the necessary
processes to tackle these idiosyncratic or strategic risks facing them. However, due
to the novelty in the concept as well as the lack of process standardization of ERM
implementation, many PLCs may not be aware that they are actually attempting to
implement ERM program let alone to ascertain if they are implementing it
effectively.
Thus, this thesis endeavors to define and develop an ERM implementation
model so as to gauge the ERM penetration level (implementation intensity) among
the Malaysian PLCs. Based on the defined ERM implementation model, this thesis
attempts to establish a conceptual framework (with theoretical and empirical
support) on shareholders value maximization of ERM implementation. Specifically,
the framework theorizes positive causal relationship between ERM
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implementation intensity and some perceived ERM benefit measures
manifested through the strategic conceptualization of firm risk premium
identified by Chatterjee, Lutbatkin and Schulze (1999) and this shall form the
core of this thesis. The strategic conceptualization of firm risk premium is referred
to as the CLS model in is thesis and the details of which are presented in section
2.10.
In general, this thesis defines ERM model to be comprised of fourteen
elements and processes. These fourteen elements and processes cover three key
dimensions of the implementation framework, namely the structure, process, and
governance. The operational definition of ERM and the fourteen elements and
processes of its implementation are further discussed in sections 2.8 and 3.7 of this
thesis.
1.6 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a term which was unheard of in the
corporate arena a decade ago. It is fast catching up in the corporate agenda and is
swiftly gaining currency due to changing business practices and escalating
regulatory requirements. Whilst the concept of ERM is widely cited today, there is
no unified definition of the terminology nor is there a standardized operational
framework. There remain great variations in terms of howfirms define, measure and
implement ERM. Nonetheless, at the broader level, there are commonalities in the
way institutions define and perceive ERM. In general, ERM can be defined as a
standard corporate risk management process which undertakes an integrated
approach in viewing and treating all risks. ERM focuses on relating risks and
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aligning risk management initiatives to business objectives and to the overall
corporate strategy in order to attain competitive advantages (Bailey et al., 2004).
ERM is a concept of a holistic approach to corporate risk management. Its
methodology ensures all risk management functions from all parts of the enterprise
to be integrated, as opposed to each of them functioning in silo. ERM
implementation program can be deployed to provide strategies for leveraging risk
management to increase the company value. The program bridges the gap between
corporate finance and risk management. Thus, corporate risk management program
should render a broader, strategic view of risk management that will help the
company finds value in uncertainty and avoids surprises that can blindside the
business and shake up the market.
ERM advocates a holistic method to risk management that enables the firm
to stabilize earnings and reduce the expected costs of external capital, thus
improving the firm's capital efficiency. This in turn, will result in the enhancement
of the firm's value. Bierc (2003) introduced the concept of strategy risk
management (SRM), which is equivalent to the concept of ERM, to embody the
above arguments. Bierc proposed that SRM to be developed and pursued so that the
key drivers that determine the firm's success and value can be identified and are
actively being managed upon.
While enterprise risk management and financial management are
intertwined, many organizations treat them separately. This study is therefore set to
investigate how public listed companies in Malaysia perceive and manage the risks
that emerge in their enterprises. The study will focus on the effects of enterprise risk
management on perceived cost of capital, shareholders value, and business
15
performance of the firm. The study will also examine the challenges for effective
implementation of ERM program.
1.7 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO
CORPORATE MALAYSIA
In the Malaysian scene, the 1997-98 Asian financial crises had exposed the
inherent internal vulnerability of Corporate Malaysia in weathering external shocks.
The outlook for Corporate Malaysia will even be more challenging with the
expected worsening of operating environment due to intense competition brought
about by globalization and market liberalization. The demanding environment will
be compounded by the unpredictable market conditions and future economic
performances due to the aftermath of terrorist attacks in New York and London in
2001 and 2005 respectively and the rise of commodities prices such as that of
petroleum prices. In light of this scenario a study detailing the relevancy and the
effectiveness of a company-wide risk management in ensuring continued positive
business performance and corporate valuation would be significant. Malaysia
operates in an open market economy with its total trade volume amounting to twice
of its annual growth domestic product (GDP). This signifies companies operating in
Malaysia are exposed and susceptible to various forms of shocks, internally or
externally, in the nature of economic, political, religious, cultural, technology,
natural disaster etc.
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Much has been discussed about the importance of risk management program
by corporations and how it can enhance business performance and add to the
corporate value. However, most of the discussion revolves around managing
financial risk for financial institution as well as non-finance corporations (NFCs) by
ways oftransacting in financial derivatives, through hedging activities. There is still
very little discussion on corporate risk management beyond that of managing
financial risk or systematic risk, let alone discussion on company-wide risk
management program especially in the NFCs and the rationale to have, or not to
have such a program. It was not until recently that the concept of enterprise risk
management or ERM has emerged attempting to fill the deficiency of risk
management activities, e.g. hedging, which traditionally only tackles financial risk.
Such an attempt is to answer the need for amore holistic approach with enterprise-
wide perspective of risk management program for corporations. Fundamental
argument on ERM suggests that risk management technique should look beyond
financial risk factor, e.g. interest rate, price, and liquidity risks. It should also
encompass those factors that form the integral part of the business process such as
strategic, operations, legal, political, reputation, governance, and etc.
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1.8 THE MALAYSIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In the light of corporations facing an array of risks in their day-to-day
operations, the consequences of which could potentially reduce or eliminate
investment return to shareholders, Malaysian regulators, i.e. Securities Commission
and Bursa Malaysia, have compelled public listed companies to quantify their
transactional risk exposure in the companies' annual reports, including that ofoff-
balance sheet activities. This is an example ofMalaysian regulators safeguarding the
interest of investing public through regulating accounting standards approach.
However, looking from a more macro level of Malaysian regulatory framework,
there is no specific piece of law that imposes the need for a rigorous corporate or
enterprise risk management program to be implemented by the public listed
companies (PLCs). The closest reference in the Malaysian regulatory framework
demanding Malaysian PLCs to manage risk lies within the Malaysian Code on
Corporate Governance.
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Code) was first issued in
March 2000. It codifies the principles and best practices of good governance and
describes optimal corporate governance structures and internal processes (MICPA,
2008). Looking from the perspective of enterprise risk management, the Code asks
for public listed companies to institute a formal risk management program to
mitigate their business risk. The Code also entails a mandatory reporting of PLCs'
corporate risk management framework in their annual reports. Following is a
summary of the key milestones of the securities commission's corporate governance
reform effort and its consequences, which to a certain extent, encompasses the
corporate or enterprise risk management agenda in Malaysia:
As mentioned earlier the Securities Commission (SC) in March 2000
introduced the first version of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Code).
The Code set out broad principles and best practices of good corporate governance
for Malaysia. Among other things, companies are required by the Listing
Requirements of Bursa Malaysia to include in their annual reports a narrative
statement of how the companies apply the relevant principles of corporate
governance to their particular circumstances. This is to ensure investors have
sufficient disclosure by the listed companies for assessment of companies'
performances and governance practices.
In the case of initial public offering (IPO) exercises, the SC in July 2000
amended the securities and company law aimed at harmonizing the regulatory
regime for issuing listing prospectuses. As a result of this effort, companies poised
for listing are required to include a section of risk factors analysis in their
prospectuses that serves as a reminder to investors on how their investment in the
companies' IPOs can potentially be undermined. The typical risk factors being
described in the prospectuses are (i) investment risks (which include credit, interest
rate, liquidity, market), (ii) risk relating to the shares (which include market history
of shares being offered, shareholding structure, post-listing price movement,
possible failure of share trading, underwriting risk), (iii) risk relating to the
applicability and timeliness of information being furnished, (iv) business risk caused
by political, economic, environmental and social development landscapes, (v)
regulatory risk, (vi) branding risk, and (vii) profit forecasting risk.
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This followed in January 2001 whereby Bursa Malaysia undertook a major
revamp of its Listing Requirements which saw the insertion of new Chapter 15 that
clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of company directors in relation to
corporate governance. In February the same year, the SC issued guidance for
directors of company on Statement ofInternal Control. In July 2002, the Institute of
Internal Auditors issued guidelines on internal audit function. In August 2004, the
SC issued guideline on "Best Practice in Corporate Disclosure". In October 2007,
the SC further revised the Code in a bid to bring Malaysia's corporate governance
framework in line with global best practice. The SC's main revisions were to
strengthen the roles andresponsibilities ofBoard of Directors andAudit Committees
to ensure the effective discharge of their duties. The amendments also spelt out the
eligibility criteria for appointment of directors and the role of the nominating
committees. On audit committee front, it touched on the composition of audit
committee, its meeting frequency and the need for continuous training. In addition,
the revised Code required internal audit functions in all public listed companies. It
also clarified the reporting line for internal auditors (SC, 2007).
Albeit the corporate governance reform efforts undertaken by the SC since
the year 2000 to date, the fact remains that the requirement for PLCs to institute a
formal corporate/enterprise risk management framework to manage their business
risks has been modestly set within the corporate governance best practices regime.
In other words, the corporate risk management requirement does not come from a
specific piece of law whose rigor is comparable to that of the United States or the
Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Nor is it comparable to the Australian and
New Zealand risk management standards (i.e. AS/NZS 4360:2004).
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For instance, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Code) describes
six principal responsibilities of the Board. Out of the six principal responsibilities,
one is directly linked to corporate risk management requirement, namely
"identifying principal risks and implement appropriate systems to manage risk". The
other five principal responsibilities are (1) "reviewing and adopting a strategic plan
for the company", (2) "overseeing the conduct of the company's business to evaluate
whether the business is being properly managed", (3) "succession planning,
including appointing, training, fixing the compensation of and where appropriate,
replacing senior management", (4) "developing and implementing an investor
relation program or shareholder communications policy for the company", and (5)
"reviewing the adequacy and the integrity of the company's internal control systems
and management information systems, including system for compliance with
applicable laws, regulations, rules, directives and guidelines" (SC, 2007).
At first glance, the last mentioned principal responsibility above (i.e.
reviewing the adequacy and the integrity of the company's internal control systems
and management information systems....) seems to be also linked to enterprise risk
management. Nonetheless, internal control system relates more towards internal
auditing exercise which is to ensure that enterprise's business transactions that have
taken place comply with the stipulated standard operating procedures or SOP. On
the other hand, corporate or enterprise risk management in its stricter sense entails a
more forward looking perspectives in managing risk where its initiatives are deemed
to be more preemptive in nature. The fact that corporate risk management
requirement in Malaysia does not come from a dedicated law which ideally would
codify clearly its principles, framework, methods and processes has resulted in it not
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being able to render a severe legal consequences for non-compliance of its
implementation by the PLCs. Hence, it gives rise to the issue of penetration level
and effectiveness of corporate/enterprise risk management practices among the
PLCs.
This regulatory scenario is in stark contrast to that of under the law of SOX.
In the United States for instance, public listed company officials such as CEOs,
financial controllers, and external auditors are required to sign-off under oath
confirming the accuracy and validity of information provided in the financial
statements issued to the public. The law also asks for confirmation on the
effectiveness of internal control system and risk management processes that are
being implemented by the enterprises. Failing which, harsh punishment including
imprisonment awaits those company officials. Such is the severity of the
consequence of breaching the SOX law that corporate risk management has become
a crucial and integral part and the preoccupation of the day-to-day managerial
function among Corporate America's top executives.
1.9 THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND ERM
Both external and internal factors within which the firms operate have
influenced the adoption of the ERM program. The major external influences
demanding the firms to a more holistic approach of risk management include (i)
globalization, (ii) industry consolidation, (iii) deregulation, (iv) increased regulatory
attention to corporate governance, (v) technological progress that enables better risk
quantification and analysis. On the other hand, the internal factors are centered on an
emphasis to maximize shareholder wealth (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003).
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In summary, ERM has captured the attention of risk management
professionals and academics worldwide. Unlike the traditional "silo-based"
approach to corporate risk management, ERM enables firms to benefit from an
integrated approach in managing risk that shifts the focus of risk management
function from primarily defensive to increasingly offensive and strategic. Findings
of a study by Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) suggested that more highly leveraged
firms are more likely to appoint a chief risk officer (CRO) than other firms of a
similar size that operate in the same industry to handle organization's risk exposure.
For a firm to have a robust and effective ERM capability indeed is to possess an
invaluable intangible asset in its stable of resources for its productive capitalization.
In the era where global economicparadigm has shifted from one that values tangible
assets to one that increasingly favors intangible assets (Starbiz, 2008b), Corporate
Malaysia like their counterparts in the developed economies, can rely more on
intangible assets, such as that of ERM capability,' to generate economic value for
themselves.
1.10 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The scenario of corporate risk management of Malaysian public listed
companies and its regulatory implication presents a backdrop of stark contrast to the
essence of enterprise risk management between Corporate Malaysia and Corporate
America. Whilst ERM is still relatively new to Corporate America, it will be just as
novel to the Malaysian corporate constituents. This is especially so when it comes to
ERM philosophy, concept, objectives, and the manner for its implementation.
Hence, there is a big question mark enveloping the curiosity that whether or
not the Malaysian public listed companies can effectively implement or are able to
fully internalize the ERM. Even if the public listed companies themselves are
doubtful of the extent to which the implementation of ERM can add value to the
firms, they may still have to institute some initiatives of ERM program to, at the
very least, meet the regulatory compliance requirement. Albeit so, the Malaysian
public listed companies at present can still afford time and room to improve their
learning curve for the effective implementation of ERM as the regulatory and
stakeholders expectations of it are relatively not as high as those seen in the United
States and elsewhere with more advanced and matured market condition. However,
it is foreseeable that sooner rather than later, we can expect the Malaysian
regulators, i.e. the Securities Commission and the Bursa Malaysia, as well as other
stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, creditors, rating agencies, to step up their demand
and expectation for the standard and intensity of an effective organizational risk
management via ERM implementation. Needless to say, to entice Corporate
Malaysia to wholeheartedly put in place a robust yet dynamic ERM program, they
have to be convinced that such effort and investment, in meeting regulatory
compliance apart, will bring about true value adding effect to their firms.
The challenge to ERM implementation is compounded by the fact that
despite risk management is an essential part of prudent business management, its
justification is at times difficult to come by. This is because the benefits which
ERM generates may not be explicit or tangible in the short run. On the other hand,
the costs associated with its implementation are often too visible.
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Nonetheless, there was hardly any well researched framework and model on
the subject matter in the Malaysian setting from which Corporate Malaysia can
make reference. It will be of great interest to find out, therefore, if most of the
practices of corporate risk management by listed companies in Malaysia are driven
merely for the sake of regulatory compliance or if they really bring about tangible
and significant benefit to companies through the effective implementation of them.
It is also important to find out the direction and strength of relationships, among the
numerous factors intertwining in the concept of ERM modeling which is
underpinned by theories from portfolio management, risk management, information
economics, and strategy. Since there are limited empirical studies related to this
area, much less in the Malaysian context, the efficacy of corporate risk management
via ERM among Malaysian listed companies warrant examination.
1.11 THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The aim of this study is fourfold. First, it attempts to examine the depth of
penetration of ERM practices among the public listed companies in Malaysia. This
is done through the measurement of a metric that gauges the ERM implementation
intensity of the public listed companies.
Second, it proposes an enterprise risk management (ERM) implementation
framework. From the proposed ERM framework, it examines how an effective
implementation process Of ERM, i.e. implementation intensity, will bring about
value-enhancing outcome, i.e. perceived ERM benefit measures, to the Malaysian
corporations. Besides, this thesis also examines how the challenges during the ERM
implementation process affect such implementation intensity and perceived ERM
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benefit measures. Hence, this study attempts to create a perceptual causal
relationship model relating these variables. In the process, the study has (i)
developed a conceptualframework of risk premium in relation to support a practical
framework for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), and (ii) developed a predictive
model {practicalframework) to anticipate value-adding ERM successes in corporate
Malaysia.
Third, this study analyzes the primary reasons for firms engaging in
enterprise risk management despite the lucid argument from the neo-classical
finance theory that such risk management program, especially risk management for
firms' unsystematic risk, is futile. In this light, this study scrutinizes several risk
management value maximization theories and their corresponding hypotheses to
justify for ERM's implementation. The most cited hypotheses in literature justifying
corporate risk management activities such as that of ERM are in the areas of profit
maximization, financial distress cost, lowering tax burden, costly external financing,
credit rating, equity market reward, informational asymmetries, and agency cost.
Fourth, this study investigates the validity of a conceptual transmission
mechanism for shareholders value creation of the proposed ERM framework. This
conceptual value creation transmission mechanism is via a strategic risk premium
model. The cited strategic risk premium model categorizes three classes of
unsystematic risk to which firms can manage in order to create value for
shareholders. These three classes of unsystematic risk are tactical risk, strategic risk,
and normative risk.
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Therefore, the specific objectives in which this study aims to achieve are as
follows:
1. to examine the depth of penetration of ERM practices among the
Malaysian public listed companies
2. to investigate the causal relationship between the factors of ERM
implementation intensity and the factors of perceived ERM benefit
measures in the proposed ERM framework
3. to investigate the causal relationship between the factors of ERM
implementation challenge and the factors of ERM implementation intensity
in the proposed ERM framework
4. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the cost of financial distress hypothesis
5. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the tax burden hypothesis
6. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the costly external financing hypothesis
7. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the credit rating hypothesis
8. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the equity market reward hypothesis
9. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework vis-a-vis the informational asymmetries hypothesis
10. to scrutinize the significance of the proposed ERM impiementation
framework vis-a-vis the agency problem hypothesis
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11. to examine the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework in relation to reducing the firm's tactical risk
12. to examine the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework in relation to reducing the firm's strategic risk
13. to examine the significance of the proposed ERM implementation
framework in relation to reducing the firm's normative risk
1.12 BRIEF STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES
In developing an ERM implementation model, a series of hypotheses have
been tested by the author concerning the relationship between the implementation
intensity, perceived ERM benefit measures, and the implementation challenge. In
particular it is investigated as whether there is a positive causal relationship between
implementation intensity and perceived ERM benefit measures, and whether there is
a negative causal relationship between implementation challenge and
implementation intensity.
From the results of these tests, a generalization of successful ERM
implementation regarding perceived ERM benefit measures and a generalization of
ERM implementation challenges toward ERM implementation intensity among
corporate Malaysia are determined. Details of the results follow in Chapter 4. Figure
1.2 depicts, in a simple form, what the practical framework will look like. The
direction of the causal relationships, indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.2, shows
that ERM implementation intensity will affect perceived ERM benefit measures
whilst implementation challenge will affect implementation intensity. The
hypothesized directions of these arrows are determined based on conceptual
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frameworks of Cummins et al.(1998), Smith and Stulz (1985), Markides (1994),
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Chapman (2003), Meagher and O'Neil (2000), Stoke
(2004), Bierc (2003), Crouhy et al.(2006), Bailey et al. (2004), Belmont (2004), Lam
(2003), Bettis (1983).










Figure 1.2: Anoutline of thepath diagram of the practical framework
1.13 THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The scope of this thesis involves the discussion of three frameworks, i.e. the
theoretical, conceptual, and practical framework. The theoretical framework
presents the theoretical foundations underpinning the underlying conceptual and
practical frameworks. Whereas the conceptual framework features a value-creating
ERM framework via a strategic risk premium model. The strategic risk premium
model underscores positive risk premium (cost of capital) impacts from managing
firm-specific (unsystematic) risks.
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The discussion involves the rebuttal of the conventional notions of capital
asset pricing model relating to managing firm-specific risks. The core of the
empirical testing of this thesis is built on the practical framework, i.e. the
development of the perceptual causal relationship model in determining the effects
of successful ERM implementation among the PLCs, as well as the validation of
value maximization hypotheses of ERM practices and the value creation
transmission mechanism ofERM implementation via a strategic conceptualization
of risk premium model. For instance, the practical framework provides empirical
testing of the significance of causal relationships among the dimensions of three
constructs in the proposed ERM framework: ERM implementation challenge, ERM
implementation intensity, and perceived ERM benefit measures. The practical
framework forms partof theconceptual framework.
In the light ofthese discussions, this thesis should help to improve enterprise
risk management practices by the firms.
1.14 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Previous research works on corporate risk management were mainly
concentrated on financial risk management and corporate performance such as
Markides (1994), Zey & Swenson (2001). Other studies looked at management
theories to justify and rationalize the practice of risk management by the firm
(Crouhy et al, 2000). The Portfolio Theory advocates the importance of
diversification to obtain to the best risk-reward tradeoff. The Capital Asset Pricing
Theory (CAPM) on the other hand, offers a model to price risk based on the
covariance of portfolio risk and the market risk. Firm-specific risk is irrelevant in
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determining risk premium in CAPM equation. The assumptions in CAPM actually
nullify the value of corporate risk management in reducing firm-specific risk. The
CAPM theorizes that all firm-specific activities are unsystematic and, hence, not
correlated with risk premium (Chatterjee et. al., 1999).
However, there are very few empirical studies on an enterprise-wide practice
of risk management framework, particularly one with the emphasis over and above
that of financial risk management, and its impact of corporate performance. ERM is
one such enterprise-wide risk management framework. The lack of studies in this
area is probably due to the fact that ERM framework entails managers to engage in
initiatives which are seen to reduce firm-specific risks. As mentioned before, most
finance theories such as that of CAPM posit that all firm-specific activities are
irrelevant in influencing a firm's risk premium. Strategic theories, however, give due
recognition to such initiatives in supporting corporate performance and value. In
addition, there is also no in-depth research that studies the critical success factors on
the effective implementation of enterprise-wide risk management program,
especially in the Malaysian context.
This study will contribute to the body of knowledge by filling the gap to
CAPM's challenge to the field of corporate risk management by examining
empirically a practical framework of ERM which forms the building block for a
value-enhancing strategic model of risk premium (see Figure 3.5). The other
contribution of this study is the development of a predictive model in anticipating
ERM. successes in Corporate Malaysia built through examining the relevant factors
of ERM implementation intensity, ERM implementation challenge, and perceived
ERM benefit measures. Several statistical procedures have been employed for the
analytic model, chief of which are factor analysis and structural equation modeling.
The discussion and interpretation of the theoretical, conceptual, and practical
frameworks link the strategic theory, theory of risk management, modern portfolio
theory, diversification and specialization theory, theory of cost of capital, theory of
performance measurement, theory of corporate valuation, in making a conclusion
and generalization on the role, efficacy and the effectiveness of Enterprise Risk
Management for Malaysian public listed companies.
1.15 CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY
The results of this study will benefit corporate Malaysia in that it will
validate and vindicate the role of enterprise risk management in reducing firm-
specific risk profile, hence, improves corporate valuation through the reduction of
the firms' cost of capital (risk premium). As our markets are imperfect with limited
and costly resources, it is imperative for individuals who manage the firms to have
insights into factors of firm-environment interface which are able to reduce firms'
cost of capital. Firms that investors perceive as being risky incur higher costs when
raising capital. Higher capital costs can put a firm at a competitive disadvantage vis
a-vis its rivals who have access to lower capital costs (Chatterjee etal., 1999).
In addition, firms will be able to improve their relation with regulators and
shareholders by presenting a comprehensive ERM framework. Informational friction
between the management and stakeholders/investors due to asymmetric information
on how the management handles corporate risk can be minimized. This will result in
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the reduction of the cost ofdoing business, especially during the time of financial
distress (Froot et al, 1993).
At the operational level, the analytic model developed in the study may lend
reference to Malaysian firms for adaptation of their own internal risk management
modeling. Having a good risk management framework and analytic model will
permit Malaysian firms to effectively allocate regulatory or economic capital
necessary to cover their given level of risk exposures. It will also help firms to
incorporate the cost of risk into their product pricing. Besides, it will enable firms to
adopt a risk-adjusted based of performancemeasurement.
1.16 CHAPTERS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The topics for each chapter are as
follows: Chapter 1 - Introduction, Chapter 2 - Literature Review, Chapter 3 -
Research Design and Methodology, Chapter 4 - Finding and Analysis, and Chapter
5 - Discussion and Conclusion.
As has been presented thus far, Chapter 1 provides the backdrop of the core
topic ofdiscussion in this thesis, i.e. enterprise risk management. The chapter begins
with theintroduction to thehistory ofcorporate risk management. Reference is made
to the risk management practices in the banking sector; the pioneer among the many
business sectors in the modern corporate history in formalizing risk management
system within its management structure. Discussion on the corporate risk
management is then led to preliminary reference to the modern portfolio theory. The
subject of corporate risk management then evolves into the concept of enterprise risk
management (ERM), a relatively new managerial concept being introduced to the
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corporate and academic worlds in recent time. The concept of ERM and its
relevance to the Malaysian corporate scene are then defined. This includes the
discussion of ERM vis-a-vis the Malaysian regulatory framework that calls for its
implementation. The driving forces which contribute to the thriving of ERM's
acceptance and popularity are discussed. The chapter then moves to present the
problem statement ofthis study. Discussion follows suit with the presentation ofthis
study's aim and objectives, brief statement ofhypotheses, and the scope, significant,
and contribution of this study.
Chapter 2 presents the review ofrelevant literature pertinent to the topic and
core subject of this study. The topics laid out in this chapter can be broadly
demarcated into three parts. The first part covers the areas of the history and
meaning of risk as well as the definition of risk management. The second part
relates to the operationalization of enterprise risk management (ERM). The third
part features ERM's value creation transmission mechanism. The literatures
reviewed are organized and presented in the following topics: (1) risk introductory,
(2) evolution of risk management, (3) concepts of risk management, (4) empirical
research in enterprise risk management, (5) theoretical arguments for corporate risk
management, (6) value propositions of corporate risk management, (7) managing
risk individually vis-a-vis the integrated approach, (8) the operational definition of
ERM, (9) the theoretical foundations of ERM, (10) a strategic conceptualization of
risk premium. Discussion of the literature review in Chapter 2 provides the
foundations for the development of the theoretical, conceptual and practical
frameworks. The core of the literature discussion for the theoretical framework
provides the rebuttal of the neo-classical finance theory notion in relation to
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managing firm's unsystematic risk. Whereas that for the conceptual framework
expounds the strategic conceptualization ofrisk premium model which espouses the
value creation transmission mechanism of ERM whilst the literature review for the
practical framework provides the building blocks for defining the pertinent
dimensions of the proposed ERM implementation model. The incorporation of the
theoretical, conceptual, and practical frameworks characterizes this study's overall
ERM framework. Figure 1.3 portrays the essence of which the presentation of










Figure 1.3: Literature Underpinning the Overall ERMFramework
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Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology of the study. It
highlights the conceptual and practical frameworks of the theorized ERM
proposition of the thesis. The conceptual framework presents the overall theorized
proposition of a shareholder's value creating ERM model whose theoretical
underpinning is derived from the discussion of literature review in Chapter 2. This
thesis refers to the theoretical underpinning as the theoretical framework for the
study. The conceptual framework is embodied by three sections, i.e. (i) an ERM
practical framework, (ii) a strategic conceptualization of risk premium model, and
(iii) ERM value maximization hypotheses for business performance. All these three
sections are connected to engender value for shareholders through reducing firms'
cost of capital (risk premium) and attaining some measures ofbusiness performance.

















Figure 1.4: The Conceptual Framework of the Study
The practical framework on the other hand, is a subset of the overall
conceptual framework. It illustrates the study's proposed ERM implementation
model which encompasses the theorized causal relationships among the pertinent
constructs, i.e. implementation intensity, implementation challenge, and perceived
benefitmeasures, as well as the constructs' respective factors.
37
The posited conceptualization of firms' risk premium model serves as a
value creation transmission mechanism for ERM implementation toward the
reduction of firms' risk premium and cost of capital, to which they lead to value
creation for shareholders.
The ERM value maximization theory make inference to the hypotheses of
minimizing the cost of financial distress, reducing tax burden, avoiding costly
external financing, agency problem, and informational asymmetries theories of
corporate risk management, to name a few, to deliver enhanced business
performance for the firms.
The chapter proceeds with the discussion on the development of various
hypotheses for empirical testing. Three groups of hypotheses are developed for the
testing of their validity. Each for the three sections embodying the conceptual
framework mentioned earlier. For instance, the first group of hypotheses is to test on
the significance of causal relationships among constructs and factors in the practical
framework, the second group of hypotheses are to validate the value creation
transmission mechanism of the conceptualization of the strategic risk premium
model for ERM implementation, and the third group of hypotheses are to test on the
ERM value maximization theory.
The chapter also presents the study's research design, the target population,
sampling frame, sampling size, and sampling method for data collection through
questionnaire survey to the public listed companies (PLCs) on the Malaysian stock
market - the Bursa Malaysia. Constructs measurement and variables scale are
discussed in the chapter.
38
The last section of Chapter 3 is dedicated to the study's analytic models.
There are two primary analytic models, namely structural equation modeling (SEM)
and bivariate Pearson correlation analysis. Factor analysis is also performed serving
as the foundation in building up the proposed structural equation modeling for a
value creating ERM implementation framework. Specifically, SEM analysis is
employed to test on the hypothesized causal relationships among constructs and
factors in the practical framework, i.e. the ERM implementation model. The
bivarate correlation tests are performed to test on the associative significance
between ERM implementation (independent variable) and the various items
(dependent variables) embodying the strategic conceptualization of firms' risk
premium (ERM value creating transmission mechanism) and the ERM value
maximization theory for business performance in testingfor theirvalidity. The SEM
and bivariate correlation analyses together close the analytic loop for examining the
validity of the overall conceptual framework of the shareholders value creating ERM
proposition of this thesis.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis and findings of the study. It first provides
the background of the survey exercise, its execution method, the population under
study, the targeted respondents, the questionnaire design, and the sampling method.
The chapter then discusses the frequency distribution analysis of the various
statements in the questionnaire relating to the ERM penetration level among the
public listed companies. This is followed by discussion on the results and findings of
reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory analysis, bivariate
Pearson product moment correlation test and structural equation modeling analysis.
All the results are then related to the examination of the various hypotheses that
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have been developed. Examination of the various hypotheses is organized into three
sections, namely (i) the hypotheses on the causal relationship among constructs and
factors of the ERM practical framework through SEM analysis, (ii) the hypotheses
on the ERM value maximization ofbusiness performances through bivariate Pearson
product moment correlation test, and (iii) the hypotheses on ERM value creation
transmission mechanism of the strategic risk premium model through bivariate
Pearson product moment correlation test. Figure 1.5 depicts a graphical
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Figure 1.5: The Hypotheses Examination and Analytic Model
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Chapter 5 represents the final chapter for the thesis. It presents the
discussion and conclusion of the thesis to provide an overall yet meaningful
perspective by connecting all the discussions that are being presented from chapter 1
to chapter 4. Specifically, this chapter interprets in a holistic manner of the findings
relates to the conceptual and practical frameworks ofthis study. Discussion is also
presented for the outcome of the factor model and the endogenous constructs in the
structural equation modeling analysis. It then follows with the discussion on the
significance of the dynamic (strategic) framework of the firms' risk premium, i.e.
the theorized ERM value creation transmission mechanism via managing firm-
specific risk. The implications of the various findings are discussed. The limitations
of the research vis-a-vis the interpretation of the findings are clearly stated. This
provides caveat to any further inference of the analysis findings to be made. A
conclusion to all the salient points of the results and findings of this study is also
presented. Finally, before the chapter closes, it takes stock of the status of
achievement ofthe many research objectives that have been set out to accomplish at
the onset of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INRODUCTION: RISK
2.1.1 Risk and Human History
Risk, and its management, has long existed in human history albeit at its
most primary and purest form. Its aim is to ensure the very survival of mankind
through the trying time offacing all problems for living. As mentioned by Vaughan
(1997, p.2), "the entire history of human species is a chronology of exposure to
misfortune and adversity and of efforts to deal with these risks". Vaughan (1997,
p.2) professed that the continued existence of human being as a species, indeed, is
"testimony to the success of our ancestors in managing risk". The major risks faced
by primitive man in the early days of human history were those related to extreme
weather, hunger, ferocious beasts, all of which made up hazardous living
environment. Similar to other animals, these primitive man's initial responses to
these risks were ones that went without involving any cognitive process; merely
through instinctive reaction such as fleeing the scene when confronted with vicious
wild animals. Throughout the time, however, with the ability to learn, they would
avoid dangerous areas and situations (Vaughan, 1997).
Nonetheless, Vaughan (1997) cast doubt that the instinctive reaction and
learned behavior are sufficient explanation of why our ancestors succeeded in
managing the risks they faced. Vaughan (1997) reasoned that other humanlike
creatures, such as Homo erectus and Homo Sapiens nean-derthalensis, which were
physically larger and stronger, did not succeed in their risk management for survival
despite employing the same responses in facing those risks. Vaughan opined that
modern humans {Homo Sapiens Sapiens) "survived and flourished" because "men
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and women think, and it is in their ability to think that they deal with risks in ways
that are different from those of other creatures" (1997, p.2). The thinking nature of
human being in facing and dealing with risk has enabled them to anticipate adversity
and to prepare for it (Vaughan, 1997).
Kloman (2003) could not agree more that life is full of uncertainties and that
events of human history are a string of endeavors to understand unexpected events.
Kloman took religious and spiritual perspectives in explaining how man deals with
overwhelmed uncertainty in life. According to him, man would attribute natural
disaster such as floods, storms, lightning bolts and social affairs such as success in
battle and love to gods or fate. As such, in order to hinder disaster from befalling
upon them or to triumph in social activities, men and women prayed to gods. In
many instances men and women would also make offerings and even human
sacrifices to propitiate the divine spirits (Kloman, 2003).
Relationship between human nature and characteristics with that of risk and
uncertainty in life which underscore the drive for risk management is well spelt out
in the 1966 study of saints, sinners, madmen and gurus, Feet of Clay, by Anthony
Storr. In the study, Storr described doubt and uncertainty as "distressing conditions
from which men and women passionately desire release... As a species, we are
intolerant of chaos and have a strong predilection for finding and inventing
order... Certainty is hugely seductive" (Storr quoted by Kloman, 2003).
Nevertheless, the existence of uncertainty in life is not necessarily a negative or
counter-productive phenomenon. The Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman
held a contrarian view from Storr which linked uncertainty and risk taking to the
progression of human civilization and development. Feynman noted that "it is in the
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admission of ignorance and the admission of uncertainty that there is hope for the
continuous motion of human beings in some direction that does not get confined,
permanently blocked, as it has so many times before in various periods in the history
of man" (Kloman, 2003). With the ability to learn, man studied their encounters
with uncertainty of events that had happened such as natural disaster and realized
that some events occur within a pattern (Kloman, 2003). Soon, they took up the
challenge to confront uncertainty and to determine the causes of various
misfortunes. And as Kloman put it, "they began to create measurable risk from
immeasurable uncertainty."
Another literature that serves as, perhaps, the best chronicle of human
progress to treating uncertainty as "risk" rather than attributing it to gods' act is
Peter Bernstein's Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (Kloman, 2003).
Bernstein wrote: "The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern
times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that future is more than a whim
of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature. Until human
beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was a mirror of the past or
a murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge of
anticipated events" (Bernstein quoted by Kloman, 2003). Man, according to
Kloman (2003), treated uncertainty as risk through the application of experience,
numbers and probability. This manner of how men and women dealt with
uncertainty is, as Vaughan (1997) pointed out, one of the very defining
characteristics of humanity.
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20th century saw the most progress being made in understanding of risk and
the comprehension of its measurement through academic discourse and socio
economic policy formulation. According to Kloman (2003), the key milestones of
the progress could be related to the following:
'Otto von Bismarck introduced social security and workers'
compensation in Germany in the late 1800s, from which these ideas
spread to Europe and the United States in the early 1900s'.
'Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty & Profit (1921) celebrated the
prevalence of surprise and separated risk from uncertainty. He
cautioned against over-reliance on extrapolating the past into the
future'.
'John Maynard Keynes' Treatise on Probability (1921) cited the
importance of perception and introduced us to the Law of Great
Numbers'.
'Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1926 and 1953) created the theory
of games and strategy and suggested that the goal of not losing is
often superior to that ofwinning'.
Markowitz (1952) developed portfolio analysis, including new
aspects ofreturn and variances'.
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2.1.2 Defining Risk
According to Holton (2004), there are limited definitions ofrisk provided by
financial literature albeit the discussions of risk are aplenty. Like Kloman (2003),
Holton (2004) pointed out that one has to explore two streams that flew through the
20c century in the quest to understand risk, namely subjective probability and
operationalism. Both streams, according to Holton (2004), were originated from the
same source in the empiricism of David Hume (1784).
Hume (1784) provided the philosophical roots ofsubjective interpretations of
probability with the following account:
"Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our
ignorance ofthe real cause ofany event has the same influence
on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or
opinion (p.55)".
Among the revolutionary reports of subjective probability include those of Frank
Ramsey (1931), Bruno deFinetti (1937), and Leonard Savage (1954).
The most famous definition of risk came from Frank Knight (1921). Knight
(1921) provided an objeetivist perspective during a period of active research into
foundations of probability. The debate during this period relates to subjective versus
objective interpretations of probability (Holton, 2004). The difference between the
objeetivist views and the subjective interpretations of probability is that the former
asserts that probabilities may be discovered through statistical analyses, hence they
are real. The contemporaneous research relating to the objeetivist views of
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probabilities includes John Maynard Keyenes (1921), Richard von Mises (1928),
and Andrey Kolmogorov (1933) (Holton, 2004). On the other hand, the subjective
interpreters view probabilities as human beliefs as they are being specified in
accordance to individuals' own characterization of uncertainty. As such,
probabilities are not intrinsic to nature as in the view of these subjectivists (Holton,
2004).
Putting the objeetivist view of probabilities into perspective, Knight (1921)
for instance, opined that "propositions have intrinsic probabilities of being true or
false" (Knight quoted by Holton, 2004, p. 19). Knight illustrated two different
manners from which probabilities are derived as follows: (i) a priori probabilities
which are obtained from inherent symmetries, as in the throw of a die, and (ii)
statistical probabilities that are derived through analysis of homogenous data
(Knight quoted by Holton, 2004). According to Holton (2004), Knight was critical
on the subjective interpretation of probability (through opinions formed) without the
presence of symmetry or homogenous data. Knight (1921) asserted that a priori and
statistic probabilities embody "measurable uncertainty" and opinions denote
"immeasurable uncertainty". Knight (1921) then came up with the following
terminology in place for the terms "objective probability" and "subjective
probability" (Knight quoted by Holton, 2004, p.20):
"Topreserve the distinction ... between the measurable
uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the
term 'risk' to designate the former and the term
'uncertainty'for the latter" (p.233).
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Therein lies the famous definition of "risk" by Knight where the term "risk"
relates to objective probabilities whilst the term "uncertainty" concerns with
subjective probabilities. It was this distinction from Knight in regard to risk and
uncertainty that it had effectively made for the economic importance of these
concepts. Further more, Knight (1921) had also linked profits, entrepreneurship and
the very existence of the free enterprise system to risk and uncertainty. As a result of
Knight's treatise, economists like John Hicks (1931), John Maynard Keynes (1936,
1937), Michal Kalecki (1937), Helen Makower and Jacob Marschak (1938), George
J. Stigler (1939), Gerhard Tintner (1941a, 1941b), A.G. Hart (1942) and Oskar
Lange (1944), started to take risk or uncertainty into account to discuss subjects like
profits, investment decisions, demand for liquid assets, the financing, size and
structure of firms, production flexibility, inventory holdings, etc. (SCEPA, 2010).
However, there is a weakness in Knight's definition of risk. Knight's
definition of risk only touches on probability and uncertainty but left out the element
of exposure, or the possible consequences of facing such an uncertainty. This is a
contentious area of Knight's definition of risk among his critics (Holton, 2004).
Essentially, Frank Knight (1921) had established a very clear distinction
between the meaning of risk and uncertainty in his seminal work Risk, Uncertainty,
and Profit when he wrote:
"...Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically
distinctfrom thefamiliar notion of Risk, from which it
has never been properly separated. The term 'risk', as
loosely used in everyday speech and in economic
discussion, really covers two things which, functionally
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at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena of
economic organization, are categorically different. ...
The essential fact is that 'risk' means in some cases a
quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other
times it is something distinctly not of this character;
and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in
the bearings ofthe phenomenon depending on which of
the two is really present and operating. ...It will appear
that a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we
shall use the term, is so far different from an
unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty
at all. We ... accordingly restrict the term 'uncertainty'
to cases ofthe non-quantitive type" (p.19).
2.1,3 Operational Definitions ofRisk: The Nature and Meaning ofRisk
Holton (2004) provided a further definition about risk in an apparent attempt
to address the shortcoming of Knight's (1921) definition of risk. Holton asserted
that risk entails two essential components, namely (i) exposure, and (ii) uncertainty.
He defined exposure as if someone cares about certain outcome of an event and that
the person is 'exposed' if she has a personal interest in what transpires. Apart from
that, Holton (2004) defined uncertainty as a situation where people do not know
what will happen to a particular event, e.g. venturing into a new business or asking
for someone's hand in a marriage. In other words, the outcome of that particular
event is uncertain. Hence, risk is present in an event or situation which manifests
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these two elements of exposure and uncertainty. In his words, Holton concluded that
risk "is exposure to a proposition of which one is uncertain" (p.22).
Holton (2004) highlighted an interesting point in relation to the condition of
risk and made clear distinction in regard to the actual bearer of risk and the conduit
through which risk is borne. To illustrate, Holton argued that risk is a condition of
individuals who are self-aware like human beings and animals. Thus, organizations,
companies, and governments are incapable of being at risk since they are not self-
aware. Instead, they are merely conduits through which individuals such as
members, investors, employees, voters, and the likes assume risk. Hence,
institutions like companies are not risk takers as commonly recognized by financial
risk management literature.
A case in point is the imposition of increased accountability of managers
through the Sarbane-Oxley Act in the US and Japan which increases those
managers' career risk but tends to reduce price risk for shareholders. This scenario
suggests the existence of a possible conflict of interest among the various
stakeholders in otherwise a seemingly noble idea and straight forward situation of
managing risk. In view of this context, Holton (2004) begged the question to the
field of financial risk management as to whose risks are actually being managed?
Despite the definition of risk in the dimensions of exposure and uncertainty,
Holton (2004) acknowledged that his definition of risk is inadequate from an
operational standpoint. This is because the notions of exposure and uncertainty are
intuitive, hypothetical, and unobservable. According to Holton, in the case of
exposure, one can be exposed without being aware of the exposure. In the case for
uncertainty on the other hand, one can be uncertain without realizing it. Holton
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argued that exposure and uncertainty that are not perceived cannot be defined
operationally. As such, he stressed that it is impossible to operationally define risk
although he reckoned that one can operationally define the perception of exposure
and uncertainty, hence operationally define his perception of risk. In this light,
Holton (2004) concluded that there is no true risk.
In the absence of true risk, practitioners of finance employ subjective
probabilities to operationally define perceived uncertainty. Industry practitioners
also embrace utility or state preferences to operationally define perceived exposure.
However, since perceived risk presents itself in various forms, it is rather
challenging to operationally define it. As an optimized solution, industry
practitioners operationally define certain aspects ofperceived risk. For instance,
Markowitz used risk metrics to define specific aspects of perceived risk, e.g.
variance of return or maximum likely credit exposure (Holton 2004). In present
days, industry practitioners employ various risk metrics in financial application such
as setting risk limits, trader performance-based compensation, portfolio
optimization, and capital allocation. In the application to set limit to market risk for
instance, the popular risk metrics to employ are delta, beta, and value-at-risk
(Holton, 2004).
A bigger question remains though. That in the absence of true risk, how can
one quantify risks that cannot be perceived? Are risk metrics still useful and
representative in the case that they might not reflect some of the unperceived risks in
a particular application? Holton (2004, p.24) opined that it is meaningless to ask the
above questions. What is more important and pertinent to ask is that whether a risk
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metric is useful, and that whether the use of risk metric in a given application will
"promote behavior that management considers desirable".
2.1.4 The Application ofRisk
The application of risk in finance discipline was made prominent by Harry
Markowitz's theory of portfolio selection. In his 1952 paper nonetheless,
Markowitz did not explicitly offer the definition of risk. Rather, Markowitz (1952)
implied risk with the term "variance of return" as "anundesirable thing" through the
proposed investing rule which stipulates that (Markowitz quoted by Holton, 2004,
P.21):
"... the investors does (or should) consider expected
return a desirable thing and variance of return an
undesirable thing" (p. 77).
Perhaps Markowitz's (1952) closest inference to the definition of risk was speltout
when he further wrote to describe that many authors "treat risk as akin to variance of
return" as follows (Markowitz quoted by Holton, 2004, p.21):
"The concepts 'yield' and 'risk' appear frequently in
financial writings. Usually if the term 'yield' were
replaced by 'expectedyield' or 'expected return', and
'risk' by 'variance ofreturn', little change ofapparent
meaning would results " (p. 89).
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Holton (2004) noted that these two statements from Markowitz (1952) suggest that
variance of return might be a proxy for risk.
At present, there are many other definitions of risk and uncertainty that vary
by specific application and situational context (Hubbard, 2009). For instance, the
Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Services2, defines risk as "the product of
the probability of a hazard resulting in an adverse event, times the severity of the
event" OHSAS (2007). In another definition, the term "risk" is referred to as the
future issues which can be avoided or mitigated, rather than present problems that
must be immediately addressed.
In finance, risk is often defined as the unexpected variability or volatility of
returns. This variability of returns includes both the worse-than-expected as well as
better-than-expected outcomes. Some refer to this upside "better-than-expected"
variation as "positive risk" whilst to the downside "worse-than-expected" variation
as "negative risk". Conventionally, industry practitioners regard the computation of
the standard deviation of the historical returns or average returns of a specific
investment as providing some historical measure of risk (Ross et al., 2002; Vaughan,
1997; Van Home, 1980).
2 OHSAS is a UK-based multi-disciplinary organization with expertise in a comprehensive range of
occupational health and safety skills. Occupational Health & Safety Advisory Services (OHSAS) was
formed in January 2001 through a merger of NHS Occupational Health and Safety Services of Fife
and Tayside. The merger gave OHSAS autonomy while allowing it to remain within the structure of
the NHS. See http://www.ohsas.org.
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In statistics, risk is regularly plotted to the probability of some events which
is seen as undesirable. The probability of that event to happen and assessment of its
potential loss of value (expected harm) is computed to provide an interpretable
perspective for the making of some decisions toward the event. For instance, in
statistical decision theory, the risk function of an estimator for a parameter to be




6(x) = risk function of an estimator;
9 = a parameter;
x = some observables;
L = the expectation value of the loss function.
This approach to risk is frequently applied in the insurance industry in determining
the premium paid by policyholders for a particular policy to be underwritten
(Nowak, 2009; Berger, 1985; Aimer, 1963).
In information security, a risk is viewed in relation to the integrity of an
asset. Risk is present when there are threats that will cause vulnerability to impact
the asset, e.g. virus attack (threat) through email attachment (vulnerability) to
computer hardware, software, and stored data (asset). Hence, risk is then assessed as
a function of three variables, namely (i) the probability that there is a threat (e.g.
fire), (ii) the probability that there are any vulnerabilities (e.g. inflammable materials
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like paper), and (iii) the potential impact to the business (e.g. system down or
monetary loss) (CASRAG, 2005).
2.1.5 Risky Insurance, and Risk Management
Knight (1921) categorized risks into insurable and uninsurable risks.
Insurable risks are those risks that entrepreneurs can get rid of by buying insurance
policy to protect them from potential loss owing to the underlying risks. Insurable
risks expose the firm to volatility which moves in single direction, i.e. downside
direction. In other words, the risks offer only chance of loss, and with no gain. It is
this single direction volatility that becomes the defining characteristic of such
insurable risks. Such risks are often called 'pure risk' (Doherty, 2000). Examples of
such pure risks are damage to property due to hazards such as fire or flood,
operating failures such as lost production, computer malfunction, mechanical
breakdown, and liability settlements, to name just a few. Note that pure risks are
different from speculative risks. Speculative risks are commonly linked to finance,
investment, and other business activities. The uniqueness of speculative risk is that
it can be viewed as either a threat or an opportunity, depending on a person's
averseness toward risk. Hence, speculative risks are not eliminated but exist either
to be avoided or to be taken advantage of (King, 2000).
Insurance is defined as the equitable transfer of the risk of a loss, from one
party (called the 'insured') to another (called the 'insurer'), in exchange for a
premium. The practicality of this is to combine loss experience by all members who
transfer such risk through the provision for payment of losses from funds
contributed (premiums). In the perspectives of law and economics, insurance is a
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form of risk managementprincipally used in hedging against the risk of a contingent
loss. In the same context, insurance can also be thought of as a guaranteed and
known small loss, i.e. from the premium paid to insurer, to prevent a large and
possibly devastating loss, i.e. from the uncompensated actual loss incurred
(Baranoff, 2004).
Insurance has long been used by corporations to manage property, liability,
and related insurable risks (Doherty, 2000). The reliance on insurance had given
rise to a rather narrow definition of risk management in the early days of corporate
management history that in retrospect, the situation seemed to be aptly fitted into
Knight's (1921) description that profit was the reward entrepreneurs earned for
bearing uninsurable risk. It is from here that historically risk management has been
embodied by insurance and internal audit functions. The function of risk
management also takes a narrow focus on hazard and operational risks (Stokes,
2004) with the second characteristic of insurable risks that they are often under the
control of the policyholder. Having this control capability enables the firm to
develop risk management strategy to reduce or avoid risk (Doherty, 2000). For
instance, a firm could reduce volatility and the expected value of losses by
influencing the probability of its property that would be damaged by fire or floods,
or the probability that it would be sued for defective products, environment
contamination, or the tortuous activities of its directors and officers. This could be
achieved through investing in safety, quality control, or hazard education. In this
respect, thus, health and safety might be put under the purview of risk manager's or
at least be coordinated with his or her activities (Doherty, 2000).
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Risk management took to the mainstream of corporate management history
during the period of the 1960s and 1970s when managers explored broader options
for managing 'insurable risk' (Doherty, 2000). The progression of risk management
has enhanced the sophistication of managers in realizing that insurance is not the
only strategy in managing insurable risk. The alternative strategy calls for a
substitute source of finance to pay for losses replicating the function of insurance.
These alternative sources of finance can come from the firm's cash, borrowings, or
fund raised from the issuance of new equity. This strategy would entail the setting
up of an internal funding mechanism to support it. According to Doherty (2000),
this funding approach is usually formalized by the setting up of a 'subsidiary, or
captive, insurance company' by the firm. Through this method, the pricing of risk
can be initiated thus facilitating the payment of premium to the captive. Meanwhile,
a formal loss settlement process can also be implemented.
Risk management for 'insurable risk' and the concept of enterprise risk
management were featured prominently in the work of Robert Mehr and Bob
Hedges in the 1960s (Druml, 2008; Doherty, 2000). Mehr and Hedges' publication
entitled "Risk Management in the Business Enterprise" was the first text to
completely address the subject of business risk (Druml, 2008). Mehr and Hedges's
(1963) text can perhaps be regarded as the antecedent or foundation to the
application of the concept of enterprise risk management (ERM) which is gaining
currency in the present days. They are hence widely acclaimed as the fathers of risk
management (Druml, 2008). According to Mehr and Hedges (1963), the following
initiatives can be undertaken to manage risk:
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• transfer risk to a counter-party by purchase of an insurance policy or
financial hedge.
• retain risk in either an active or passive way. Simply not insuring is
retaining risk. But the firm can mimic the insurance process by self
insuring with internal pricing, reserving, and loss settlements.
• reduce risk by investing in sprinklers, smoke alarms, inspections, and
other safety measures.
• avoid risk by not undertaking activities that are risky or by
substituting less risky processes.
(Mehr and Hedges quoted by Doherty, 2000, p.4). The above initiatives highlight
the methodological approaches in handling risk, i.e. transferring, retaining,
reducing, and avoiding risk. According to Doherty (2000), the conceptual work of
Mehr and Hedges has propelled the evolution in the industry practice by expanding
the function of the "insurance manager" of the firm into the broader role of "risk
manager". Mehr and Hedges (1963) asserted that the active management of the
entire business risks could maximize efficiency which in turn would result in greater
productivity. As such, all business risks should be given due attention and actively
managed, instead of merely managing those risks that are insurable or just the
insuring itself (Druml, 2008). Mehr and Fledges (1963) further presented the
following steps for the risk management process to be adopted by enterprises
(D'Arcy,2001):
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i. Identifying loss exposures
ii. Measuring loss exposures




iv. Selecting a method
v. Monitoring results
Recent development in corporate risk management strategy saw risk
management process expanded rapidly especially with the banking sector. In
banking fraternity, risk management process encompasses the rigorous
quantification and mitigation of financial risks (Stokes, 2004).
2.2 EVOLUTION OF RISK MANAGEMENT
2.2.1 Development ofCorporate Risk Management
There was little discussion about risk before the 1970s as it was either being
concealed or not recognized. Hence its effects on businesses and projects were
ignored (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). During the period, risk and uncertainty were
regarded as "a necessary evil that should be avoided" (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008,
p.40 quoted Archibald and Liehtenberg, 1992). In the 1970s, project risk
management grew rapidly in the area of quantitative assessment. Its development
then expanded fast into methodologies and processes (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
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Risk management was generally recognized as a specific topic in the project
management literature in the early 1980s (Artto, 1997). The practice of risk
management in project management was well documented in the dimensions of risk
identification, estimation, and response (Lifson and Saifer, 1982; Chapman, 1998).
During this time, the discussion on risk management was tied to quantitative
analysis such as the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) type of
triple estimates, and optimistic, man, pessimistic, and etc. The principal project risk
management applications gave emphasis in time and cost objectives, as well as in
the feasibility studies of the project (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
Risk management became the managerial 'buzz word' in the capital markets
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Risk management was widely practiced by
financial firms in the management of portfolio risk for the investor. The
pervasiveness of risk management was due to the prevalent financial innovation with
the growth of derivatives markets such as options, futures, and related markets
(Doherty, 2000). Facilitating the rapid growth of the derivative markets during the
periods was due to the work of Fisher Black and Myron Scholes whom in the early
1970s developed the options pricing techniques, i.e. the renowned Black-Scholes
options pricing model. Such options pricing model had offered transparency into the
options' pricing mechanism to the buyers and sellers of the options contracts and
assisted them to enter the trade with great confidence and without much hesitation.
It is due to this rapid development in the derivative markets nonetheless, risk
management over time has been increasingly understood and referred to as the
process of managing a corporation's exposure to financial risks (Doherty, 2000).
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Since then, corporate risk management has undergone "dramatic
fundamental and far-reaching changes" (Stokes, 2004). Its focus and emphasis have
also shifted from the traditional treasury and insurance departments towards line
management. Subsequently, corporate risk management finds its way to the
boardroom when risk is treated in a much broader enterprise-wide perspective.
Having said that however, the degree and manner in which risk management is
integrated into firms' day-to-day operations and culture vary significantly. Some
firms view risk management as nothing more than a regulatory compliance issue
whilst others may treat it more strategically with sophisticated responses to the
challenges amidst the ever changing business landscape (Stoke, 2004).
According to Merna and Al-Thani (2008), although most of the risk
management methodologies developed in the 1980s continued to be used today, the
application of questionnaires and checklists was a great development in the 1990s.
Furthermore, the advancement of the application of questionnaires and checklists
has also contributed to the concept of knowledge-based systems. Merna and Al-
Thani (2008) further pointed that those important principles developed in the 1980s
such as that in regard to the contractual allocation of risk have persisted into the
1990s. For example, the strategies of partnership and alliance have been formulated
to prevent traditional contractual rivalry and instill a risk and reward sharing
approach especially in the area of capital projects. It is also notable that the
conventional concentration of quantitative risk analysis of risk management practice
in the 1980s has been shifted to the understanding and improvement of risk
management processes in the 1990s. For instance, whilst project risk management
software was widely applied as an analysis tool in the 1980s, the current trend is to
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employ risk quantification and modeling as a device to enhance communication and
response planning teamwork instead of merely for analysis (capture and response).
Risk quantification and modeling techniques are viewed as a method to improve
both insight and knowledge regarding a project and as a conduit to relay that
information to the project team members and relevant stakeholders (Merna and Al-
Thani, 2008). This efficacy of risk quantification and modeling techniques has a
positive impact on reducing informational asymmetry among various stakeholders in
relation to the project.
A prescriptive approach to risk management processes has become
increasingly prominent after 1990. Many advocates proposed risk management
processes as follow (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, p.42):
• the simple generic risk management process - identification, assessment,
response and documentation
• the five-phase generic process — process scope, team, analysis and
quantification, successive breakdown and quantification and results.
Risk management in the present days sees the emphasis on an enterprise-
wide approach of risk management methodology and processes. This is a contrast to
the traditional way which looked at risk management in a rather fragmented manner.
More and more organizations have realized that adopting a more holistic approach to
risk management will make a better sense and work better. More advanced
organizations in risk management have set up risk committees, which function to
oversee the entire risk management operations across their organizations. Such
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committees are often chaired by a senior board member or a risk facilitator (Merna
and Al-Thani, 2008).
2.2.2 Risk Management as a Management Discipline
Until recently, risk management in its many forms is not regarded by
managers as a management discipline (Thompson, 2003). The meaning and
application of risk management are often misunderstood at many levels of
management. What has inclined to transpire is that the paradigm and execution of
risk management initiatives by risk managers are strongly influenced by the biasness
of the managers' individual expertise and perspectives. This biasness comes in the
areas of financial markets, occupational health and safety, insurance, project
management, technology, and political risk management. Albeit so, Thompson
(2003) did not think there is anything wrong with these approaches of risk
management. But he highlighted that the weakness of it lies with the fact that their
focus is limited and lacks an integrated framework. Hence, establishing a common
framework for all types of operational risks will tremendously enhance the
acceptance of risk management as an effective management tool throughout
organizations (Thompson, 2003).
One plausible cause to the above observation could be due to the fact that
conventionally the analytical and statistical issues revolving the treatment ofpure
risks are at variance with those surrounding other production cost and revenue
uncertainties. This variation has entailed that pure risk costs4 and production costs to
be distinct. Thus optimal production decisions can be made by treating these factors
in isolation as opposed to combining them. As a result, risk management has been
separated from the rest offinancial theory (Mehr and Forbes, 1973).
Financial theory relates to the administration of the overall assets and
liabilities of the firm with the goals to maximize shareholder wealth and other
business objectives. Whereas risk management has evolved from the insurance field
and insurance traditionally has been alienated from the other business disciplines.
The separation lies with the fact that the normative theory of risk management
decision models which are drawn from the insurance field may prescribe a formal
rule of conduct for making a decision regarding the amount of the insurance
deductible, hence the insurance coverage and premium to be paid. But these models
fail to recognize the behavioral realities of the conflict that exist between internal
management and shareholder interests.
Pure risks concern those events which usually involve only financial loss to a firm. These include
destruction of property, theft, credit losses, death or disability of employees, legal liability, and
failure of suppliers to perform (Mehr and Forbes, 1973).
Pure risk costs include insurance premiums, administrative costs involving pure risks, costs
involved in loss reduction or prevention, and the difference in the present values of the firm before
and after a loss not compensated by insurance or other sources such as tort recoveries (Mehr and
Forbes, 1973).
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To illustrate, the internal management would usually give priority to the long
term survival of the firm thus securing the managers' career whereas the
shareholders would emphasize in short-term wealth maximization objectives via the
increase in share prices. These differences are reflected in complex corporate
objectives relating to profitability, growth, solvency, and social responsibility. The
conflicting goals are further manifested in such subsidiary matters as the trusteeship
concept, satisficing, and maintenance of financial mobility (Mehr and Forbes, 1973).
Besides, normative theory also assumes uniformity among corporate
objectives. This notion spells problem because firms may impose varying penalty
and reward systems upon different forms of risk management conduct. For instance,
whilst some firms may give emphasis to social responsibility hence aiming for low
incident of industrial and other accidents regardless of cost, other firms may
emphasize in profitability thus willingly to face moderate occurrence and severity
accident rates if this strategy leads to reduction of total operating costs which
include lower insurance premiums (Mehr and Forbes, 1973).
In this light, Mehr and Forbes (1973) examined the risk management
decision in an enterprise-wide environment, or in their words: "in the total business
setting", in an attempt to "recast risk management theory in light of the complex
objectives of modern corporations" (p.389). Mehr and Forbes (1973) stressed that
the design of the risk management function must begin with understanding the
business objectives as well as possessing the insight on how these business
objectives interact with the decision making process. One has to realize that
corporate objectives are multiple and complex. Whilst some are complementary, the
others may be conflicting with one another. As such, it is imperative to understand
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that business decisions are rarely based merely upon a single criterion, but a
combination of objectives is weighed and balanced. This in turn is what determines
the corporate behavior.
In addition, Mehr and Forbes (1973) criticized the study of pure and
dynamic5 risk behavior in a compartmentalized manner. According to them, in the
context of modern financial theory (MFT), this traditional approach to risk
management decision will at best result in "non-optimal business decision" and at
worst causes "a complete disregard for the pure risk cost" as a result of such
decision. This is because the MFT views the firm as an integrated unit hence all of
the cost and revenue dimensions of a business issue are to be analyzed concurrently.
Due to this argument, Mehr and Forbes (1973) advocated that risk management
theory needs to merge with traditional financial theory for an appropriate model so
that the decision making process can bring added realism. In other words, risk
management should be incorporated into the mainstream of financial theory where
risk management decision should be integrated directly into the corporate decision
making processes within the firm which according to the MFT, functions in its
totality.
As an example, in the capital budgeting model to determine the internal rate
of return, the model ought to recognize and merge pure and dynamic risk theory.
Mehr and Forbes (1973, p.398) found fault at the conventional treatment and
implicit assumptions of the model where:
5Dynamic risks are risks arising from perils which result in either gain or loss to a firm (Mehr and
Forbes, 1973).
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(i) all of the pure risk cost associated with a project are
summarized in terms ofpremium outlays, and
(ii) insurance exactly replenishes the preset value of the net cash
flov\>s lost because ofthe occurrence ofa peril.
Mehr and Forbes (1973) highlighted that the above assumptions are invalid for two
reasons, namely (i) some pure risks are not insurable, and (ii) insurance does not
entirely indemnify an insured risk in the event of a loss. Owing to this, the present
value of the firm may not remain the same before and after the loss even with the
presence of insurance as otherwise the concept of indemnification of an insurance
policy would assume.
In supporting the call for a holistic and integrated theory to risk management
and corporate decision making processes, Mehr and Forbes (1973) pointed out that
the modern executive has a more holistic view in solving his business concerns
rather than through the thin lenses of specialization. The executive hence has
become a generalist who employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to
decision making. This approach concurrently place equal importance to financial,
accounting, production, and marketing dimensions of a problem. Besides, the
generalist executive's responsibilities comprised of integrating the firm's operations
as opposed to managing a narrow circle of subordinates. The executive's
information systems on the other hand, are devised to swiftly supply accurate and
pertinent data as inputs to settling multi-dimensional setbacks of the firm's
operations. Thus, an integrated risk management model which incorporates risk
management theory with traditional financial theory will work well within a firm
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that operates as a totality. The integrated model will assist the executive to achieve
his objectives by facilitating the exercise of his controls in directing the firm's
operations in a holistic and unified manner (Mehr and Forbes, 1973).
2.3 THE CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT
2.3.1 The Definition
Risk management is of paramount important in running a business.
According to Meagher and O'Neil (2000), risk management is simply about being
equipped to handle the outcomes of uncertainty. Cummins et al. (1998), roughly
defined risk management as "any set of actions taken by individuals or corporations
in an effort to alter the risk arising from their primary line(s) of business". Looking
from another perspective, Cummins et al. (1998) also referred risk management as
decision making process where an individual or firm endeavor to alter the risk/return
profile of future cash flows. In this respect though, Cummins et al. (1998)
explained that altering a firm's future cash flow can work along both ways in terms
of reducing as well as increasing the firm's risk exposure. Those actions undertaken
by managers to reduce risk are referred to as hedging whilst actions undertaken to
expose firm to more risk with the hope that such a strategy will bring abnormal
profits are referred to as speculating.
According to Doherty (1985), risk management is concerned with the
financing of the firm's investment activities and can promote efficient investment
decisions.
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Miller (1992), on the other hand, pointed out that a firm can employ either
financial or strategic approaches in response to managing risk exposures. Financial
risk management techniques involve the reduction of corporate exposures to
particular risks without changing the firm's strategy whilst strategic responses
generally impact a firm's exposure across a wide range of environmental
uncertainties.
Meulbroek (2002) pointed out that the objective of risk management is to
maximize shareholder value.
Handy (1999) on the other hand, summarized risk management as follows
(Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, p.44 quoted Handy, 1999):
Risk management is not separate activity from
management, it is management... predicting and
planning allow prevention... reaction is a symptom of
poor management.
Smith (1995) describes that risk management is a crucial part of the project
and business planning cycle which:
• requires acceptance that uncertainty exists
• generates a structured response to risk in terms of alternative plans,
solutions and contingencies
• is a thinking process requiring imagination and ingenuity
• generates a realistic attitude in an investment for staff by preparing them
for risk events rather than being taken by surprise when they arrive.
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Merna and Al-Thani (2008, p.44) concluded that risk management at its most
fundamental level:
...involves identifying risks, predicting how probable
they are and how serious they might become, deciding
what to do about them and implementing these
decisions.
2.3.2 Risk Management Strategy
2.3.2.1 Risk Reduction and Cost ofRisk Reduction
There are two generic types of risk management strategy available to firms
(Judge, 2006). In the first strategy, the firm can attempt to reduce the risk itself.
Alternatively, the firm can reduce the cost of the given risk that it faces. The former
strategy of risk reduction comes in several forms. For instance, the firm can enter
into insurance for hedging insurable risk. Other examples are the hedging of
financial risk by means of using hybrid debt securities, ensuring geographical and
product diversification6, altering the fixed-floating debt mix or the cun-ency debt
mix, and lowering operating gearing. All these are on-balance sheet activities.
Apart from that, financial price risk such as those of interest rate and foreign
currency risks can be hedged using financial derivatives. The use of financial
derivatives is generally specific to the risk exposures or sources (Judge, 2006).
6This is a totally passive strategy. If risks from various sources are less than perfectly correlated, they
are sub additive. If no corporate risks are hedged, this strategy enables the achievement of some
degree of natural diversification for the firm.
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The objectives of using financial derivatives are analogous to the argument
made by Merton (1993). Merton (1993) suggested three ways to moderate risk,
namely by (i) diversifying it, (ii) selling (or hedging) it, or (iii) insuring against it.
Merton (1993) cited an analogy of the owner of a ship to describe the above
approaches. According to him, a ship owner can (i) diversify by buying a portfolio
of ships to circumvent a total loss if one ship sinks; (ii) sell (or hedge) the ship and
have no economic exposure to its subsequent outcome; or (iii) buy an insurance
policy that compensates if the ship sinks, but at the same time allows the ship owner
to profit if it does not. The term hedging referred to by Merton (1993) meant
entering into a position such that the payoff is the same despite of the outcome,
which could be achieved by way of either selling the ship today or entering into
binding forward contract to sell it at some time in the future (Judge, 2006).
The second strategy of risk management involves the reduction of the cost of
risk (Judge, 2006). This strategy serves as a substitute for the comprehensive
hedging strategy in which all sources of risk are hedged, such as that of financial
price risk. However, the cost reducing strategies are not risk source specific like
those of risk reducing strategies. Nonetheless, this strategy can be executed in
various ways. One method is the lowering of the firm's gearing. For instance, a
firm can issue more shares to increase its capital base. A higher level of equity (or
lower gearing) can reduce the costs of risk since equity capital providers are residual
or variable claim-holders. Equity providers or shareholders have a claim to the
proceeds of investment only after firms' prior claims have been met. As such,
equity capital acts like a cushion to absorb the firm's losses due to risks. Thus, the
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strategy to reduce the cost of risk may involve the firm's capital structure or
financing policy (Doherty, 1995; Merton, 1995; Judge, 2006).
2.3.2.2 Actual Capital and Contingent Capital
According to Judge (2006), both risk reducing and cost reducing strategies
entail the provision of either actual or contingent capital. For instance, a firm can
transfer its business and financial risks to shareholders in return for upside exposure
of the firm by issuing equity. On the other hand, a firm can transfer its risk to
bondholders or creditors in exchange for the promise to pay periodic coupon or
interest payment and repurchase the risk at some point in the future when it is
financially solvent by issuing bond or other debt instruments. Alternatively, a firm
can expect to receive some contingent capital in the event of a specific loss by
buying insurance. A premium is paid by the firm against the specific risk being
insured in exchange for such contingent capital. Similarly, a firm can buy foreign
exchange options with premium in exchange for contingent capital. If the options
expire in-the-money, the contingent capital will turn into capital.
Thus, the risk reducing strategies via those of hedging and insurance depicts
the generation of contingent capital during the time it is most needed, i.e. with the
manifestation or realization of the risks being insured or hedged against. On the
other hand, the description of risk reducing strategies through issuing debt and
equity presents the provision of actual capital. However, it must be noted that the
expected generation of contingent capital through derivatives like hedging and
insurance does not come without the reciprocal contingent loss (Doherty, 1995;
Shimko, 1996; Judge, 2006). The contingent loss is due to the presence of credit
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risk. For instance, risk exists that insurers and counterparties in the derivative
contracts may not be able to honor their part of the obligation to pay up the expected
contingent capitalwhen needed. Therein lies the main difference between contingent
capital and actual capital to the firm. Another advantage of actual capital over
contingent capital is that the former can be utilized by the firm at the very moment
of the issuance of such securities, i.e. shares and bonds.
2.3.2.3 Capital Structure and Cost ofRisk Reduction
Traditionally, corporate risk management has given emphasis in actual
capital. Specifically, the management of actual capital is in the form of equity as it
provides a form of protection or 'cushion' against the firm's business risk. The
managerial maneuvering is to raise extra capital above what is necessary for the
funding of the physical investment and working capital to keep the firm afloat. This
capital has commonly been raised through equity. In other instances capital in the
form of debt which is subordinated to customer contractual claims has also been
issued. This additional reserve of capital will become useful in absorbing the losses
incurred should the firm's risk materializes (Merton, 1995).
When actual capital is involved in risk management strategy, the firm will
be primarily concerned with the reduction of the cost of risk. In other words, the
preoccupation with the reduction of the cost of risk will relate to the firm's capital
structure or financing policy strategies. The use of actual capital in the form of
equity is an attractive method in managing the firm's risk for reasons that have been
mentioned earlier, that is, equity-holders are residual claim-holders whose claim to
the investment proceeds will come only after the firm's prior claims have been met.
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As such, in the event where prior claims are higher than those expected, adverse
outcome which gives rise to losses will happen. Under such circumstance, equity
will absorb those losses. This essentially means that equity will protect the firm
against all forms of risk. Hence, a higher level of equity in the firm's capital
structure, i.e. lower gearing, is able to lower the costof risk in several ways as below
(Doherty, 1995;Merton, 1995; Shimko, 1996; Judge, 2006).
Lowered gearing decreases the chances of banlcruptey and hence minimizes
the expected costs of bankruptcy. In the case of high gearing, the ex ante expected
value of debt instruments such as bonds will be netted out correspondingly to reflect
the higher risk involved as creditors and bondholders alike will bear the bankruptcy
costs ex post. Thus, lowering the risk of bankruptcy through reducing gearing on the
part of the firm will reduce the price of issuing such debt instruments. One instance
to minimize the probability of banlcruptey is for the firm to hold more liquid assets
on its balance sheet (e.g. cash balance and short-term investments) to ensure ample
funds are available to satisfy debt claims. This will result in lowered net gearing
where liquid assets serve as negative debt (Merton, 1995).
Another way of reducing the cost of risk is through lowering dividend
payments to avoid financial distress. This approach calls for the firm to raise its
capital via issuing preference capital instead of debt. According to Nance et al.
(1993), a firm can choose to postpone the dividend payment due on preference
capital if necessary without invoking any threat of insolvency. This is in stark
contrast to the deferment of interest payment on debt which could trigger
insolvency. However, there is an opposing view to this argument. Geczy et al.
(1997) pointed out that the use of preference capital increases the firm's effective
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debt because the characteristics of preference capital behave more like debt than
equity. Its use therefore, will lower the borrowing capacity of the firm. As a result,
the use of preference capital will limit the availability of the less costly external
funds such as debt to the firm. This also implies a more reliance on costly new
equity issues by the firm for its funding needs.
The use of actual capital in the form of equity (low gearing) will lower the
potential conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders in selecting
investment projects. In other words, high gearing in the firm's capital structure will
create a problem of adverse selection on the part of shareholders for choosing
investment projects. For instance, shareholders relatively have limited liability in a
high gearing situation and this essentially creates a put option for them where
shareholders possess the option to put the firm to the bondholders in the case of
bankruptcy. It is due to this fact that shareholders tend to underestimate the net
present value (NPV) of the chosen investment project by the value of this put option.
Note that the put option has value if the firm is bankrupt or has a high probability of
financial distress. Furthermore, since shareholders have effectively a call position
on the value of the firm, the consequence of adverse selection will prompt them to
select high risk projects ignoring the downside risk for this risk is basically borne by
the bondholders. The consequent of these distortions in project selection is lowered
firm value. In this respect, the higher the level of gearing or the risk with the firm's
cash flows, the greater the loss in firm's value. As such, it follows that with the
reduction in the firm's gearing, hence the risk, it will result in improved investment
project selection and thus, enhanced firm value (Doherty, 1995; Merton, 1995;
Shimko, 1996; Judge, 2006).
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Risk management strategy that relies on actual capital instead of contingent
capital, i.e. hedging with derivatives, will mean that the funding of unhedged
financial price losses entails the foregoing of other investment opportunities, hence
the opportunity costs. Otherwise, new capital has to be raised with the attendant
issue costs. To illustrate, when a financial price loss occurs, the firm is forced to
divert internal funds away from a new investment project or it has to raise new
capital in order to fund both the investment project and the loss. However either
choice incurs hefty costs as the nature of risk management strategy using actual
capital does not create contingent capital like that of hedging.
Hedging enables the firm to stabilize the availability of internal funds thus to
avoid unnecessary fluctuation in either investment spending or external financing.
The situation is well described by the pecking order hypothesis where it posits that
internal funds are less costly than external funds, and that external debt is less costly
than external equity (Myers and Majluff, 1984). Taking hint from the pecking order
hypothesis, a firm can maintain its capacity to undertake positive NPV investments
by having low levels of gearing through large equity shield. The large equity in the
firm's capital structure is not only able to absorb or cushion unhedged losses, the
low level of gearing will also not impair the firm's capacity to borrow (external
debt). This enables the firm to fund new investment projects and unhedged losses
without having to resort to the issuance of costly new equity (Myers and Majluff,
1984; Doherty, 1995; Merton, 1995; Judge, 2006).
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Not all are agreeable to the arguments which assert the reduction of the cost
of risk through lowering the level of debt in the firm's capital structure. For
instance, Leland (1998) cited tax deductibility of interest payment as the principal
benefit of utilizing debt in the firm's capital structure. The use of debt instruments
is argued to enhance firm value under this model. Moreover, the use of certain debt
instruments such as convertible debt in place of straight debt is argued to be able to
rein in agency problems and address the adverse selection issue of investment
project selection as discussed earlier whilst enjoying the tax benefits. The
conversion option of convertible debt instruments permits such debt holders to
convert their debt securities into a specific number of the firm's shares. The
conversion option is in the money if the firm's share price rises to a level where
shares obtained from such a conversion have higher value than the original debt
securities. Green (1984) indicated that this conversion feature attached to the debt
securities helps straighten out the payout function of investment projects such that
payouts to different stakeholders, i.e. equity and debt holders, are more closely
aligned, thus minimizing the distortions of investment project selection. Owing to
this, debt instrument is more sensitive to firm value changes than its straight debt
counterpart which in turn, mitigates the sensitivity of equity value to firm value
changes. As a result, the use of convertible debt enables the lessening of incentive
conflict among various stakeholders in the firm.
One way of mitigating incentive conflict with the use of convertible debt is
through ungearing. Ungearing can take place during the time when the firm is
performing well and also when the firm is not performing well. It all depends on
whom the conversion option is granted. For instance, when the firm is doing well
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and the share price enhances, holders of conventional convertible bond will find it
sensible to convert their bonds to shares (equity), thus ungearing the firm's balance
sheet. On the other hand, in the case where the convertible debt is issued and where
the option is granted to the firm, the firm then can recall the debt when the debt
becomes a financial burden or during the period in which the firm faces financial
distress. This again will ungear the firm's balance sheet. Doherty (1995) referred to
this type of convertible debt where the option is granted to the firm as the reversible
convertible dent (RCD) (Judge, 2006).
The agency problems literature points to two types of conflicts of interest in
a firm, namely (i) conflict between stockholders and managers, and (ii) conflict
between debtholders and stockholders. Conflicts between stockholders and
managers occur when managers pursue their own personal interest at the expense of
stockholder wealth (Sung et al., 1994). This problem can be mitigated with debt
financing by granting debtholders the option to force liquidation if the firm's cash
flows are poor (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Otherwise the availability of free cash
flow to managers is limited to prevent them from engaging in activities that benefit
their own interest (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). On the other hand, conflicts between
debtholders and stockholders take place when bondholders experience expropriation
of their wealth through unsuitable selection of investment projects by the owners of
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Myers (1977) proposed two
solutions to the agency problem between stockholders and bondholders, namely
restrictive covenants and renegotiation provisions (Sung et al., 1994).
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The agency cost literature such as Myers (1977) pointed out that by
shortening the maturity of debt, the firm not only reduces its level of debt but it also
mitigates the costs of asset substitution as well as the costs of underinvestment. For
instance, since short-term debt facilitates the repricing of debt, bondholders can
easily respond to changes in the risk of the firm by adjusting the debt's risk
premium. As such, firms have an incentive to choose a lowrisk investment strategy
with short-term debt to minimize the imposition of risk premium on their debt
instruments (Myer, 1977). Apart from that, issuers of short-term debt face less risk
compared to issuing a long-term one, hence a larger portion of the gains from
incremental investment accrue to shareholders instead of bondholders. This scenario
has provided an incentive for firms to avoid underinvestment (Myer, 1997; Judge,
2006).
Wall (1989) proposed a hybrid of short-term debt and an interest swap
strategy to lower financing cost by allowing high risk firms to reduce their agency
costs without incurring interest rate risk. The swap protects the firm from
fluctuation in market interest rates whilst allowing the credit risk component to vary.
Therefore the firm still faces the possibility of an increase in its risk premium for
any shift toward higher risk investments (Judge, 2006). However, a study by Long
and Malitz (1983) presented evidence which suggested that firms make short-term
borrowing decisions independent of long-term investment requirements.
Furthermore, the study also found that firms do not endeavor to resolve agency
problems by substituting short-term debt for long-term debt (Judge, 2006).
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2.3.3 Risk Management Process
According to Smith (1995), risk management process entails the following
four stages:
• identification of risks/uncertainties
• analysis of implications
• response to minimize risk
• allocation of appropriate contingencies.
Merna and Al-Thani (2008) on the other hand pointed out that risk management is a
continuous loop as opposed to a linear process. By this it means that as an
investment or a project goes through its life cycle, a process of identification,
analysis, control, and reporting of risks is constantly being carried out. Despite the
increased use of risk analysis and risk management as essential elements of the
overall business management approach, there is no established standard in relation
to the techniques, factors, and approaches to which reference may be made (Merna
and Al-Thani, 2008). As a consequence several organizations and research
authorities have provided guidelines with regards to phases associated with risk
management process. For instance, Merna (2002) identified three phases, i.e. risk
identification, analysis, and response amidst the 15-step sequence to account for risk
management. Others such as Boswiek (1987), Eloff et al. (1995), the British
Standard BS 8444 (BSI, 1996), and the Project Management Institute's (PMIs)
Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK 1996) identified
four processes of risk management (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
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Chapman and Ward (1997) on the other hand suggested eight phases in the
risk management process. The eight phases are: define, focus, identify, structure,
ownership, estimate, evaluate, andplan. Chapmanand Ward (1997) associated each
phase of the risk management process with some broadly defined deliverables. Each
deliverable in turn, is presented in the context of its purpose and the tasks necessary
to attain it. Merna and Al-Thani (2008) emphasized that the risk management
process outlined by Chapman and Ward (1997) should also encompass an
enterprise's corporate and strategic business elements in identifying risks at these
levels before sanctioning an investment project.
It is recommended that enterprises adopt PMBOK's (1996) project risk
management processes as their own ERM processes. The PMBOK (1996) project
risk management processes includes risk identification, risk analysis, and risk
response. The processes also comprise of capitalizing the results of positive events
and minimizing the outcomes of adverse events (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
Sections 2.3.3.1 to 2.3.3.3 discuss the recommended risk management processes.
Note that whilst some parts of the discussion of risk management processes
explicitly make reference to that of a project, its inference of the processes extends
in similar meaning and manner to both corporate and strategic business levels of the
enterprise.
2.3.3.1 Risk Identification
Risk identification involves the determination of particular risks (both
internal and external) that are likely to influence the project. The process also
includes documenting the characteristics of each identified risk. Each primary
source of risk needs to be classified in accordance to their severity of impact on
variables such as cost, time schedules, and project objectives. The initial
identification of risks can be performed using historical and current information
available.
Examples of the inputs to risk identification are: product or service
description; work breakdown structure; cost and time estimates; specification
requirements; and historical information. Examples of the outputs (deliverables) to
risk identification include: sources of risk; potential risk events; risk symptoms; and
inputs to other processes. All identified risks which have the likelihood to affect the
project shall be properly kept in a register of risks. This shall include a full and
validated description of each risk concerned.
The main objectives of risk identification are to: (i) identify and capture the
principal stakeholders in risk management, (ii) establish the platform to provide
necessary information for risk analysis, (iii) identify the project or service
components, (iv) identify the inherent risks in the project or service (Merna and Al-
Thani, 2008, p.48).
2.3.3.2 Risk Quantification and Analysis
Risk quantification and analysis consist of evaluating risks and assessing risk
interaction vis-a-vis the potential outcomes. It entails ascertaining risk events that
require a response from the management. The main output from this process is a list
of opportunities that ought to be pursued and threats that require attention and
reaction. The outcomes of risk quantification and analysis serve as basis for the
enterprise to make decision on the next course of action in relation to a particular
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risk event. The objective of this process is hence to find the balance that exists
between risk and opportunities. Determining the balance between risk and
opportunities is crucial in facilitating managerial responses so as "to tilt the balance
in favor of the opportunities and away from risks" (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008,
p.51).
There are primarily two approaches in risk quantification and analysis
process, namely the qualitative risk analysis and the quantitative risk analysis.
Qualitative risk analysis comprises of developing a register of risks and a description
of their potential outcomes. The evaluations of qualitative analysis do not produce
numerical values. Rather, the evaluations help enhance the understanding of the
nature of the risks involved. Quantitative risk analysis on the other hand involves
numerical data. The numerical data is often analyzed using statistical procedures in
the context of mathematical modeling. The analysis is commonly performed with
the aid of computer software application (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
2.3.3.3 Risk Response
Risk response entails laying out plans to capitalize on opportunities and to
respond to threats. Emphasis will be on what appropriate steps to take in response to
the risks faced. Enterprises can generally respond to threats in one of the following







Risk avoidance necessitates the elimination of a particular threat. The
removal of threat can be done either by eliminating the source of the risk within a
project or by excluding projects or business entities from which the source of risk
originate (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). As such, the avoidance option includes
simply not performing an activity that could carry risk. An example would be to not
travel in a car in order to avoid exposure to the risk of involving in a road accident.
Avoidance is the simplistic way of dealing with risk. Avoiding risks also
means losing out on the potential gain that otherwise accepting (retaining) the risk
may have offered. For instance, not venturing into a business to avoid the risk of
loss also avoids the possibility of earning profits.
2.3.3.3.2 Risk Reduction
Risk reduction entails the lowering of the probability of risk occurrence or
the reduction of the severity of the loss should a risk event happen, or both. For
instance, wearing of hard hats may reduce the severity of injuries from falling
objects in a building site. At the same time, embracing safer working practices can
lower the chances of objects falling (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). Another example
is such as sprinklers which are designed to put out fire to reduce the risk of loss by
fire.
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Acknowledging that risks can be positive or negative, it is therefore
imperative to realize that risk optimization must be sought in the process of risk
reduction. Optimizing risks means finding a balance between assuming negative
risk and having the benefit of expected profit through business operations and
activities; or between risk reduction and the loss of profit opportunity.
2.3.3.3.3 Risk Transfer (Sharing)
Risk transfer basically means the process of transferring the risk that an
enterprise faces to a third party. In other words, it involves assigning the burden of
loss (perhaps as well as the benefit of gain) from a risk to another party. This is
done as a measure to reduce a risk facing an enterprise. An example of risk transfer
is such as in a contractual risk allocation whereby in a project involving the
construction of a facility, some risks related to the construction are transferred from
the client organization to the contractor carrying out the work. The risk being
involved here may be that of the likelihood for the construction not being able to be
completed within the stipulated time frame, hence some monetary losses may be
incurred as a result. Financial markets offer various instruments for risk transfer
such as derivative contracts used for 'hedging' purposes (Merna and Al-Thani,
2008). Flanagan and Norman (1993) described risk transfer as follows:
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Transferring risk does not reduce the criticality of the source of the
risk, it just removes it to another party. In some cases, transfer can
significantly increase risk because the party to whom it is being
transferred may not be aware of the risk they are being asked to
absorb.
Some authors prefer to use the words risk sharing instead of risk transfer
with the belief that it is a mistake to use the words risk transfer. Their argument is
that you cannot transfer a risk to a third party such as through the purchase of
insurance or outsourcing. This is because the purchaser for such contract generally
holds on to legal commitment for the losses "transferred". In this light, insurance
may be more suitably described as a post-event compensatory mechanism. To
illustrate, a personal injuries insurance policy does not transfer the risk of a car
accident to the insurance company. The risk is still present with the policy holder
who may get involved in an accident. The insurance policy simply provides that if
an accident occurs then some financial compensation may be payable to the policy
holder (Baranoff, 2004; Vaughan, 1997).
As such, it should be realized that popular risk transfer instruments such as
insurance is only capable of transferring the potential financial consequences of a




Risk retention involves accepting the loss, or benefit of gain, from a risk
when it occurs. Risk retention can be planned or may be unplanned. Unplanned or
unintentional risk retention is the result of oversight or failure during the risk
identification and risk analysis processes. If a risk fail to be identified or if its
potential impacts are underestimated, the enterprise will be unable to consciously
avoid, reduce, or transfer it sufficiently, hence the unplanned retention of it (Merna
and Al-Thani, 2008).
Planned risk retention consists of an entire or fractional acceptance of the
potential consequence of a risk. Every profit-making organization undertakes
certain business risks in its daily operations. The manifestation of risk and reward
relationship will render it impossible for an enterprise to reap satisfactory return on
capital without any risk exposure. Nonetheless, in the name of prudent management,
the retained risk should be that in tandem with the enterprise's strategic mission and
core value-adding activities. Moreover, the retained risk must also fall within the
organization's risk appetite and capability to manage it in a cost-effective manner
vis-a-vis external entities. This is because risk transfer and avoidance must
essentially cost some premium (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
Certain risk may also be retained in such situation as for small risks where
the cost of insuring against (transfer) the risk would be larger over the period than
the total losses sustained. In the same context, all risks that are not avoided or
transferred are retained by default. This includes risks whose potential losses are so
huge or catastrophic that either no insurance policy is available or the premiums
would be prohibitive. Besides, retained risk is also present in the form of any
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amounts of potential loss exceeding the amount being insured. This risk response
strategy may also be appropriate in the case where the probability of a very huge
loss is low or if insuring for greater coverage entails so large a premium that it
adversely affects the enterprise's financial standing.
2.4 THEORECTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CORPORATE RISK
MANAGEMENT
The history of risk management started with its application concept in
diversification of investor's investment portfolio. Classic finance theory postulates
that investors have two primary risk management tools to match their wealth
creation activities with their chosen level of risk that suit their unique risk appetite
(Belmont, 2004). The first of these tools is diversification and the second is asset
allocation. Diversification of portfolio means the exercise of distributing portfolio
holding across a greater number ofassets (i.e. to include more than one asset type in
the investment holding such as combining stocks, bonds, money market instruments,
commodities, real estate and etc inorder to reduce exposure to risk). The advantages
of diversification were first highlighted and analyzed by Harry Markowitz under his
Modern Portfolio Theory laid out in 1952. The concept was widely accepted with
the subsequent adaptation and application into the development of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). Asset allocation, on the other hand, entails the decision of
determining the amount of wealth being invested across asset classes. The essence of
this exercise is to achieve the optimal combination of expected return and risk
consistent with the investor's objectives (Belmont, 2004).
It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the term "risk
management' received wide mention in the capital market. Its application was
progressively extended from the initial management ofinvestment risk by portfolio
investors to the corporate environment where it was applied in managing
corporation's exposure to financial risks (Doherty, 2000). Justification for corporate
risk management can easily be accepted with the intuition that shareholders are risk-
averse and their interests are well served if firms manage risk on their behalf. The
efficacy of this application of risk management in corporate environment is also
backed by finance literature. For instance, studies in the 1980s and 1990s by
Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Smith & Stulz (1985), Mayers & Smith (1982, 1987),
Amit &Wernerfelt (1990), Froot, Scharfstein &Stein (1993), Froot &Stein (1996),
Tufano (1996, 1998), Smithson (1998), Leland (1998), Cummins et al. (1998), saw
an emerging paradigm on the role of risk in determining corporate value (Doherty,
2000).
Ironically, it is also with this progression of risk management application
from the portfolio investment realm to the corporate management environment that
has opened the door to continuous argument among academics. Whilst the notion of
value creation through corporate risk management stands well with the older
classical models of asset pricing, it seems to be at odds with the new explanation of
asset pricing that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s by neo-classical financial theory.
The critics of corporate risk management question its efficacy of value creation to
the firms, and ultimately to shareholders, who are the owners of the firms.
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The notion of investors having access to the two powerful tools of risk
management mentioned earlier (i.e. diversification and asset allocation) has formed
the basis of argument that investors only benefit from internal firm-specific risk
management initiatives if the initiatives increase the present value of the firm's
expected cash flow. If this isnot forthcoming, the theory holds that internal firm risk
management should then focus on managing systematic risk since investors
themselves can diversify away firm-specific risk, or unsystematic risk with ease
(Belmont, 2004). However, this notion of firms managing systematic risk is also
questionable. The classic finance theory holds that, in an efficient market, the
hedging of the firm systematic risk, i.e. through engaging in derivative contracts, or
the transferring of risk to insurers, are zero-sum games for shareholders. This is
because the value created by eliminating this systematic exposure is equal to the cost
of the firm hedging it, or the premium for insurance policies (Crouhy et al., 2006;
Belmont, 2004; Doherty, 2000a). The irony of these contradicting notions of
corporate risk management is further compounded as evidenced by the following
literature review:
A study by David Cummins in 1976 which explained risk management in the
CAPM realm was an important piece of work in this area. Doherty (2000a)
described that this was probably the first serious attempt in finance literature to link
risk management with the famed CAPM. The paper showed how a firm could
maximize its value by insuring risk, rather then retaining it. Cummins discussed in
details on the early works of capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by
Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) which had
contributed significantly to our understanding of how risky securities are valued by
90
the market (Main, 1983). With this understanding of pricing of risk, it had made it
possible for firms to use CAPM approach in their risk management through the
decision of insurance purchasing (Main, 1983).
In the study, Cummins (1976) integrated risk management decision variables
into the theory of the firm under risk. With this integration, he developed risk
management decision rules which were consistent with the firm's overall objectives.
According to him, most of the studies of risk management decision rules previously,
such as those of Allen & Duvall (1971, 1973), Shpilberg & de Neufville (1975),
Neter & Williams (1971), Mortimer (1974), Hartman & Siskin (1974), and Head
(1974), "have concentrated on local rather than global optimization" (Cummins,
1976: 588). This, according to Cummins (1976: 588), "may be suboptimal in the
context of the firm's broader goal". To overcome this problem, Cummins extended
the risk management problem for application in the theoretical construct of CAPM
where decision rules were developed for optimal proportional retention, selection of
aggregate deductibles and choosing reserving policies.
The study analyzed the trade-off between the benefits of saving on insurance
premium through risk management decision process that use deductibles and self
insurance (i.e. risk retention) with the increased risk faced by the firm as a result of
reductions in the firm's insurance coverage. This increase of risk can be interpreted
as in a higher degree of variability in the firm's income stream. The model reveals
that "the firm should increase its retention to the point at which marginal rate of
substitution between expected return and risk is equal to the market price of risk
multiplied by the correlation coefficient between the firm's returns and those of the
market" (Cummins, 1976: 607). Cummins concluded by most accounts, it is better
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for the firm to reduce retention of pure risk, or in other words, the firm should
transfer the risk to the insurer. He stressed that the firm must be cautious of the
increase in risk accompanying risk retention program for dealing with pure risk.
Finally, he construed that the CAPM can be applied as an useful theoretical
construct for analysis on the relationships between expected costs, risk, as well as
other parameters relevant in risk retention programs.
From the adaptation of CAPM as the theoretical construct, Cummins
described firm's equity price in capital market equilibrium which becomes the basis
for the firm's risk management decision as follows:
E(Vj) - Sm pjm o-(Vj)
Pj= (l^Rf) (1)
Pj = the equilibrium market value of thejth firm at the
beginning of period 1 (in equilibrium, this quantity is
being maximized);




Vm = the market value at the beginning of period 2 of the
market portfolio;
Rf - the risk-free borrowing-lending rate;
pjm - thecorrelation coefficient between the return on the jlil
firm and that on the market portfolio
where
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The placement of a tilde over a symbol indicates that it represents a random variable.
Cummins' conceptual argument was that firm could employ risk management to
affect its valuation through varying its mean and variance of return within limits.
This can be achieved by varying the variables E(Vj) and a(Vj) in equation (1) by an
appropriate mix of self-insurance and market purchase of insurance. Decision rule
based on the above model will result in the optimal amount of risk retention (Main,
1983).
However, subsequent debates on Cummins' results suggested that insurance
can only add value if the policy is under-priced (Doherty, 2000a). Referring to
Cummins' study in 1976, Main (1983) commented that there was a flaw in
Cummins' analysis. Main (1983) highlighted that Cummins failed to distinguish the
fundamental difference between the type of risk (i.e. systematic risk and
unsystematic risk) treated by the CAPM as well as the type of risks that are
susceptible to insurance cover. This omission has resulted in fundamental flaw in the
way Cummins presented his theoretical argument (Main, 1983). The critics put forth
the risk measured in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as an important
variable in their argument. CAPM model postulates that those risks that could not be
diversified away by investors (i.e. through portfolio holding diversification and
portfolio asset allocation) would be priced. On the other hand, those corporate risk
that could be diversified away would not be priced, as it would imposed no costs on
investors (Doherty, 2000, p.9).
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To explain further, the neo-classical finance theory7 postulates that firm-
specific risk is irrelevant and that only the covariance of the firm's asset returns to
the market portfolio matters which is measured by the beta in the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) (Belmont, 2004). Neo-classical finance theory holds that in
the perfect and complete market condition8, investors have full information
pertaining to the risks in the firm. As such, investors are able to hedge the firm-
specific risk as easily as the firm could itself through diversification of their
portfolio holding. As a result, risk management activities by the firm will not make
any difference in terms of value creation in relation to what investors are able to do
for themselves. This logic is obviously at odds with the concept of corporate risk
management. This line ofargument can be applied to insurance purchasing by firms.
The purchase of insurance policy is a common dimension of corporate risk
management whereby risk is transferred to third party, the insurer. Whilst
proponents of corporate risk management such as Cummins, Mayers and Smith are
in support of insurance purchasing, neo-classical finance theorists hold that
insurance premium paid by the firms is costly. The potential benefit gained through
Neo-classical financial theory seeks to derive theories of investment, portfolio selection, cost of
capital, capita] structure, capital budgeting, and market equilibrium under uniform assumptions of
perfect and complete markets with uncertainty. The CAPM and the efficient frontier are elements of
Modern Portfolio Theory which in turn, isa part ofneo-classical financial theory (Belmont, 2004).
8Under neo-classical finance theory, a market is complete if: (1) all streams ofcash flows can be
traded irrespective of amount, time, structure, and risk profile, (2) a risk-free asset exists whose
interest rate is the same for all market participants irrespective of lending or borrowing, (3) costless
and complete information leads to homogenous expectations and to the absence of arbitrage
opportunities; financial markets are perfect if: (1) there are no differences in information across
investors (i.e. markets are informationally efficient and information is simultaneously and fully
available to all market players), (2) there are no taxes, (3) there are no transaction costs, (4) there are
no costs of writing and enforcing contracts, (5) there are no restrictions on investments in securities
(i.e. no limitations on short selling), (6) all market players are price-takers (i.e. the price is the same
for allparticipants andthere are no bid-ask spreads) (Belmont, 2004).
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insurance coverage will be totally offset by the costly premium paid. It is a zero-
sum-game. Hence, no real value will be created for the firms.
The neo-classical finance theorists' view of scenarios was as bad as denying
firms' role in risk management under the condition of efficient markets. Hedging
diversifiable risks by firms would not create value since they were irrelevant for
shareholders. Transferring risks on the other hand, would entail firms to transfer the
benefits of such risk management activities to the insurer through the payment of
insurance premium. If this scenario is true as portrayed by the neo-classical theory
that there would be no net gain, then the need to manage risk will be questionable
(Doherty, 2000a).
However, neo-classical finance theory is also at odds with observed reality
(Belmont, 2004). Firms, especially those in the finance and banking industry do
actively manage risk. This phenomenon can be explained by looking at the market
conditions and environment in which these firms operate in reality and by
comparing them with the assumptions put forth by the neo-classical finance theory.
For starters, firms such as banks' stakeholders (depositors, customers and
counterparties) must be convinced that the default risk at the bank is low before
choosing to transact with it. Public confident is extremely crucial in certain
industries such as banking. This is because banks use a lot of other people's money
to do business. Secondly, internal risk management by the firm can be driven by
regulatory requirement.
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In the banking industry, to ensure minimizing the systemic risk in the
industry and to maintain an orderly market, regulators require banks to set aside
minimum regulatory capital amount and to demonstrate effective risk management
process. The stock exchange commission of the United States requires listed
companies to institute rigorous internal control procedure and risk management
process under the Sarbane-Oxley Act. Shareholders, on the other hand, do not have
full information as to the risk exposure of firms they invest in. Although listed
companies are required to disseminate material information to the shareholders by
the listing regulation, the information usually did not come ina timely manner. Even
if they did, shareholders may not possess the analytical ability necessary to
accurately assess the impact of that risk on the share price. This has resulted in
informational asymmetries. Under this condition of asymmetric information,
coupled with high technology cost and the lack of sophisticated risk measurement
skill, investors on their own cannot efficiently hedge for their portfolio holdings
(Belmont, 2004). As such, it is not surprising if firms do actively manage their risks
with the belief that an efficient internal risk management function can create value
for shareholders.
With this observed reality, how does one provide theoretical link to explain
the disparity between theory and reality?
Providentially, Mayers and Smith (1982) provided a reconciliatory argument
for asset pricing theory and corporate risk management in the early 1980s through
their paper on corporate purchases of insurance. They concluded that the addition of
insurance contracts could increase the firm's market value. Mayers and Smith (1982:
281) defined corporation as "a set of contracts among parties who had claim to a
96
common object (i.e. stockholders, bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers, and
customers). The bounds of the corporation were defined by the set of rights under
the contracts". "These claimholders would make rational forecasts of the payoffs
under their respective contracts and reflect these forecasts in their reservation
prices".
Mayers and Smith acknowledged that whilst the specific demand for
insurance by corporations might not be explained by the obvious reason for risk
reduction, it could be justified by how this could affect the present value of the
market price ofthe firm. This justification is consistent with the modern theory of
finance. They argued that insurance purchases (risk management) by the firm would
add value to the firm by ways of "...(i) allocating risk to firm's claimholders who
have a comparative advantage to bear risk, (ii) lowering expected transactions costs
of bankruptcy, (iii) providing real-service efficiencies in claims administration, (iv)
monitoring the compliance of contractual provisions, (v) bonding the firm's real
investment decisions, (vi) lowering the corporation's expected tax liability, and (vii)
reducing regulatory constraint on firms" (Mayers and Smith, 1982, p.281).
For instance, Mayers and Smith argued that the firm's equityholders and
debtholders have comparative advantage in risk bearing as compared to other
claimholders because equityholders and debtholders have divisible claims which are
traded in organized secondary markets. This has enabled equityholders and
debtholders to diversity their risk in the capital markets. As a result, equityholders
and debtholders bear the firm's risk at the lowest costs as compared to other
claimholders. Mayers and Smith implied that if the equity and debt claims of the
firm were large enough, the firm could simply shift risk to these two classes of
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firm's claimholders to provide an optimum level of risk for the firm. This will
increase the value of the firm by way of favorably affecting the claimholders'
forecasts in their reservation prices. But Mayers and Smith (1982) also pointed out
that the shifting ofrisk to stockholders and bondholders is constrained by the firm's
capital stock. Under this situation, insurance contracts would enable firm to
conveniently shift risk to insurance company, resulting in "an efficient allocation of
risk for the firm's other claimholders" (Mayers and Smith, 1982, p.281).9
Corporate purchase of insurance referred to by Mayers and Smith is a form
of corporate risk management. It involves the transfer of risk to insurer. In the
context ofthis thesis, the arguments for its efficacy can lend support to the concept
ofenterprise risk management (ERM), in the light ofmodern theory offinance such
as the asset pricing model. The difference from insurance purchase of risk
management is that ERM will retain the risk management function for risks that are
not insurable, especially those of firm-specific risks, which exist in the firm.
Newer theory of corporate risk management began to look into frictional
costs that are associated with corporate risk. For instance, "risk will tend to increase
taxes and will increase the prospective costs of financial distress. Moreover, when a
firm's cash flows are risky, conflicts of interest arise between shareholders and
creditors. Unless constraints are imposed on managerial actions, this incentive
conflict can lead to dysfunctional investment decisions" (Doherty, 2000a, p.9).
Mayers and Smith assumed that "it is more expensive for the employees, suppliers, and customers
to purchase insurance than for the firm. This occurs both because ofeconomies ofscale in contracting
and because employees, customers, and suppliers are unlikely to have an 'insurable interest' in the
firm (because ofmoral hazard, they are unlikely to be able to purchase insurance)".
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2.5 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
2.5.1 DeterminantsofTraditional Risk Management
Due to a lack of academic literature regarding the determinants of enterprise
risk management (ERM), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) looked to the literature that
deals with determinants of traditional risk management activities such as hedging
and corporate insurance demand. According to Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), the
demand for corporate insurance by firms with well-diversified shareholders is not
driven by risk aversion. Since these shareholders are able to costlessly diversify
idiosyncratic risk, insurance purchases at actuarially unfair rates reduce stockholder
wealth. However, when viewed as part of the firm's financing policy, corporate
insurance may increase firm value through its effect on reducing (i) agency cost, (ii)
expected bankruptcy costs, (iii) the firm's tax liabilities, and (iv) the costs of
regulatory scrutiny.
Corporate hedging, on the other hand, reduces expected banlcruptey costs by
reducing the probability of financial distress. Hedging literature also suggest that
this form of risk management potentially mitigates incentive conflicts, reduces
expected taxes, and improves the firm's ability to take advantage of attractive
investment opportunities (Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, according to
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), the traditional risk management approach has been
characterized as a highly disaggregated method of managing firm risk in which
various categories of risk are managed in separate units within the firm.
As such, most empirical works on risk management research have evolved
around the studies of the usage of derivative securities by firms. Derivative contracts
are used as the proxy since their existence is only for risk management purpose.
99
Derivative products allow the firm's managers to avoid undesirable risks at a micro-
level by transferring those risks to other participants in the derivative market who
would like to bear them (Obaidullah, 2002). In this context, the trading volume of
derivative products is used to measure the intensity ofrisk management activity in a
firm. Most research involved the establishment of causal relationships between risk
management activity and managers' motives for altering the distribution of future
cash flow through the usage ofderivative contracts (Cummins et al., 1998).
Research literatures on corporate risk management such as Miller and
Modigliani (1961); Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993); Tufano (1996); MacMinn
and Gaven (2000) have discussed the rationales for corporations to engage in risk
management practice against their exposure to various risk factors. Studies in this
particular area have cited that managers attempt to minimize the volatility of
companies' cash flows because they are personally risk averse especially when
managers' compensation is benchmarked against firms' performance, hence, the
managerial risk-aversion hypothesis of risk management. Other literatures (e.g.
Stulz, 1996; Cummins et al., 1998; Doherty, 2000a, b; Dionne and Garand, 2000)
present the argument that managers engage in risk management to explicitly change
the risk profiles of their firms so as to enhance the value of the firm's stocks, hence,
the value-maximizing theories ofrisk management. However, the above justification
for managers to engage in risk management activity does not run in tandem with the
basic finance theory which postulates that, "absent friction in capital markets,
shareholders can manage their own risk exposure" (Cummins et al., 1998, p. 30).
The portfolio theory also advocates that it is cheaper for shareholders to minimize
their risk exposure through diversification in their investment portfolio holding than
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for the firm to do it on shareholders' behalf. Cummins et al. (1998), thus, argue that
the value-maximization rationale for risk management with derivatives entails
"specific notion of important market imperfections" since employing derivative
contracts comes at a cost.
2.5.2 Risk Management in Non-Financial Firms: The Determinants
Tufano (1996) highlighted that since the early 80s finance literature has
presented discussions on the theoretical determinants of risk management, but very
few have been featured on the effective measuring of the relevance of the various
determinants that were being proposed. According to Tufano (1996), there are two
classes of arguments presented to assert the reasons non-financial firms undertake
risk management activities, namely (i) to maximize the firm's value, and (i) to
protect risk-averse managers. Dionne and Garand (2000) pointed out that these two
classes of argument were further developed in "the principal theoretical studies on
the subject" by other studies such as Stulz (1996); Doherty (2000); Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (1993); Caillaud, Dionne and Julie (2000); and MacMinn and
Gaven (2000). Tufano's (1996) empirical study onrisk management practices in the
gold mining industry revealed that the determinants for maximizing the firms' value
were not significant whilst the managers' risk behavior related determinants were
significant (Dionne and Garand, 2000).
According to Dionne and Garand (2000), literatures on risk management
always cite four main determinants in justifying risk management activities: i)
reducing the expected costs of financial distress; ii) reducing the risk premiums
payable to various partners; iii) increasing investment possibilities; and iv) reducing
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expected tax payments. Dionne and Garand's (2000) replicated Tufano's (1996)
study on risk management determinants affecting firms' values for the North
American gold mining industry by updating the data base with the incorporation of
the time-sensitive (or panel) aspect of the data. The results presented a new
empirical results vis-a-vis that ofTufano (1996). The results indicated that many
determinants related to maximization of the firms' value were statistically
significant. For instance, variables related to tax and financial distress (or risk
premium to stakeholders) were significant. On the contrary, determinants related to
investment opportunity did not indicate significant effect. Dionne and Garand
(2000) attributed this insignificant effect to the natural hedging argument as
suggested by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
Dionne and Garand (2000) pointed out that there was hardly literature on risk
management in non-financial firms which proposed adopting a portfolio approach of
risk management. This apparent lack of study had not made it possible to offer a
simultaneous observation on all available diversification possibilities for a firm to
manage its overall portfolio, e.g. interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity
prices. This lack of literature was due to the fact that there were limited proposed
models which were able to measure potential correlation between the different
sources of risks for firms. Furthermore, there are also lack of proposed models that
featured the simultaneous implementation of various strategies to manage risks, e.g.
purchase of insurance, hedging against currency exchange fluctuations, credit risk of
partners (Dionne and Garand, 2000).
102
2.5.3 The RiseofEnterprise Risk Management
As a consequence to the frequent occurrence ofcorporate financial reporting
scandals of late, enterprise risk management or ERM has emerged as a new
paradigm for managing the portfolio of risks facing organizations. ERM seems to
be able to stand up to the calls from the corporate world for a new mechanism which
focuses on the improvement of corporate governance and risk management (Beasley
et al., 2005). Specifically, enterprise stakeholders are expecting larger oversight on
key risks facing the entity to ensure that stakeholder value is enhanced and well
preserved (Walker et al., 2002). The design of ERM provides exactly such a
mechanism in that it enhances the abilities of the board and senior management to
oversee the portfolio ofrisks facing an enterprise (Beasley et al., 2005).
Numerous regulatory reforms globally contributed to the growth of ERM
deployment. In the U.S. for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 (SOX 2002)
has significantly extending public policies related to effective corporate governance
and risk management. The recent amendments in the New York Stock Exchange's
(NYSE) Corporate Governance Rules saw the inclusion ofspecific requirements for
NYSE registrant audit committees to shoulder explicit responsibilities with respect
to "risk assessment and risk management". These responsibilities include the
assessment and management of risks that are beyond financial reporting (NYSE,
2003; Beasley et al., 2005). Thus, a successful ERM deployment can serve as an
effective corporate governance mechanism to pre-empt the ever-changing portfolio
ofrisks facing the enterprise. In the absence of this kind ofmechanism, stakeholder
value is at risk. From the regulatory standpoint, this can potentially result in major
io:
public policy concerns if it is no tackled properly and with urgency (Beasley et al.,
2005).
In respond to the new regulatory requirements for enterprise risk
management, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) in September 2004 issued Enterprise Risk Management-
Integrated Framework, to provide a model framework for ERM. The COSO's
framework defines ERM as follows:
Aprocess, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and
other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO,
2004).
Many organizations are deploying ERM processes to enhance the efficacy of
their risk management initiatives, with the ultimate objective to increase stakeholder
value (Beasley et al., 2005). In this respect, ERM is able to deliver a significant
input of competitive advantage for organizations which can demonstrate a strong
ERM capability and discipline (Stoh, 2005).
Despite the rise and increased acceptance of ERM however, not all
organizations are adopting it. There is little insight as to why some organizations
embrace ERM while others do not. There is also little academic research on the
efficacy, impact, and factors associated with the implementation of ERM.
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2.5.4 Factors Associated with ERMImplementation
Two recent academic studies looked into the adoption status of ERM.
Kleffner et al. (2003) examined the characteristics ofCanadian companies and their
ERM adoption status. The study revealed that companies adopting ERM cited the
following determinants (with respond frequency in bracket) as the key factors
causing their adoption of ERM: "the influence of the risk manager (61%)",
"encouragement from the board of director (51%)", and "compliance with Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSE) guidelines (37%)". Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) on the other
hand gauged the appointments ofChief Risk Officer to investigate the determinants
of ERM adoption. The study found that companies appointing a Chief Risk Officer
had higher leverage.
A global survey of insurance executives found that enterprise-level risk
management has caught the attention of insurers and was given high-level
accountability as well as clear responsibilities (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2004).
An empirical study by Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson (2005) looked into
factors associated with the stages of ERM implementation at a variety of US and
international organizations. Based on the data collected from 123 organizations,
Beasley et al. (2005) found that the stages ofERM implementation were positively
related to the presence of: (i) a chief risk officer, (ii) board independence, (iii) the
apparent support for ERM from the CEO and CFO, (iv) the presence of a Big Four
auditor, (v) entity size, and (vi) entities in the banking, education, and insurance
industries. Furthermore, Beasley et al. (2005) also found that US organizations to
have less-developed ERM processes than their international counterparts.
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2.5.5 Financial Crises and ERMImplementation byMalaysian PLCs
The East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the 2008 global financial
meltdown as a result ofUS sub-prime mortgage crisis have had profound impact on
the earnings of Malaysian companies. For instance, it has been reported that in the
aftermath ofthe 1997 and 2008 crises, the Malaysian stock market had experienced
a drop of about 45% of its market value (measured through its barometer Kuala
Lumpur Composite Index, KLCI) (Angabini &Wasiuzaman, 2010). The drop in the
market value could be a manifestation of the material direct impact from the crises
on companies' earnings or a knee-jerk reaction of the lost of confidence on the
future prospect of companies' earning due to informational asymmetries. The latter
phenomenon (informational asymmetries) was evident for the 2008 crisis as things
were quickly settling down after the market realized that the situation was not as
severe for the Malaysian market as it was initially anticipated. The market
rebounded strongly in 2010 and the better-than-expected situation was mainly due to
some good precautionary measures being put in place by the regulators to safeguard
market stability after learning from the bad experience in the 1997 crisis.
Majority of Malaysian public listed companies did not encounter much
problem either in terms of liquidity or earnings capacity during the 2008 crisis.
Compared to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, this time around most ofthe companies
had already put in place some form of enterprise risk management (ERM)
mechanism within their operating structure, courtesy to the learning curve obtained
from the awful experience in 1997. Even if some companies initially faced a few
problems, they rebound strongly and quickly thanks to their ERM program
implemented.
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The experience during the 2008 crisis has somewhat attested the efficacy
of ERM program. As firms can expect more challenges ahead in their business
dealings, they should see the importance of instituting a formal ERM program
within their operating structure to cope with future challenges.
2.6 VALUE PROPOSITIONS FOR CORPORATE / ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT
As discussed earlier that Dionne and Garand (2000) identified two classes of
argument in the principal theoretical studies (e.g. Tufano, 1996) on the determinants
for firms (non-financial enterprises) to undertake risk management activities. These
two classes ofargument are (i) to maximize firm value, and (ii) to protect risk-averse
managers.
Many literature such as those of Doherty (2000b); Stulz (1996); and Froot et
al. (1993) have cited the following principal determinants derived from the two
classes of argument for firms to engage in risk management, namely (i) reducing
cost of financial distress, (ii) lowering risk premium, (iii) lowering tax burden, (iv)
avoiding costly external financing, (v) reducing informational asymmetry, (vi)
firms' capital structure, (vii) increasing investment possibilities, (viii) agency
problem, and (ix) managers' risk-averseness. This thesis provides further review on
these principal theoretical determinants which lead to the proposed value creating
enterprise risk management arguments as follows:
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2.6.1 Reducing Cost ofFinancial Distress
Studies such as Dionne and Garand (2000); Stulz (1996) have also provided
evidences that are consistent with value-maximization theories ofrisk management.
These studies investigate the primary rationales for risk management. One primary
rationale is to mitigate the costs offinancial distress. There are evidences to support
the hypothesis that firms engage in risk management if they are more likely to incur
financial distress costs. For example, a study by Wall and Pringle (1989) provided
evidence that firms with lower credit ratings are more likely than those with higher
rating to use derivative contracts such as swaps for risk management. However,
Cummins et al. (1998) indicated that the evidence is not persuasive for non-financial
companies. This argument is refuted by Dionne and Garand (2000) with their
empirical study in the gold mining industry. The study provided yet another
evidence to indicate that the cost of financial distress is high for firms with heavy
debts as well as with stakeholders who are risk averse.
2.6.2 Lowering Firms' Risk Premium
Dionne and Garand (2000) also highlighted that two principal determinants
for corporate risk management, namely financial distress costs and risk premium,
were always bundled together for analysis in study since there were no variables
capable of differentiating between them. As such, the two determinants
demonstrated similar effect on corporate risk management. Dionne and Garand
(2000) pointed out that firms with high expected financial distress costs and those
with high risk premium to pay to their various creditors and business partners were
more strongly motivated to engage in risk management in order to hedge their risks
108
to reduce these two costs, i.e. financial distress cost and risk premium, and hence
increase the firm's net value.
Dionne and Garand (2000) employed four variables to measure these costs.
They are direct and indirect operating costs, long-term debt weighted according to
market value, payment of dividends, and use of preferred shares. The former two
have positive association with the firm's financial distress costs whilst the latter two
have negative association with financial distress cost which measure the firm's
financing possibilities other than debt instruments. Dionne and Garand (2000)
concluded that firms with high production costs are less efficient, hence more prone
to financial failure. Thus, these firms would soon find themselves in financial
difficulty. As a result, they would pay higher premiums to their various business
partners.
2.6.3 Lowering Tax Burdens
Another primary rationale for the firm to engage in risk management activity
is that of reducing expected tax burdens. Evidence on taking position in derivative
contracting as the risk management tool to reduce company's expected tax liabilities
is more convincing (Cummins et al, 1998). Empirical study by Nance, Smith, and
Smithson (1993) reports non-financial companies with higher investment tax credits
are more prompt to transact in derivative markets. Cummins, Phillips, and Smith
(1997b) also lend evidence to support the tax hypothesis that taxes are a significant
determinant for companies to engage in derivative transactions. Furthermore, risk
management through hedging enables firms to reduce fluctuation in their earnings.
If firms are having a convex tax structure, this may cut their average taxes (Dionne
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and Garand, 2000). This tax structure convexity argument is derived from the nature
of governments' asymmetrical methods of taxation (Dionne ad Garand, 2000;
Doherty, 2000b; Graham and Smith, 1999). The empirical study by Dionne and
Garand (2000) indicated that risk management through hedging reduced taxable
income volatility within the range of 5% whilst the mean of the tax save variable
was about 5%.
2.6.4 Avoiding Costly ExternalFinancing
Numerous studies have lend strong evidence that firms engage in risk
management, primarily using derivatives as the tool, to ensure the stability of
internal funding mechanism through the reduction of income stream variation. This
is to ensure that firms have sufficient internal fund to undertake attractive and
positive yielding projects. Internal funding is preferred over the external ones
because the former is cheaper. These findings are consistent with the costly external
finance hypothesis which postulates that managers persistently trying to alleviate the
need to source costly external funds for taking advantage of investing in profitable
projects. For instance, Gay and Nam (1997) document evidence that non-financial
firms with low levels of liquidity and high growth opportunities, as measured by the
ratio of the market value to the replacement value of the firm, tend to hedge more
with derivatives. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1977) and Nance, Smith, and
Smithson (1993) deliver similar findings. Both studies find that less liquid non-
financial firms are more likely to use derivative to prevent situations in which firm
may force to forgo valuable projects due to a shock to the internal capital resources.
A study by Ahmed, Beatty, and Talceda (1997) on 152 U.S. commercial banks
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reports that banks with less liquidity tend to hedge their exposure to various price
risks by using derivatives. Studies by Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997a, 1997b)
on insurers find that firms with large portion of illiquid assets tend to mitigate the
volatility of their income stream with derivatives.
2.6.5 Reducing Informational Asymmetry
However, not all risk management undertaken by managers only serves the
narrow interest of managers themselves. Risk management is justifiable if it will
enhance enterprise value. Cummins et al (1998) put forth two generic rationales
which argue that there may be in shareholders' interest for certain types of
enterprises to manage risk. The first rationale is that there may be some risks that are
not tradable and the second rationale is that there exists situation in which there are
informational differences among owners and managers. The existence of non-
tradable risk limits the degree of homemade diversification that shareholders can do
for themselves (Smith and Stulz, 1985) whilst informational differences can lead to
undervaluation of firms (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993), which is obviously not
in the interest of the corporation's shareholders (Cummins et al, 1998).
One of the examples of non-informational frictions that prompt for value-
related motive of risk management by managers is the existence of fixed costs,
especially those that are related to the use of derivative instruments during the risk
management process which require large up-front costs. Another example is that of
costs on the firm that are associated with financial distress or bankruptcy. Examples
of these costs are both the direct legal and regulatory costs of bankruptcy as well as
the indirect cost costs resulting from deteriorating relationships with key employees,
111
suppliers, or customers. Even in the case where bankruptcy is not the ultimate
outcome, the indirect costs related to financial distress faced by a firm can have an
adverse impact on the firm's cash flow (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988). Due to this
dynamism, shareholders would rationally be supportive of hedging profits in an
effort to protect themselves from incurring these costs (Cummins et al., 1998; Smith
and Stulz, 1985).
On the informational friction front, Froot, Scharfstin, and Stein (1993) argue
that if there is asymmetric information between managers and potential outside
investors, this will result in even a fundamentally sound firm, when facing
temporary distress, will find raising the needed funds in the capital market to be
either not easily available or too costly, i.e. firm will have to sell securities to
outsiders at a discount, which is less than the full-information value of the claims on
the firm. As such, by engaging in risk management activity to hedge against the
fluctuation in the firm's cash flow, such as by entering into futures or forward
contracts, these firms can avoid having to go to capital markets to source funds
during the time oftemporarily financial distress (Cummins et al, 1998).
2.6.6 Firms' Capital Structure
The link between a firm's capital structure and risk management activity has
attracted numerous studies. Conceptually, it is believed that a firm with higher debt
ratio structure will increase the likelihood of financial distress. For example, if a
firm uses more debt instruments over equity in its balance sheet, it is said to be
highly leveraged. Hence, the firm assumes more risk for the shareholders since the
financial obligation on these debt instruments is contractual. In this regard, many
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studies investigate whether a firm's likelihood to engage in risk management via
derivatives contracting is a function of the firm's capital structure. Mian (1996),
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) do not find evidence to suggest that derivatives
trading is highly linked to a firm's capital structure. Minton, and Schrand (1997)
take a step further by examining the relationship between capital structure and the
decision to manage foreign currency exposure by recognizing the simultaneous
nature of managers making capital structure and risk management decision for their
firms. Minton and Schrand incorporate the joint decision making process of
managers in their estimation procedure. Result of the study shows no relationship
between capital structure and the decision to use derivatives.
Studies on decision by financial companies to use derivatives in managing
risk of financial distress have delivered mixed results. Study by Sinkey and Carter
(1994) provide only mild evidence suggesting the relationship between risk
management activity and capital structure of U.S. commercial banks. Similarly,
Gunther and Siems (1995) show no significant link between the usage of derivatives
and the capital structure of the firm. Further more, when probing further on those
banks that recorded higher volume on derivative trading, Gunther and Siems find out
those banks to have higher capital ratios. This result seems to be not in tandem with
the financial distress hypothesis. Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997b), however,
reveal a result in support of financial distress hypothesis which show a significant
and negative relationship between capitalization level of insurance companies with
the engagement in using derivative products.
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A study on non-financial firm regarding the capital structure-risk
management link conducted by Dolde (1996), however, reports a significant
complementary relationship between the two variables. In the study, Dolde applies a
control on the firm's underlying exposure to various financial risks.
2.6.7 Increasing Investment
It is crucial for firms to ensure stable and ample internal earnings so that
there isno need to seek external financing to fund investment projects. According to
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), external funding is a more expensive funding
method since entrepreneurs (borrowers) and investors (lenders) are in an
asymmetrical information position in regard to the quality of investment projects to
be financed. As such, firms should hedge risks to strive to reduce the fluctuations of
internal earnings. This can avoid in missed opportunities for good investment
projects or having to fund investment projects with costly external financing. This
argument is especially true during theperiod of lowinternal earnings.
Dionne and Garand (2000) observed a positive relationship between
investment opportunities and hedging ofrisks. Dionne and Garand (2000) employed
two variables: exploration (in gold mining industry) and acquisitions to measure
investment opportunities. Nonetheless, Dionne and Garand (2000) cautioned that
this relationship couldbe very wealc and even negative in the case where the values
of investment opportunities are themselves random. For example, when there is
occurrence of natural diversification within the firm, and if this natural
diversification is positively linked to investment opportunities and the source of
internal financing, then the need for hedging will be much less.
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2.6.8 Agency Problem
The rationale and justification for risk management in corporations have
always been a contentious issue. As Cummins (1998) had rightly indicated, farmers
for example, who may engage in risk management by participating in futures or
forward commodity markets before harvest time to hedge against the price volatility
of their anticipated crop and a firm with large number of shareholders, which is
facing the same commodity risk as the farmers, may not take costly market position
to manage risk as it may be cheaper for the shareholders to reduce or eliminate the
risk by diversifying their portfolio holding instead (Cummins et al., 1998). This
argument is supported by the two studies by Modigliani and Miller (1958; Miller
and Modigliani 1961) which said that any effort undertaken by managers in
changing the risk profile of the firm's cash flow could not benefit their shareholders
in a world with no transactions costs or taxes. In the situation postulated by Miller
and Modigliani, shareholders would be able to do at no costs what managers would
do to maximize shareholders' value. Although Miller and Modigliani's studies on
changing the firm's risk profile through the use of debt instruments or the
arrangement of dividends distribution instead of using financial derivative securities,
argument on the essence of who should manage risk is the same regardless of the
methods and instruments used (Cummins et al., 1998).
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2.6.9 Managers' Risk Averseness
As such, the question arises as to why managers of widely held corporation,
who are supposed to act in the interest of their stockholders, should bother to
manage risk since their shareholders could presumably do so and at lower cost at
their personal portfolio holding level. Cummins et al. (1998) highlight the motives
for such an effort in one of these two areas: "either there are some risks that
shareholders cannot manage for themselves as inexpensively" or "managers are
acting in their own interest, rather than those of the stockholders of the firm".
Cummins et al. further argue that managers have an economic incentive to ensure
the firm continues to do well in that they have disproportionately large investments
in the forms of their skills or human capital in the firm. It is costly to transfer these
skills should they need to seek other works. As such, managers concern about any
negative shocks to profits that might result in putting the firm into financial distress
or the edge of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy and times of financial distress often lead to
the replacement of current management. This poses a huge personal risk that cannot
be easily diversified like what shareholders can.
Tufano (1996) investigates managerial motives for risk management by
looking into managerial compensation schemes and hedge ratios in the gold mining
industry. Tufano argues that risk-averse managers whose compensation comes in
large part through acquiring shares in the firm will be motivated to engage in risk
management to safeguard their interest by securing the firms' cash flow. In contrast,
managers who earn a relatively large portion of their compensation through the
granting of stock options would have higher tolerance on risk since they could
simply not exercise the options should the firm underperform whilst on the other
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hand, they could capitalize the high payoffs offered by their positions should the
firm do well. Results ofTufano's study are in line with the risk aversion hypothesis
ofrisk management. Two salient points have been highlighted by Tufano's study.
Firstly, the interest of shareholders will not be enhanced as there is almost no
evidence to support the various rationales that would make risk management a
value-maximizing decision. Secondly, the study reveals that risk management
activity is much less in the firms that have large cash balances.
Traditional finance theory like the one postulated by Sharpe (1964),
however, highlighted that shareholders are not always agreeable with the managers'
line of thinking about risk management. Stockholders would not share
management's dismay about financial distress or even the failure of one particular
corporation. It is only about systematic risk of the portfolio holding, or the portion of
risk that cannot be diversified away by spreading out their investment across firms
with various types of businesses, that shareholders are concern about. Stockholders
therefore, would not be inclined to support actions by management that reduce risk
that is viewed as diversifiable (Cummins et al, 1998). The conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders in the need for risk management in this respect
reflects a typical scenario of agency problem.
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2.7 MANAGING RISK INDIVIDUALLY VIS-A-VIS INTEGRATED
APPROACH
Meagher and O'Neil (2000) pointed out that the current risk management
approaches are fragmented, treating risks as disparate and easily compartmentalized.
Bierc (2003) supported this argument by saying that risk is typically viewed as
something to be avoided or mitigated - and to be separated, categorized and
addressed in silo. Bierc (2003) continued to argue that risk management has often
been practiced to merely comply with the many new rules and regulations, which
has failed to add any sustainable value. To meet the needs of future business,
according to Meagher and O'Neil (2000), risk management process should be one
that improves the linkage of risk and opportunity and to position it as a source of
competitive advantage. The process should seek a wider concept and understanding
of risks that present themselves within the setting of an organization. The
undertaking of these risks then should be lined up with corporate strategies,
objectives, and goals (IAAS, 2008).
In addition, the risk management approach should be positive and proactive,
value-based and broadly focused, embedded in processes, integrated in strategy and
total operations, and continuous. On the other hand, Miller (1992) cautioned that
corporate risk management is not limited to the assessment of exposure to losses and
application of appropriate financial risk management practices. He pointed out that
financial and strategic responses are interrelated in such a way that decision making
in either area to the exclusionof the otherwould be suboptimal.
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2.8 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (ERM): THE OPERATIONAL
DEFINITION
Chapman (2003) defined ERM as the process of identifying and analyzing
risk from an integrated, company-wide perspective. Meagher and O'Neil (2000) on
the other hand, described enterprise-wide risk management (EWRM) as a structured
and disciplined approach in aligning strategy, processes, people, technology and
knowledge with the purpose of evaluating and managing the uncertainties the
enterprise faces as it creates value. Stoke (2004) viewed enterprise-wide risk
management (ERM) to be an essential element of modern business as the focus for
corporate risk management is shifting from operational hazards and pure financial
risks to a much more strategic view ofthreats to business success and an appetite for
upside risk. Stoke added that by combining this with a more holistic, top-down
approach to risk strategy and appetite, companies can focus their attention on most
significant threats to business objectives and achieve even greater value from risk
management. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) concurred that unlike the traditional
"silo-based" approach to corporate risk management, ERM enables firms to benefit
from an integrated approach in managing risk that shifts the focus of risk
management function from primarily defensive to increasingly offensive and
strategic.
In a nutshell, the concept of ERM entails a paradigm shift which dictates that
the focus of risk management has to be shifted from the conventional operational
hazards and pure financial risks to a much more strategic view of threats to business
success. A robust and dynamic risk management framework should also promote an
appetite for upside risk. The framework for business risk management process
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traditionally will not run away from the following basic steps: evaluating,
identifying, measuring, treating, and monitoring risk. The Committee ofSponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission's (COSO) ERM's model consists of 8
components: internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk
assessment, risk response, control activities, information and communication, and
monitoring (COSO, 2004; Chapman, 2003). In comparison, the Arthur Andersen
Business Risk Management Process (BRMP) develops a risk management
framework that comprises 7 elements: (i) establish the business risk management
process, (ii) assess business risks, (iii) develop business risk management strategies,
(iv) design/implement risk management capabilities, (v) monitor risk management
performance, (vi) continuously improve risk management capabilities, (vii)
information for decision making (Meagher and O'Neil, 2000).
To ensure successful enterprise-wide risk management process
implementation, Meagher and O'Neil (2000) emphasized the following 4
dimensions: (i) moving away from fragmented approach, towards an integrated and
systematic framework that gives credibility to the risk management role within the
business; (ii) identifying risk management goals and linking them to enterprise's
strategies; (iii) delegating responsibility for risks and making managers accountable
to the board for continuously improving the management of those risks; (iv) do not
only manage individual risks, butbe able to systematically pool them and assess risk
as a portfolio for the enterprise as a whole.
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In comparison to the old silo-approach of risk management, ERM
proponents argue that an integrated approach of risk management increases firm
value by reducing inefficiencies inherent in the traditional approach, improving
capital efficiency, stabilizing earnings, and reducing the expected costs of external
capital and regulatory scrutiny (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003). Bierc (2003) introduced
the concept of strategy risk management (SRM). According to Bierc, SRM should
be developed and pursued with substantial regard to the key drivers that would
impact success and value ofacorporation. It should keep an organization focused on
the things that drive success, providing tools that effectively measure "execution".
An ERM initiative typically includes the following activities: (i) articulating
and communicating the objectives of the organization, (ii) determining the risk
appetite of the organization, (iii) establishing an appropriate internal environment,
including a risk management framework, (iv) identifying potential threats to the
achievement ofthe objectives, (v) assessing the risk i.e. the impact and likelihood of
the threat occurring, (vi) selecting and implementing responses to the risks, (vii)
undertaking control and other response activities, (viii) communicating information
on risks in a consistent manner at all levels in the organization, (ix) centrally
monitoring and coordinating the risk management processes and the outcomes, (x)
providing assurance on the effectiveness with which risks are managed.
The above activities of an ERM program is well represented by a schematic
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Figure 2.1: Enterprise Risk Management Framework
Source: Tanjung Public Limited Company Risk Management Process
http://www. tanjongplc. com/flashSite/Corporatelnfo/systemControl. asp
[29 April 2008]
2.9 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS
Earlier in the chapter, it has been presented clearly on the contradictory
argument between classic finance theory (CFT), neo-classical financial theory
(NCFT) i.e. Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), and risk management value-maximization theory on the efficacy of
corporate (financial) risk management. Note that the efficient frontier and CAPM
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are elements of Modern Portfolio Theory and the latter is a part of neo-classical
financial theory (Belmont, 2004). In this section, this thesis will provide a discussion
on the consolidated view of all arguments that will lead to a new perspective of
corporate risk management and hence, the development of the research model for
the study.
To provide an overview, CFT advocates two primary risk management tools
for investors in their wealth investment, namely, (i) diversification10 and (ii) asset
allocation1'. These two concepts of investors' risk management tools were first
studied and popularized by Harry Markowitz (Belmont, 2004). Harry Markowitz in
1952 extended his work by introducing a Model of Portfolio Theory. He theorized a
relationship between risk and return. Markowitz's model of portfolio theory
emphasizes on risk return trade-off in terms of mean-variance efficient portfolio,
hence the introduction of the Efficient Frontier of various assets combination and
weight. An efficient frontier ofan investment domain (Figure 2.2) represents a set of
"efficient portfolios" that maximize expected returns at a given level of portfolio
risk, orthat minimize portfolio risk for a given expected return (Belmont, 2004).
However, Markowitz (1952) posited that there are as many efficient
portfolios that lie on the efficient frontier as there are investor risk preferences.
Nonetheless, by referring to this efficient frontier and based on their risk
preferences, investors can construct risk-return efficient portfolios that offer them
the optimal return (Belmont, 2004); that is, a diversified portfolio of securities that
Diversification ofportfolio means the exercise ofdistributing portfolio holding across agreater
number ofassets (i.e. to include more than one asset type in the investment holding such as
combining stocks, bonds, money market instruments, commodities, real estate and etc in order to
reduce exposure to risk).
Asset allocation, on the other hand, entails the decision ofdetermining the amount ofwealth being
invested across asset classes.
12:
provide investors with the highest level of return for a given level of risk (Chatterjee
et al, 1999). Essentially, Markowitz's model of portfolio theory also stipulates that
investors can only get a higher return by accepting a higher level of risk along the





Figure 2.2: The Efficient Frontier
Source:Belmont (2004), p.22.
Applying these two powerful options of diversification and asset allocation
advocated by the CFT, the NCFT (i.e. Modern Portfolio Theory and CAPM) on the
other hand, postulates that any internal risk management effort undertaken by the
firm to reduce its firm-specific risk will be of no value to shareholders because
shareholders can easily employ the above two risk management options, and
arguably at a cheaper cost, to attain the same purpose and effect through building an
investment portfolios. This argument holds true unless firm-specific risk
management can prove to result in the increase of the present value of the firm's
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cash flow. As such, internal risk management by the firm should focus only on
reducing its systematic risk by such ways ofhedging or buying insurance (Belmont,
2004). This conclusion of NCFT somehow runs counter to the initial value
proposition of corporate risk management by the CFT. For instance, Markowitz's
model of portfolio theory would suggest that if managers could find ways to
minimize the firm's cash flows volatility, or "total risk"12, then they could create
value for shareholders as long as the stabilized cash flows would not come at the
expense of their expected value. NCFT such as CAPM, which extended
Markowitz's portfolio theory, demonstrated that in equilibrium, the "market
portfolio" is the only one efficient portfolio that applies to all investors, regardless of
their risk preferences. Hence, therein gives rise to the notion of beta. Thus,
according to CAPM, beta risk is the only risk that investors should be concerned
about in equilibrium (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
Notwithstanding so, it is worth noting that according to another school of
thought, i.e. the classic efficient market theory, even the management of systematic
risk is futile. This is because it will not add value to shareholders since the costs of
such activities like hedging and buying insurance policies will completely offset the
value of eliminating such systematic risk. Hence a zero sum game ensued for
shareholders (Belmont, 2004; Doherty, 2000a).
"Total risk is defined as the standard deviation in a firm's returns over some specifies time period-
say, 150 trading days" (Chatterjee et al., 1999:564). In the concept of portfolio risk, total risk is the
sum of systematic (market) risk and unsystematic (firm-specific) risk.
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2.9.1 CAPM; Systematic riskversus Unsystematic risk
Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) introduced Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) by using the concepts ofdiversification and asset allocation,
coupled with the modern portfolio theory as building blocks (Belmont, 2004; Bettis,
1983). Variables that are involved in CAPM's formulation are systematic risk,
specific risk (unsystematic risk), beta, and risk premium. Core to CAPM's notion is
the division a security's total risk into two parts, namely the systematic risk (also
called market risk) and the unsystematic risk (also called firm-specific or unique
risk). CAPM explains systematic risk as the component of an asset's price variance
that is affected by the movement of the general market. It is also referred to as
market risk. The covariance of the market and the asset's price movements is
measured by a coefficient called Beta (p). Thus, systematic risk is the risk of holding
the market portfolio (Belmont, 2004).
Specific risk of an asset, on the other hand, is the other component of the
asset's price variance that is unique to itself and has no correlation to the general
market movement. This element of specific risk can be eliminated through
diversification within an asset class. Systematic risk, however, cannot be diversified
away. Nevertheless, it can be hedged. According to CAPM, the marketplace is
efficient and compensates investors for taking systematic risk. Exposure to specific
risk (idiosyncratic risk) will notbe compensated because CAPM expects investors to
diversify that risk away without reducing returns and at no cost in their portfolios'




where E(RS) is the expected return on assets Rf is the return on a risk-free asset; P™
measures the covariance of asset's return to that of the market; E(Rm) is the
expected return on the market. Since p (beta) measures the sensitivity of an
investment's return to movements of the entire market, stocks with a beta of less
than 1 will be less risky than the market whilst those with a beta greater than 1 will
be more risky than the market (Bettis, 1983). In the CAPM formula term, the
product of pmi [ E(Rm) - Rf ] represents risk premium for stock i. In other words, it is
the compensation for the stock's exposure to the systematic risk.
CAPM's assumptions are:
• There are no taxes or transaction costs.
• All investors have identical investment horizons.
• All investors have identical perceptions regarding the expected returns,
volatilities and correlations of available risky investments.
In the context of NCFT's uniform assumptions of such a simple world (i.e.
perfect13 and complete markets14), Tobin's (1958) saw a super-efficient portfolio as
represented by the market portfolio (Tobin quoted by Belmont, 2004). Bettis (1983)
pointed out that although CAPM's formulation is explained in terms of stock
returns, it has a parallel implication in capital budgeting situations where:
Financial markets are perfect if: (l) there are no differences in information across investors (i.e.
markets are informationally efficient and information is simultaneously and fully available to all
market players). (2) there are no taxes. (Belmont, 2004: 26)
4Amarket is complete if: (1) all streams of cash flows can be traded irrespective of amount, time,
structure, and risk profile. (2) a risk-free asset exists whose interest rate is the same for all market
participants irrespective of lending or borrowing. (3) costless and complete information leads to
homogenous expectations and tothe absence ofarbitrage opportunities. (Belmont, 2004:26)
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r = rf + (project beta) (rm - rf), and
r = required rate of return on the project.
Hence, the required rate of return on a project increases in tandem with the project's
beta. It then follows that the true cost of capital is influenced by the risk profile of
theproject for whichthe capital is put to use (Bettis, 1983).
2.9.2 Recent Challenges to CAPM
Lusk, Halperin & Bern (2008), Guo (2004) and Chatterjee, Lutbakin &
Schulze (1999) highlighted that CAPM's theoretical veracity has been questioned by
many scholars owing to its simplifying assumptions which do not conform to reality.
For instance, Chatterjee et al. (1999) cited examples such as Kadlec & McConnel
(1994), Levy (1978) and Merton (1987) who doubted that investors are fully
diversified as assumed by CAPM; Roll and Ross (1994) who claimed the
impossibility to construct a fully diversified portfolio; Teece (1984) who referred to
CAPM's static equilibrium as a "fictitious state"; Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), Stein
(1988, 1989) who rejected CAPM's perfect market assumption from economic of
information point of view on the premise of information asymmetries that exist in
the markets; Arrow (1974) who stressed that the reason why markets fail and
organizations are formed is because markets do not distribute information
thoroughly, albeit efficiently. Due to these asymmetries, Chatterjee et al. (1999)
noted that it has created principal-agent problems which prompted agency theorists
championing the setting up of a proper governance mechanism within corporate
structure.
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Besides, CAPM's predictive validity has also been challenged (Lusk et al.,
2008; Guo, 2004). Fama & French (2004) and Chatterjee et al. (1999) cited
examples of Reinganum (1981); Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986); Merton (1987);
Bhandari (1988); Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991), who doubted the predictive
ability of beta. These authors provided empirical evidence which indicated that
investors were concerned with more than just beta. In addition, Chatterjee et al.
(1999) also highlighted other studies which suggested that the predictive power of
non-market (firm-specific) factors are better than beta alone when it comes to
predicting stock returns. For instance, Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.557) cited Levy
(1978) who found that "a firm's unsystematic risk is a key predictor" to stock
returns; Basu (1983) who found that "the earnings-to-price ratio explains stock
returns at least as well as beta"; Merton (1987) who found that "both beta and firm-
specific risk are important predictors". On the other hand, other researchers such as
Bhandari (1998) also found that leverage is just as important in predicting stock
returns. Whilst Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1993) found the same effect for total
variance in a firm's stock returns (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
Evidence from some strategy studies also challenges beta's "predictive
validity" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.557). Forexample, Amit and Wernerfelt (1990)
highlighted the material impact of firm-specific risk by noting an inverse
relationship between a firm's market value and its level of unsystematic risk. Miller
and Bromiley (1990), Cannella and Lubatkin (1993), Lubatkin and Chatterjee
(1994), on the other hand, found a significant correlation (p < .001) between beta
and unsystematic risk at .43, .32, and .31 respectively (Chatterjee et al., 1999). The
two terms were estimated from the market model. Chatterjee et al. argued that the
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two risks should be uncorrected since they are randomly distributed across firms.
The significant correlation indicates that the two terms have "an overlapping
component that is omitted from the model" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.557).
Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.557) described Fama (1991, 1997) and Fama and
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) as an "arguably the most prominent challenge to
the predictive validity of beta". Fama and French (2004, p. 43) described the
version of CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) as "has never
been an empirical success". Fama and French (2004) cited the following reasons as
to why CAPM has failed empirically. Firstly, it is due to investors' irrational pricing
of stocks in terms of book-to-market ratios for sorting growth and distressed firms.
Secondly, the failure is caused by the oversight of the model itself incapturing some
other important dimensions of risk (i.e. the covariance of investors' portfolio return
with labor income and future investment opportunities). Moreover, Fama and French
(2004, p. 41) also noted that researchers have a problem to find reasonable proxies
for market portfolio. They noted that the model's stipulation for market portfolio is
"theoretically and empirically elusive". As they put it: "it is not theoretically clear
which assets (for example, human capital) can legitimately be excluded from the
market portfolio, and data availability substantially limits the assets that are
included".
Thus, Fama and French concluded that market model is not effective in
predicting stock returns, but is able to explain the majority of its variation. However,
these authors found that the market model's accuracy could be markedly
strengthened by adding two firm-specific factors, namely, firm size (market
capitalization) and book-to-market value (i.e. higher average returns on small stocks
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and high book-to-market stocks) (Fama & French, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999).
They argued that although these two variables are not themselves state variables,
"they reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks
(covariances) in returns that are not captured by the market return and are priced
separately from market betas" (Fama& French, 2004, p.38).
In conclusion, in determining a firm's risk premium, investors are concerned
with more than just the covariance of the firm's earnings with that of market
portfolio, or beta. Other state variables (i.e. inflation) as previously cited and firm-
specific elements are just as relevant and important in deciding a firm's share prices
and in estimating long-term returns (Fama & French, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999;
Barber & Lyon, 1997). The growing recognition of firm-specific measures in asset
pricing, nonetheless, has posed "a challenge to CAPM because of their theoretical
nature" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p. 558). Fama and French label these measures as
"empirical anomalies" because they are not given any "special standing in asset-
pricing theory" (Fama & French quoted by Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.558).
Notwithstanding so, these measures are given due recognition by authors like Fama,
French, Lakonishok, Haugen, DeBondt, and others in estimating a firm's risk
premium (Fama & French, 2004; Chatterjee et al, 1999). Despite all these,
Chatterjee et al. (1999) reckoned that the use of firm-specific measures like firm size
and book-to-market value is rather "coarse grained" and justifications to include the
measures into a model of asset pricing are "too theoretically thin" to satisfactorily
tackle the "what and why questions".15 Nonetheless, recent study by Drew,
5Chatterjee et al. cited Ravenscraft (1983) in suggesting that theory supports size for a firm's
structure advantage, thus attributing it to expected stock returns. But evidence from case studies and
management theories reveal the shortcomings of pursuing size for its own sake. Besides, there are
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Marsden, and Veeraraghavan (2007) on CAPM residuals (unexplained variance) in
relation to idiosyncratic risk suggests that the residuals may be linked to firm size
with the smaller firms having higher residuals than do larger firms.
The above represent the many attempts in response to the fine tuning of
CAPM's predictive power on asset returns in the trading markets by incorporating
firm-specific variables. The most recent studies such as Lusk, Halperin & Bern
(2008), Ferreira & Laux (2007), Drew, Marsden & Veeraraghavan (2007), and
Fetcher (2007), on the other hand have been focusing on the filtered output of the
CAPM model, or the residuals, in examining idiosyncratic risk profile of
organization as the structural information employed to recalibrate the use of the
CAPM as an effective tool in the firm's planning decision support system (Lusk et
al., 2008). Other studies such as Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) have provided foundation for the analysis of
idiosyncratic risk. For instance, Lusk et al. (2008) presented an analysis on
reformulating the CAPM with the focus on idiosyncratic risk and Roll's meta
analysis16. Based on Roll's (1988) meta-analysis of R2 (coefficient of
determination) which revealed that CAPM explained less than 50 percent of the
relative linear movement of the firm's returns vis-a-vis those of the market, Lusk et
al. (2008) attempted to sort out the structure of the uncertainty embodies in the
unexplained variation - the residuals, or the idiosyncratic risk17, which is given by 1-
also no solid theoretical supports for their inclusion in estimating a firm's risk premium. This
argument also holds true for book-to-market value.
16 See Roll, R. (1988), "R2", Journal ofFinance (July).
Also variously referred toasnon-systematic, unique or a-synchronous risk.!7
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R2. In doing so, Lusk et al. (2008) characterized the residuals of the CAPM by
citing Knight's concept of uncertainty18.
Lusk et al. (2008) replicated similar study by Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria
(2004) by examining the residuals of the CAPM for organizations rated as to their
corporate social responsibility (CSR), which has been identified as one of the several
possible structural drivers of idiosyncratic risk, in an attempt to discern structural
variable relationships associated with the idiosyncratic risk19. Boutin-Dufresne and
Savaria (2004) found that there was a negative/inverse relationship between the CSR
profile and idiosyncratic risk. Lusk et al. (2008) furthered the study by analyzing
the CSR partition with the return/idiosyncratic risk relation. Specifically, Lusket al.
(2008) investigated the profile relationship between Jensen's a20 and IRiskBHL21
using the CSR profiles. The results found no evidence to support that there is a risk
relationship relative to the CSR classification (i.e, high responsible-HR and low
responsible-LR) of the firms. In addition, the results also failed to support the
established notion of return/risk relationship for the LR group of firms.
18 See section 2.1.2 on Knight's definition on risk and uncertainty.
19 Other possible structural drivers of idiosyncratic risk identified are private information, corporate
governance, firm size, executive compensation, and political instability.
Jensen's a is the classic measure of the market benchmarked excess return from the mean variance
CAPM givenby Jensen's a = fc - (rt + % /)•„, - rj).
IRiskBHL is Ben-Horim/Levy formulation which has now become the standard measure of
idiosyncratic risk: lRiskBHL a = ac-[%x anJ <jc-[%x a„J (see Ben-Horim & Levy, 1980).
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2.9.3 Unsystematic Risk and Risk Premium: CAPM modification
CAPM's theoretical framework clearly indicates that there is no favorable
risk pricing effect for reduction in unsystematic risk, hence implying that any
deliberate effort on the part of the firms to manage their unsystematic risk is futile.
However, assuming if there would be a positive effect on managing unsystematic
risk, how would this notion impact the variables in the CAPM formula then? It
should follow that variable r, representing the required rate of return for an asset or a
project, should be reduced due to the lower risk profile (either perceived or
otherwise). A lowered r, which is also used for discounting firms' expected cash
flows, should yield a higher firm value as follows:
Firm value = X E(CFt) / (1 + n) *
where X E(CFt) is the sum of all expected cash flows, t is the time period, and r is
the discount rate. And according to NCFT, on the basis of maximizing shareholders'
wealth, the appropriate firm-decision rule is for managers to pursue all investment
opportunities that will yield a positive net present value (NPV) (Belmont, 2004).
In the CAPM's formula E(r) = Rr + pmi [ E(Rm) - Rf ], where Rf is the risk
free rate, p1" is the firm's (asset) beta or the correlation coefficient of that particular
firm to the market portfolio. The term [ E(Rm) - Rf ] is the market potfolio's risk
premium and the term p™ [ E(Rm) - Rf ] is the firm's risk premium. The reduction of
expected or required rate of return, E(r), will be significantly influenced by the
firm's risk premium term, or p1" [ E(Rm) - Rf ]. The return on a risk-free asset (Rf)
and the expected return on the market [ E(Rm) ] are externality variables to the firm
that there is nothing much managers can do to influence them managerially other
than to hope for market forces to change these variables in the favorable direction
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for risk pricing reduction. The same applies to the firm's beta (p™). Beta measures
the covariance ofthe firm's return to that ofthe market portfolio, or in other words,
it is the measurement for the firm's systematic risk. The only way the beta of the
firm will change is by way of the firm varying its existing business line so that its
business risk profile is relative to that ofthe market shifts. One example ofthis is to
initiate business diversification through either the firm's product lines or target
markets. But this managerial maneuvering involves the systematic risk aspect ofthe
firm. As such, in order to capture the positive effect of managing a firm's
unsystematic risk and reflect it inthe CAPM formulation, we may attempt to include
an additional variable, i.e. ja, to impact the firm's risk premium term. This variable
should take a negative value so that it can have diminishing effect on the term p™ [
E(Rm) - Rf ] such that the new risk premium term ofthe firm becomes p™ [ E(Rm) -
Rf ] - p. Thus, the modified CAPM formula that recognizes the effect ofmanaging a
firm's unsystematic risk shall be:
E(Ri) = Rf+pmi[E(Rm)-Rf]-M
Conceptually, it should be noted in the above formula that the effect of
unsystematic risk does not come in the form of a direct reward for bearing them in
the way similar to bearing systematic risk in the asset pricing model. Rather, the
reward comes from the nature for its successful reduction or elimination. This notion
runs contrary to the concept of market risk in asset pricing whereas investors are
being rewarded for bearing market risk because it is not diversifiable. Nonetheless,
the notion of unsystematic risk management does not suggest that firms be rewarded
for bearing unsystematic risks. This is because those risks are diversifiable.
However, the notion suggests that firms to be rewarded for their ability to reduce
135
those unique risks that they face. The rationale for this reward system is by giving
the recognition that managing firms' unsystematic risk can result in firms enhancing
their capability to improve earnings. This earnings improvement can come in the
form of reducing or eliminating negative profit variation, reducing cost of financial
distress, minimizing agency problem, enhancing corporate brand name and the likes.
Managers, thus, should endeavor to manage firms' unsystematic risk well enough to
earn the largest possible value of -u. as possible from the investors in order to reduce
the firms' required rate of return (risk premium) or cost ofcapital.
In the context of asset pricing, the idea for managing firms' unsystematic risk
comes from the hypothesis where it is postulated that investors would welcome such
a reduction in firms' specific risks. As a result, investors would demand a relatively
lower risk premium for their investment in the firm. Neverheless, in transforming
the above hypothesis into precise mathematical formulation, the challenge would
emerge in the area of firms' valuation. The measurability of firms' value
enhancement as a result of this unsystematic risk management would hinge on the
market's ability to identify and quantify the reduction of each firm-specific risk for a
reward (i.e. the reduction in discount rate), that is, the p, as mentioned above.
2.9.4 The rebuttal
According to modern financial theory, managing unsystematic risk will not
be rewarded by the stock market (Bettis, 1983). However, Bettis (1983) highlighted
that the idea of managers should not be concerned with managing unsystematic risk
is contradicting with the notion of corporate strategy and the theory of strategic
management. This contradiction is vividly highlighted with Salter and Weinhold's
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(1979, p. 106) account on managerial behavior that: "Given a business opportunity
producing a cash flow, the risk/return model emphasizes that market value will be
affected by managing systematic risk rather than unsystematic, or company specific
risks. Ironically, managers spend most of their efforts on these very real company
specific risks (such as competitive retaliation, labor relations, or even bankruptcy)
which are both obvious and immediate, as well as being potentially disastrous to
personal and organizational welfare" (Salter and Weinhold quoted by Bettis, 1983,
p.408). This managerial situation is very true considering that unsystematic risks are
associated with firms' specific resources and competencies. Moreover, the risks are
also linked to the firms' operating environment (Bettis, 1983). To this end, Andrews
(1980) argued that managing these unsystematic risks become inherent in the
concept of matching corporate resources and competencies to opportunities within
the firms' environment (Andrews quoted by Bettis, 1983).
Bettis (1983) indicated that there had been many studies that had showed the
success of companies through strategic management that relied on the strategic
adaptation by skillful, rigorous, and continuous management of unsystematic risk.
Examples are those empirical studies of company success by Hall (1980) and
Mintzberg, (1987), theoretical explanations in industrial economics (Penrose, 1959),
a massive study of industrial history (Chandler, 1962; 1977). Apart from these, in
the area of organizational theory, studies by Chakravarthy (1982), Child (1972), and
Summer (1980) indicated effective management of unsystematic risk was the central
cause of organizational evolution, where "the cause that determines which
organizations survive and grow and which decline and die" (Bettis, 1983, p.408).
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In the marketing domain, one example of unsystematic risks in the context of
corporate strategy management is the issue of entry barriers. For instance, Van
Home (1980) cited specific management of unsystematic risk in managing the risk
of a newentrant into a market where a firm is competing. To manage this risk it will
entail the formulation of strategy for deterring such new entrants. Hence, corporate
strategy will require managers to devote attention to barriers of entry. One such
strategy researcher that has notably been arguing the importance of managing
barriers of entry under various conditions for firms to stay competitive in the market
place is Porter (1980). Studies in industrial organization economics such as
Shepherd (1979) and Scherer (1980) also gave generic conclusion that the profit
potential of an industry or individual firm was influenced by the height of barriers to
entry.
Thus, a manager who does not manage unsystematic risk (i.e. entry barriers
as in the above examples) is to ignore an important element of strategy (Bettis,
1983).
2.10 A STRATEGIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RISK PREMIUM: THE
CLS MODEL
We can conclude from the above discussion that the views of modern
financial theory (neo-classical finance theory) and that of strategy theory are
somehow contradicting when it comes to corporate risk management and
specifically in the context of the efficacy of ERM. In effect, the conclusions of
modern financial theory also mn contrary to that ofclassical theory (i.e. Markowitz)
in this respect. Nevertheless, as Bettis (1983, p.409) aptly put it: "To alter either
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result is to disrupt significantly the logical structure of the underlying discipline".
But then, how can one provide plausible and sensible explanations in an effort to
describe this discrepancy and to even reconcile the difference? Therefore, it will be
ofgreat interest and significance to attempt to provide a theoretical linkage among
the three schools of thought, namely the classical finance theory, neo-classical
finance theory, and strategy theory. This thesis, hence, endeavors to provide such
linkage.
To begin with, we may describe the apparent contradictory conclusions of
neo-classical financial theory (NCFT) which sits on one camp and classical/strategy
theory on the other by drawing reference to some anecdotal evidences of the
practices of corporate risk management in the real world. Risk management in the
context of NCFT would only mean diversification, asset allocation and to a certain
extent, the hedging or transfer of risk (Belmont, 2004). However, Belmont (2004,
p.21) also pointed out that, in the real world realm, corporate risk management
activities include "a logical and systematic method of establishing the context,
identifying, analyzing, evaluating, mitigating, monitoring and communicating risk
associated with any financial activity, function or process in a way that will enable
organizations to minimize financial losses andmaximize financial opportunities".
This description by Belmont (2004) on the ultimate purpose of corporate risk
management (i.e. minimizing financial losses and maximizing financial
opportunities), however, is still not as comprehensive as what this thesis will be
defining for the concept of enterprise risk management (ERM). In the context of
ERM, its framework shares the same logical and systematic method as the above
risk management procedures mentioned by Belmont (2004). However, ERM will go
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further by establishing additional goals of dealing with all business activities, from
financial to operational, and to minimize/maximize not only financial
losses/opportunities, but also other aspect of business losses/opportunities such as
reputation, branding, governance, and corporate entrepreneurship, to name a few.
The operational definition ofERM is given in earlier section ofthis chapter.
Another stark distinction ofthe concept of ERM as compared to the notion of
risk management by NCFT is the management ofunsystematic risk or firm-specific
risk. In effect, apart from managing systematic risks, ERM also highlights the
importance for managing unsystematic risk with the belief that it will lead to an
enhanced shareholders' value. This concept blends well with the value-enhancing
notion as postulated by strategy theory. Hence, to bridge the gap of the seemingly
contradicting arguments regarding unsystematic risk management between modem
financial theory and strategy research, it requires a model that fits well within the
two contradicting schools ofthought. This model shall serve as the value enhancing
transmission mechanism of ERM. One such plausible model is related to the risk
premium of the firm. In this light, this thesis attempt to theorize a model capturing
the causal relationships of the risks that are strategically associated with the firm's
performance. This thesis directs its research lens toward the notion of managing
firms' unsystematic (specific) risk via an enterprise risk management framework
that leads to the enhancement of shareholders' value. The mechanism through which
firms' value enhancement takes place is by developing a strategic conceptualization
of risk premium.
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The focus is on the adaptation of a model called "a dynamic framework of a
firm's risk premium" developed by Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) which
will reconcile and fill in the gap between modem financial theory and strategy
theory. Throughout this thesis, this risk premium model developed by Chatterjee et
al. (1999) is referred to as the CLS (risk premium) model.
2.10.1 The CLS risk premium model
The CLS risk premium model was developed based on the assumption that
investors do care about firm-specific risk. This is owing to the fact most investors
are not as fully diversified and markets are not as perfect as CAPM assumes. The
interactions among constructs in the model take reference from information
economics, resource-based view of the firm, and the industry structural view of
strategy (Chatterjee et al., 1999). The information economics highlights the
existence of information asymmetries in the market and notices that the belief
among market participants to be heterogeneous. The resource-based view of the firm
provides explanation that the asymmetries that happen in the resources markets are
caused by the characteristics of the resources in which they are lumpy,
heterogeneous, and to be acquired with a cost. The industry structural view of
strategy on the other hand, sees asymmetries in market power distribution in the
input and output markets (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
In developing the CLS risk premium model, Chatterjee et al. (1999)
postulated that investors are exposed to various classes of firm-specific risk in a
world of partial diversification and imperfect markets. This notion forms the core of
the CLS model. In other words, CLS model makes extension to the CAPM notion
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where apart from recognizing the sensitivity of a firm's expected returns to
macroeconomic uncertainties, CLS risk premium model also gives inclusion to the
sensitivity of a firm's expected returns to three additional classes of firm-specific
risks. This is the part where CAPM has omitted. CLS risk premium model
categorizes these three classes of unsystematic risk as tactical, strategic, and
normative risk. As Chatterjee et al. (1999) pointed out tactical risk exists mainly in
information asymmetries, whilst strategic risk comes from imperfections in the
resource and output markets, and finally normative risk presents itself in the forces
that define institutional norms.
2.10.2 Tactical risk
The nature of tactical risk lies with the uncertainty in firm's expected
earnings. It is based on the assumption that investors are averse to earnings surprises
owing to information asymmetries. Hence, investors will request lower risk
premium from firms who can stabilize earnings. Firms can employ three strategies to
manage tactical risk, i.e. the use of financial tactics, hedges, and real options.
Chatterjee et al. (1999) pointed out that financial tactics include earnings
management, governance, and liquidity. He cited earnings management literature
which indicates that the use of financial tactics can minimize information
asymmetries that exist between management and investors. This will result in
enhancing investors' ability to forecast earnings. Chatterjee et al. (1999) also pointed
to Healy & Palepu (1995) which provided theoretical and Chaney & Lewis (1995)
which provided empirical evidence that firms can reduce their risk premium if they
can reduce this source of tactical risk for investors by developing a reputation to
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minimize earnings surprises. Smith et al. (1994) cited example of GE's low risk
premium owing to the management's rapport and effort in helping investors to
forecast earning estimates. It also cited Disney's low risk premium partly to the use
of specific accounting and sales scheduling tactics in smoothing out earnings.
Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Mathieu (2004) found evidence in the banking industry to
support the hypothesis of earnings management to reduce earnings variability, which
in turn led to favorable risk premium reflected in share prices and the cost ofcapital.
Thus, CLS risk premium model posits that earning management serves to directly
link firm-specific actions and risk premium. This is depicted by arrow H in Figure
2.3.
Empirical studies such as Hughes, Liu and Liu (2007) and Morkoetter and
Westerfeld (2009) further support the information asymmetry-risk premium
argument. For instance, Hughes et al. (2007) investigated how asymmetric
information affected a firm's cost of capital. The study examined the impacts of
private signals that were informative of both systematic factors and idiosyncratic
shocks in influencing asset payoffs. Keeping total information constant, Hughes et
al. (2007) found that greater asymmetry led to higher factor risk premium, hence
higher costs of capital. Morkoetter and Westerfeld (2009) on the other hand
highlighted the important roles of credit rating agencies which acted as information
agents in overcoming information asymmetries that exist between investors of
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) markets and the issuers. Morkoetter and
Westerfeld (2009) argued that the incorporation of incremental information through
assigned ratings will reduce information asymmetry, thus increased transparency.
This resulted in lowering investors' demand for risk premium and leading to lower
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credit spreads. Markoetter and Westerfeld's (2009) empirical analysis found that on
average credit spreads decreased with an increasing number of ratings.
Besides earnings management literature, Chatterjee et al. (1999) also found
support of the above firm-specific actions and risk premium relationship in
governance, liquidity, hedging, real options, and strategy literature. For instance,
governance literature indicates that investors will raise a firm's risk premium if the
firm fails to provide satisfactory market oversight by adopting a poison pill tactic.
On the other hand, Gardiol et al. (1997) and Lehn et al. (1990) suggested that if a
firm develops a reputation for achieving predictable growth, investors will not only
lower the firm's riskpremium, they will also allow its management some freedom to
decide on the type of information to be made public, as well as allow the
management voting control of the firm through dual class share (Gardiol et al. and
Lehnet al. quoted by Chatterjee et al., 1999).
In liquidity literature, Bmnnermeier and Pedersen (2009) presented an
empirical model that linked an asset's market liquidity and traders' funding
liquidity. The study showed that under certain conditions, margins would be
destabilized and market liquidity and funding liquidity were mutually reinforcing,
leading to liquidity spiral. The model predicted that speculators' capital was a driver
of market liquidity and risk premiums (Bmnnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). Tarek
(2009, p.46) presented empirical evidence that liquidity risk was a factor to be priced
for the yield spread of risky corporate bonds and that "the associated liquidity risk
premia helps to explain the credit spread puzzle". Kim's (2008) empirical study
found that liquidity constraint played a crucial part in determining yield spreads. The
study concluded that the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates
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could be supported when incorporating liquidity and risk premiums. Gardiol et al.
(1997) postulated that stock liquidity has direct linkage with a firm's risk premium
in that it affects an investor's potential cost ofexisting from an investment. A firm
with illiquid shares outstanding will find investors asking for higher risk premium.
As such, a firm can increase liquidity by splitting its stock to lower its risk premium
(Gardiol et al., 1997). The above relationships between liquidity and risk premium
are illustratedby arrow H in Figure 2.3.
The hedging and real options literature describes tactics that present indirect
relationship between firm-specific actions and macro-economic risk. This indirect
linkage is indicated by arrow I in Figure 2.3. Chatterjee et al. (1999) presented
anecdotal (Froot et al., 1994), theoretical (Smith, 1996; Smith & Stulz, 1985), and
empirical (Froot et al, 1993) evidence that the effective use of hedges22 and real
options by firms will result in investors requiring lower risk premiums. This is
because the use of hedges and real options enables the firms to reduce the
probability of earning surprises. For example, hedges function as "contingent
commitments that minimize the sensitivity ofa firm's future earnings to cyclical and
random variations in the price of those commodities the firm considers essential to
its particular value chain" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.559). The use of these
instruments also offers flexibility to firms because they do not incur firms as
significant an opportunity costs as those incurred by fixed resource commitments
(Chatterjee et al., 1999).
Hedges include derivatives, swaps, futures contracts, and options. Financial hedges reduce the
possibility of default whilst adding to a firm's debt capacity. Non-financial hedges, such as futures
contracts, grant the firm the right to take possession of commodities at a later date.
Real options are contingent commitments made by a firm that grant it the right to secure non-
commodity resources at a later date.
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The above argument is supported by Lee and Makhija (2009) who found
evidence that the flexibility provided by real options of international investment
could create value for firms when faced with domestic economic uncertainty. This
was true when the international investment network was characterized by greater
breadth and lower depth (Lee &Malchija, 2009). Gaur and Seshadri (2005) on the
other hand presented the construction ofoptimal hedging transactions for inventory
risk to minimize the variance of profit and increase the expected utility for a risk-
adverse decision maker. This hedging strategy catered for a short life cycle or
seasonal inventory when its demand was correlated withtheprice of a financial asset
(Gaur & Seshadri, 2005). In addition, Mieghem (2003) highlighted that risk
aversion contributed to the firm's capacity problems and that financial and





Figure 2.3: The CLS Risk Premium Model
Normative risk
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The above discussion of tactical risk presented by various research streams
(i.e. earnings management, governance, liquidity, hedging, and real options) has lent
support to the argument that some firm-specific activities are relevant to investors.
The conclusion of which posits that by managing this tactical risk that is rooted in
informational asymmetries in the market between managers and investors, it will
lower the variance of a firm's expected earnings by way of minimizing its earnings
surprises. This in turn, will result in investors demanding lower risk premium from
the firms (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
2.10.3 Strategic risk
The nature of strategic risk is due to the uncertain performance outcomes
from the firm's committed resources. It is caused mainly by imperfections in
resource and output markets (Chatterjee et al, 1999). Since firms' survival in the
marketplace hinges on how well the firms formulate strategy in committing and
deploying their scarce yetprecious resources to stay competitive, it follows that risks
exist if the goal to attain and sustain such competitive advantage from the committed
resources cannot be achieved. Thus CLS model defines strategic risk as "the
probability that a firm can isolate its earnings from macroeconomic and industry-
specific disturbances" (Chatterjee et al., 1999:560). This risk is represented by
arrows J and K in Figure 2.3.
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The concept of earnings isolation can find its core in strategy literature such
as those of Barney (1991) and Rumelt (1984). As pointed out by Chtterjee at al.
(1999), strategy literature provides good accounts for various determinants of
strategic risk. These include the firm-structure view, resource-based view,
knowledge-based view, and strategic options view.
For instance, Porter (1980) analyzed strategic risk from the firm-structure
view. He categorized strategic risk in his "five forces" analysis of market rivalry and
"diamond theory" of national competitive advantage (Daniels et al., 2007; Chatterjee
et al., 1999). Porter's five forces of market rivalry are (1) supplier power, (2) threat
of substitutes, (3) degree of rivalry, (4) buyer power, and (5) barriers to entry
(ICMBA, 2007). Porter's four determinants of diamond theory for national
competitive advantage include (1) factor endowment, (2) demand conditions, (3)
related and supporting industries, and (4) firm strategy, structure, and rivalry
(Daniels et al, 2007). According to Porter's diamond theory of competitive
advantage, one determinant for firms' to attain competitive advantage lies with the
firms' "strategy, structure, and rivalry" (Daniels et al., 2007).
Porter also stressed that due to the fact that the five forces of strategic risk
(market rivalry) are asymmetrically distributed in industries, firms whose
organization possess structural advantage may flex their muscles in order to isolate
their earnings from their rivals' onslaught (degree of rivalry) as well as from
potential threat coming from the remaining four forces (ICMBA, 2007; Chatterjee et
al., 1999). Owing to this, Chatterjee at al. (1999) postulated that firms that are able
to flex their market power to stabilize and enhance their cash flows by leveraging
and sustaining theirstructural advantages will enjoy lower risk premiums.
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On the other front, the resource-based view (RBV) of strategic risk argues
that a firm may keep its resource-based advantages from the knowledge of its rivals.
This is because valuable resources are sometimes intangible and tacit, coupled with
the fact that their distribution is not homogeneous. The nature of these advantages
hence, enables a firm to keep them invisible from the detection of competitors. As a
result, it will help cripple competitors' effort to strategize against the firm (Barney,
1991; Connor, 1991).
As such, a firm with resource-based advantage will be able to isolate itself
from market pressures, similar to that of structural advantages (Chatterjee et al.,
1999). For example, Porter noted that to reduce demand-side risk, a firm can
strategize customer loyalty program such as offering better quality good and services
at lower cost than its rivals to ride through cyclical downturns (Porter quoted by
Chatterjee et al., 1999). Similarly, to handle supply-side risk, a firm can forge
strategic alliances with its suppliers and manage its factors of production and supply
chain more effectively (Daniels et al., 2007; Russell & Taylor, 2003).
Referring to Lane & Lubatkin on the knowledge-based view of a firm's
strategic risk, Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.561) pointed out that "the ability of firms to
absorb, interpret, and commercialize critical information on a timely basis is also
asymmetrically distributed". Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.561) cited Intel and Microsoft
as firms which may enjoy low risk premiums because their knowledge advantages
on innovation enable them to reinvent their product life cycles, "create asymmetries
for future advantage, and partially isolate their earnings from technological
obsolescence".
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Chatterjee at al. (1999) deduced the fourth and last determinant of strategic
risk from strategic options literature such as that of Sanchez (1993). Chatterjee et al.
(1999) explained that strategic options might have originated from "real" options,
which are contingent in nature, but later turned to its form when firm committed its
resources to the contracts due to changes in market conditions. According to
Raynor (2008), strategic options are fundamentally different from growth options in
that their focus is not to create possible avenue for new growth, but to create the
opportunity to redirect strategy in the existing business model. Chatterjee et al.
(1999, p.561) reckoned that strategic options are investments that are difficult to
undo once committed. Firms undertake such commitment in order to "mitigate
specific sources of macroeconomic and industry-specific disturbances risk". Miller
(1998) noted that the use of strategic options is due to the unavailability of other
type of options, like hedges. Nonetheless, Raynor (2008) pointed out that to manage
strategic risk effectively a firm has to establish a portfolio of strategic options so that
it can create "strategic flexibility" without compromising the need to commit.
Examples of strategic options are such as a firm may develop fee-earning
services to subsidize other activities - a case of cross subsidy of activities (DCG,
2006). A firm may also diversify to other sector of economy to reduce its single
business exposure. In the service industry, a firm can expand by adding services to
an unrelated client group or to an unrelated type of service, or in an unrelated area
(DCG, 2006). Miller (1998) suggested acquiring a key supplier so to minimize the
sensitivity of its cash flows to price variability of non-commodity inputs.
150
In summary, based on the above various views (firm-structure, resource-
based, knowledge-based, and strategic options) of strategic risk faced by the firms,
the CLS risk premium model posits that "investors require a lower risk premium for
firms that achieve a degree of isolation from market forces because these firms can
offer investors the promise of stable earnings and growth" (Chatterjee at al, 1999,
p.560).
2.10.4 Normative risk and dynamicforces
CLS model posits that risk premium advantages attained through active
management of tactical and strategic risks are temporary. Due to competitive forces,
any previous advantages will be imitated by competitors and will be neutralized
after some time. At this point, the ability oftactical and strategic risk management to
reduce risk premium will diminish and they will become "nothing more than a
source of variance about some baseline level of firm-specific risk" (Chatterjee et al.,
1999, p.562). Tactical and strategic actions will then lose its uniqueness and
differentiating factor but become institutionalized and pre-requisites for firm to stay
in the industry (Chatterjee et al., 1999; Scott, 1995; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). This
relationship is presentedby arrows L and M in Figure 2.3.
Normative risk, thus, is defined as the risk premium (or penalty) that a firm
is subjected to if it fails to comply with its institutional norms or rules that it is
expected to follow (Gunningham et al., 2005; Graf, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999).
These norms represent the common expectations of the firm's stakeholders (i.e.
investors, regulators, interest groups) with regards to its behavior (Graf, 2004). CLS
model stresses that complying to pre-requisite norms will not yield firms any reward
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but will be slapped with higher risk premium if firms fail to observe them. This is
owing to investors having to bear additional risk without the promise of higher
return (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
Financial accounting literature such as Jones (1996) provided indirect
support for this assertion. Jones (1996) noted consistent evidence that the
incremental information provided by going-concern audit opinions had an influence
on investors' reaction. Gunningham et al. (2005) on the other hand examined
regulated firms' perceptions in the electroplating and chemical industries of how
various instrumental, normative, and social factors motivated these firms'
environmental compliance actions. The study found that "implicit general
deterrence", i.e. the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity,
was far more vital than either specific or general deterrence. The study concluded
that most reputation-sensitive firms in the environmentally sensitive chemical
industry opted to act significantly above compliance for reasons that were related to
risk management as well as to the perceived requirement to safeguard their social
license to operate. Apart from that, almost half of the respondents cited normative
explanations for their compliance (Gunningham et al., 2005).
Relationship of theabove argument is depicted by arrow N in Figure 2.3.
Chatterjee et al. (1999) also posited that tactical risk premium advantage (i.e.
lowering the variance of expected earnings through minimizing information
asymmetries) is more susceptible to "isomorphic pressure" than strategic risk
premium advantage to be transformed into normative activities. This is because
competencies attained through tactical activities are more common and imitable (i.e.
tactical activities canbe outsourced to financial intermediaries).
152
As for strategic activities, Chatterjee et al. (1999) deduced from Miller
(1998) that strategic risk premium advantage (i.e. a firm's ability to isolate its
earnings from market forces) is itself the function ofmacroeconomic variability. For
instance, fluctuation in foreign exchange rates can affect a firm's cost strategy. In
other words, sources of isolation will become less "strategic" when competitive
forces weaken the effect of structural advantages. As such, CLS model posits that
"market forces transform competitive advantage from firm-specific determinants of
risk premium to institutional norms" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.562). This hypothesis
is indirectly supported by evidences presented by Chan & Chen (1991) and Fama &
French (1995). Both studies concluded that firms suffer higher risk premium as soon
as expectation build up that the sustainability of firms' current earnings are in
question, long before they actually decline.
However, as the adage of"what goes around comes around", Chatterjee et al.
(1999) theorized those activities that have been institutionalized may once again be
linked to a firm's strategic risk profile. This is due to the fact that institutional norms
may be transformed by changes in the macroeconomic environment or by the
formulation ofnew strategies. This notion is in tandem with conventional strategic
thought for a firm to reinvent itself in facing market challenges by "finding new uses
for existing resources and capabilities" or by "changing the rules of the game"
(Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.562).
Nevertheless, as in the words of Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.563), "norms
impart a neutral influence on the risk premium unless mismanaged". This nature of
normative risk is obviously different from those of tactical and strategic risks which
firms can actively manage so to create asymmetries into their risk premium
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advantages vis-a-vis their rivals. As in the case of institutional norms and industry
rules, firms have to ensure their proper compliances so to avoid penalty charged
onto their risk premium.
2.10.5 CLS risk premium model in summary
CLS risk premium model highlights the notion that there are dynamic
relationships between unsystematic risk (i.e. tactical, strategic, and normative risks)
and a firm's risk premium. Thus, firm-specific activities and skills derived from the
active management of those risks will influence a firm's risk premium. This
argument is well supported by the current theories of strategy (Graf, 2004).
However, this assertion is apparently inconsistent with CAPM which does not
acknowledge such a relationship. CAPM defines that all firm-specific activities,
which are measured by the variance of the error term in the market model, as
unsystematic risk. This unsystematic risk is not correlated with risk premium. Thus,
it is irrelevant (Belmont, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999). Nonetheless, as discussed,
the theory of CAPM has been subjected to many challenges of late. This is
especially so with the beta being doubted by many studies to be a reliable proxy for
the firm's risk premium (Adrian & Franzoni, 2009; Lusk et al., 2008; Guo, 2004;
Fama & French, 2003).
The concept of CLS model, on the other hand, takes a multivariate approach.
The constructs of the model include macroeconomic, tactical, strategic, and
normative risks, all of which are omitted by CAPM. Besides, CSL model also pays
due recognition to the dynamic of the continuous interplay between elements of the
firm's activities and market forces. This approach of conceptual assertion not only
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comes in tandem with the studies of strategic management, but also offers to connect
the former with the theories in financial economics in providing a solid and robust
conceptual framework for enterprise risk management (ERM). This linkage of
theories from the two disciplines (i.e. strategic management and financial
economics) enables the building of a new theory postulating that ERM can lead to
improved business performance and enhanced shareholders value. In effect,
Chatterjee et al. (1999, p.563) suggested building "a more conceptually complete
asset pricing model" with the combination of contributions from the empirical
discovery of financial economics as well as the conceptual description of strategic
management.
Risk premium is a crucial element for firms. It has a profound impact on
finns' cost of capital. Firms with risky profiles in the eyes of investors will suffer
from incurring higher costs when raising capital. This comes in the form of either
selling equity at lower prices or issuing bond/debt with higher coupon/interest rates
(Tarek, 2009; Kim, 2008; Hughes et al., 2007). Firms encountering this situation
will face an unfavorable strategic opportunity set (Copeland et al., 2005). Besides,
higher capital costs will return lower present value when discounting firm's future
earnings. As such it can become a source of competitive disadvantage when a firm
faces its rivals in accessing capital markets (Belmont, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999).
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the structural framework and the relevant
literature relating to the strategic conceptualization of risk premium or the CLS
model.
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Table 2.1: Strategic Conceptualization ofRisk Premium (CLS model)
Firm-
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Based on the theoretical argument laid out in chapter 2 which in particular
takes reference on the value maximization theory of corporate risk management, this
research posits that implementation of ERM program by firms can create value for
shareholders. The conceptual framework is such that ERM implementation will lead
to some tangible andintangible benefits to the firm. These benefits include outcomes
like optimizing risk/return profile of the company, reducing earning volatility (Lam,
2003), strengthening management's confidence in business operations and risk
monitoring, creating smooth governance procedures, enriching corporate reputation,
improving clarity of organization-wide decision making and chain of command,
encouraging corporate entrepreneurship, and boosting enterprise's profitability
(Crouhy et al.,2006; Bailey et al., 2004; Belmont, 2004; Lam, 2003; Bettis, 1983).
These benefits derived from ERM implementation, in turn, will define the distinctive
competitiveness of the firm. This causal relationship is depicted by the arrow A in
the path diagram in Figure 3.1.
However, the study reckons that any potential challenges that may be faced
by the firm either before or during the implementation process will affect its
commitment and intensity level for its planned ERM program. These challenges can
be in the areas of finance, people, information, infrastructure, structure, and
priorities. These challenges become a factor affecting the intensity and commitment
levels of ERM practices by the firm. The influence of this moderating factor is
represented by the dotted arrow B.
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All the tangible and intangible benefits as a result of ERM program
implementation will then lead to lower cost of capital as shown by arrow C and
contribute to improved business performance, i.e. improved price-to-earning ratio of
share price, as depicted by arrow D. The lowering of cost ofcapital is due to risk
premium reduction as a result of the firm lowering its idiosyncratic or unsystematic
risk profile24. The improving price-to-earning ratio of the firm's share prices on the
other hand, happens because investors are willing to pay a higher price for the
company's share at a given level of earning-per-share (EPS) due to the firm's
perceived lower risk profile. These two causal relationships represent the value
creation from ERM program.
Discussion of the research model onthe interaction between a risk premium framework and the









Solid arrows indicate causal relationships
Figure 3.1: Path Diagram of Conceptual Framework
3.1.1 Empirical supportfor ERM
A recent survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited of
senior managers indicated that 84% of the respondents believed that enterprise risk
management can improve price-to-earning ratios and the cost of capital (Belmont,
2004). These two variables are measurement for shareholder value.
From the above study it indicates that there is a link between risk
management and shareholder value creation whereby risk management can improve
returns to shareholders and reduce the cost of capital. Other literatures, such as
Bailey et al. (2004), Lam (2003), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Bierc (2003), Crouhy
et al. (2000), Markides (1994), also indicate similar support to the above linkage.
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3.2 THE PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK
As has been mentioned previously in Chapter 1 of this thesis, this study
attempts to ascertain several interrelated questions in relation to enterprise risk
management (ERM) for Corporate Malaysia. For starters, what are the variables that
determine the commitment and intensity level of firms' ERM implementation
program? Secondly, what benefits can Corporate Malaysia expect from an effective
implementation and a successful ERM program. These questions epitomize a series
of issues which is of both managerial and theoretical importance.
With these research questions, this study theorizes that the commitment and
implementation intensity of ERM program will be determined by the various
challenges faced during such implementation process. The implementation intensity,
in turn, will determine the amount of benefits received by the firm. The thesis
continue to theorize that in the event of corporations successfully implementing the
ERM program, the benefits received from such effective execution will have a long-
term positive impact in creating value for the corporations' shareholders. This value
creation process is achieved via a two-pronged process. Firstly, shareholders' value
is created by way of lowering the corporations' cost of capital which takes place
through a dynamic framework of risk premium reduction mechanism (CLS risk
premium model) as discussed earlier. Secondly, the value is created by means of a
generic improvement of business performance. This improvement encompasses all
functional areas such as finance, operations, marketing, human resources, and
governance. The final result of this two-pronged value creation process is the higher
return of share prices for shareholders. These theoretical relationships are depicted
by Figure 3.2.
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We define the scope of this study in the area of empirical testing the
significance of causal relationships among ERM program challenges, ERM
implementation intensity, and ERM benefit as represented by the solid arrow lines
depicted in Figure 3.2. We refer to this part of Figure 3.2 as the practical
framework whilst we denote the entire causal relationships portrayed in Figure 3.2
as the conceptual framework. The underlying theoretical foundations (theoretical
framework) supporting the conceptual framework has been discussed in section 2.9
to 2.10. Due to practicality and to optimize the research scope, data collection and
the subsequent empirical testing had been geared towards examining the practical
framework. As a result, the practical framework became a predictive model for a




















Based on the conceptual and practical frameworks discussed in sections 3.1
- 3.2 and with their graphical representation in Figure 3.2, this study develops
several hypotheses in an attempt to test the validity through statistical significance of
the value creation or value maximization theory of enterprise risk management that
it posits. Literature of the relevant theories that builds up this study's proposition
has been presented extensively in Chapter 2.
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3.3.1 Hypothesis on the ERM Practical Framework
For starters, this study zooms in on the theorized ERM practical framework
which highlights the causal relationships among the various pertinent constructs as
portrayed in Figure 3.3, namely, Implementation Challenge, ERM Implementation
Intensity, and Perceived ERM Benefit Measures. Each of this construct is measured
by several relevant variables. The details of these construct-measurement relations
are discussed in the later part of this chapter. Two general hypotheses have been
developed to reflect the manner in which these causal relationships are intertwined.
i.e. Hi, and H2, as below. The causal relationships denote that effective
implementation of ERM program can lead to shareholders value creation whilst
certain challenges are present during such implementation:
Hi: ERM Implementation Intensity has a positive effect on Perceived
ERM Benefit Measures




Figure 3.3: The Practical Framework
Hi is to challenge neo-classical finance theory (NCFT) which says that since
investors have access to diversification and asset allocation, internal firm risk
management should then focus on managing systematic risk alone. This is because
investors themselves can diversify away firm-specific risk (unsystematic risk)
(Crouhy et al., 2006; Belmont, 2004; Doherty, 2000a). Conversely, H, attempts to
vindicate the notion that ERM implementation is well justified as shareholders are
not always well diversified. They are also risk-averse and their interests are well
served if firms manage risk on their behalf. This notion of (enterprise) risk
management in corporate environment is well supported by Demsetz & Lehn
(1985), Smith & Stulz (1985), Mayers & Smith (1982, 1987), Amit & Wernerfelt
(1990), Froot, Scharfstein & Stein (1993), Froot & Stein (1996), Tufano (1996,
1998), Smithson (1998), Leland (1998), Cummins et al. (1998).
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To validate the value creation theory of the ERM practical framework as
depicted in Figure 3.3 above, a structural equation modeling (SEM) has been
developed to statistically test the hypothesized causal relationships (structural path),
i.e. Hi and H2, among the constructs for their strengths and significances. The
specified SEM model is made up of the structural and the measurement models.
Detailed discussion of these SEM models is presented in the later part of this
chapter. From the two general hypotheses, i.e. H, and H2, additional hypotheses
which are the subset of H, and H2 have been developed as a result of the three
constructs (i.e. Implementation Challenge, ERM Implementation Intensity, and
Perceived ERM Benefit Measures) being factor analyzed in the SEM model. Again,
the later part of this chapter provides further discussion on this subject.
3.3.2 Hypotheses on Value Maximization Theory ofERM
Neo-classical finance theory (NCFT) postulates that firm will not make any
difference in terms of value creation in relation to corporate (enterprise) risk
management. However, newer theorists have studied the various reasons and
motives for corporate risk management that lead to maximizing shareholders value.
Ample literature on risk management has linked the rationale for such initiatives in
ensuring business performance. Hypotheses that are mostly being cited in those
literature are in the areas of: (i) profit maximization, (ii) financial distress cost, (iii)
lowering tax burden, (iv) costly external financing, (v) credit rating, (vi) equity
market reward, (vii) informational asymmetries, (viii) agency cost.
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3.3.2.1 Cost ofFinancial Distress and Tax Burdens Hypotheses
Mayers and Smith (1982) justified enterprise risk management by looking
into frictional costs that associated with corporate risk. Sibilkov (2009), Nguyen and
Faff (2002), Mayer and Smith (1982) believed that risk would tend to increase taxes
and would increase the prospective costs of financial distress. Huang and Wang
(2009) however found evidence in Chinese listed firms where firms with high
distress costs paid little attention to risk management due to bankruptcy protection
by local governments. Another primary rationale for the firm to engage in risk
management activity is that of reducing expected tax burden (Ramlall, 2010; Morri
& Cristanziani, 2009). Evidence on taking position in derivative contracting as the
risk management tool to reduce company's expected tax liabilities was more
convincing (Cummins et al, 1998). Empirical study by Nance, Smith, and Smithson
(1993) reported non-financial companies with higher investment tax credits were
more prompt to transact in derivative markets. Cummins, Phillips, and Smith
(1997b) also lent evidence to support the tax hypothesis that taxes were a significant
determinant for companies to engage in derivative transactions, which is a form of
corporate risk management. Based on the above literature, which give rise to the
financial distress cost hypothesis and lower tax burdens hypothesis, this study
establishes the following hypotheses:
H3: ERM implementation intensity has an effect on reducing cost of
financial distress
H4: ERM implementation intensity has an effect on lowering tax burden
166
3.3.2.2 Costly External Financing Hypothesis
Numerous studies have lent strong evidence that firms engage in risk
management primarily using derivatives as the tool, to ensure the stability of internal
funding mechanism through the reduction of income stream variation. This is to
ensure that firms have sufficient internal fund to undertake attractive and positive
yielding projects. Internal funding is preferred over the external ones because the
former is cheaper. These findings are consistent with the costly external financing
hypothesis which postulates that managers persistently trying to alleviate the need to
source costly external funds for talcing advantage of investing in profitable projects
(Ramlall, 2010; Park & Pincus, 2001; Gay & Nam, 1997; Ahmed, Beatty, &
Takeda, 1997; Nance, Smith, & Smithson, 1993; Geczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1977).
These arguments lead us to the hypothesis that:
H5: ERM implementation intensity has an effect on reducing cost for
externalfinancing
3.3.2.3 Credit Rating Hypothesis
A study by Wall and Pringle (1989) has provided evidence that firms with
lower credit ratings are more likely than those with higher rating to use derivative
contracts such as swaps for risk management. Other studies such as Puri (2010),
Bajaj (2010), Weber et al. (2010) havefound that risk management would contribute
to better corporate credit ratings. Applying the same concept and motive for
enterprise risk management, this study hypothesizes that
H6: ERM implementation intensity has an effect on improvingfirm's credit
rating
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3.3.2.4 EquityMarketRewardand Informational Asymmetries Hypotheses
Cummins et al (1998) put forth two generic rationales which argue that there
may be in shareholders' interest for certain types of enterprises to manage risk. The
first rationale is that there may be some risks that are not tradable and the second
rationale is that there exist situation in which there are informational differences
among owners and managers. The existence of non-tradable risk limits the degree of
homemade diversification that shareholders can do for themselves (Smith and Stulz,
1985) whilst informational differences can lead to undervaluation of firms (Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993), which is obviously not in the interest of the
corporation's shareholders (Cummins et al, 1998). The presence of informational
friction/asymmetry in the firm will cause even a fundamentally sound firm facing
difficulties raising the needed fund when facing temporary distress (Morkoetter &
Westerfeld, 2009; Hughes, Liu & Liu, 2007; Froot, Scharfstin & Stein, 1993).
The above arguments give rise to the equity market reward hypothesis and
the informational asymmetries hypothesis. Hence, the following hypotheses are
developed:
H7: ERM implementation intensity will be rewarded by the equity market




Agency theory in financial literature was first presented by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). Since then financial economists have examined agency
relationships mainly in the context of owners/shareholders versus managers, and
shareholders versus creditors (Wu et al., 2007; Dufrene, 1993). Other literature such
as He, Mukherjee and Wei (2009), Madura and Nixon (2002), Allen and McConnell
(1998) examined the agency problem between self-serving behavior ofmanagers in
the parent firms versus their counterparts in the equity carve-out units during
corporate restructuring exercises. In the shareholders-creditors agency problem for
instance, conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors bound to happen
when firms are facing cash flows problem. Unless constraints are imposed on
managerial actions, this incentive conflict can lead to dysfunctional investment
decisions (Braun &Latham, 2009; Wu et al., 2007; Cummins etal., 1998).
In the context of corporate risk management, implementation of enterprise
risk management can be motivated by managers acting in their own interest rather
than those of the shareholders of the firm. Nonetheless this may not come at the
expense of the shareholders' interest. Managers have economic incentive to ensure
firm continues to do well because they have disproportionately large investments in
the forms of their skills or human capital in the firm. It is costly to transfer these
skills should they need to seek other work (Cummins et al., 1998). Managers
concern about any negative shocks to profits that might result inputting the firm into
financial distress or the edge of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy and times of financial
distress often lead to replacement of current management. This poses a huge
personal risk that cannot be easily diversified by mangers like what shareholders
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can. As such, in the final analysis, the effect of this managerial motivated risk
management effort can actually lead to positive contribution toward the agency
conflict in the firms. Hence, the above scenario gives rise to the agency problem
hypothesis. This study, thus, hypothesizes that
H9: ERM implementation intensity will reduce agencyproblem in thefitnrms
3.3.3 Hypotheses on ERM Value Creation Transmission Mechanism
The theoretical argument ofthe framework put forth by Chatterjee, Lubatkin,
and Schulze (1999) in relation to a strategic conceptualization of risk premium,
being referred to as the CLS risk premium model in this thesis, suggested that a
firm's specific activities in managing its unsystematic risk can have a positive effect
on reducing the firm's risk premium. The CLS risk premium model postulated that
investors are exposed to various classes of firm-specific risk in a world ofpartial
diversification and imperfect markets. This notion forms the core of our theorized
ERM value creation transmission mechanism (see section 2.12). CLS model makes
extension to the CAPM notion where apart from recognizing the sensitivity of a
firm's expected returns to macroeconomic uncertainties, CLS risk premium model
also gives inclusion to the sensitivity of a firm's expected returns to three additional
classes of firm-specific risks. CLS risk premium model categorizes these three
classes of unsystematic risk as tactical, strategic, and normative risk. Tactical risk
exists mainly in information asymmetries. Strategic risk comes from imperfections
in the resource and output markets. The normative risk, on the other hand, presents
itself in the forces that define institutional norms (Chatterjee et al., 1999).
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3.3.3.1 Tactical Risk Hypothesis
The sources of tactical risk presented by various research streams (i.e.
earnings management, governance, liquidity, hedging, and real options) have lent
support to the argument that some firm-specific activities are relevant to investors
and shareholders. The conclusion of which posits that by managing this tactical risk
that rooted in informational asymmetries in the market between managers and
investors, it will lower the variance of a firm's expected earnings by way of
minimizing its earnings surprises. This in turn, will result in investors demanding
lower risk premium from the firms (Chatterjee etal., 1999). Owing to this, this study
posits the following:
HJ0: ERM implementation intensity willreducefirm's tactical risk
3.3.3.2 Strategic RiskHypothesis
The nature of strategic risk is due to the uncertain performance outcomes
from the firm's committed resources. It is caused mainly by imperfections in
resource and output markets (Chatterjee et al., 1999). Thus CLS model defines
strategic risk as "the probability that a firm can isolate its earnings from
macroeconomic and industry-specific disturbances" (Chatterjee et al., 1999, p.560).
Strategy literature provides good accounts for various determinants of strategic risk.
These include the firm-structure view, resource-based view, knowledge-based view,
and strategic options view.
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In summary, based on the above various views (firm-structure, resource-
based, knowledge-based, and strategic options) of strategic risk faced by the firms,
the CLS risk premium model posits that "investors require a lower risk premium for
firms that achieve a degree of isolation from market forces because these firms can
offer investors the promise of stable earnings and growth" (Chatterjee at al., 1999,
p.560).
Hn: ERM implementation intensity will reducefirm's strategic risk
3.3.3.3 Normative Risk Hypothesis
CLS model posits that risk premium advantages attained through active
management of tactical and strategic risks are temporary. Due to competitive forces,
any previous advantages will be imitated by competitors and will be neutralized
after some time. Tactical and strategic actions will then lose its uniqueness and
differentiating factor but become institutionalized and pre-requisites for firm to stay
in the industry. Normative risk, thus, is definedas the risk premium (or penalty) that
a firm is subjected to if it fails to comply with its institutional norms or rules that it
is expected to follow (Graf, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999). As in the case of
institutional norms and industry rules, firms have to ensure their proper compliances
so that to avoid penalty charged onto their risk premium. Based on the above, this
study hypothesizes that
Hi2: ERM implementation intensity will reducefirm's normative risk
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3.3.4 CLS model as Proxyfor Cost ofCapital
This study adopts the nineteen statements (see items d2 to d20 in Appendix
2) measuring up the three classes of firms' unsystematic risks, i.e. tactical, strategic,
and normative risks of the CLS risk premium model as a proxy for cost ofcapital. A
reduction in the three classes of firms' unsystematic risks as a result of ERM
implementation would mean a reduction in firms' risk premium, hence lowering the
firms' cost of capital. As such, hypotheses Hi0, Hn, and H12 can be rewritten to read:
ERM implementation intensity will lowerfirms' costofcapital.
The impact of cost of capital for Malaysian public listed companies will be
felt when they issue capital instruments such as shares and bonds. The risk premium
demanded by the Malaysian capital market for a company's debt instrument such as
bond or short-term debt notes is influenced by the recommendation made by rating
agencies through the latter's credit profile rating of the formers.
As far as the Malaysian capital market is concerned, the country's central
bank or Bank Negara Malaysia in May 1991 has made the rating of corporate bonds
mandatory in its bid to promote transparency and instill confidence in the country's
capital market, especially in the bond market. This development has given birth to
the setting up of Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM), which has since become a
premier local credit rating agency in the country (RAM, 2002), for such exercises.
As time progresses, the domestic capital market sees the establishment of the second
local rating agency, which is the Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad (MARC).
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3.3.4.1 RAM's rating criteria
The analytical framework that RAM uses to analyze Corporate Malaysia's
creditworthiness is in tandem with our ERM framework's CLS risk premium
model. In its credit rating methodology, RAM takes into consideration both
quantitative (i.e. financial strength) and qualitative (i.e. management quality and
operating environment) factors.
For instance, RAM looks at a firm's (i) industry risk (i.e. growth potential,
vulnerability to industry factors, barriers to entry); (ii) business risk (i.e. market risk
- basis ofcompetition, market position and size, product/service diversity, customer
analysis; operational risk - availability of raw materials, efficiency of assets, cost
structure, labor relations, credit controls, inventory management); (iii) financial risk
(i.e. profitability &coverage, funding structure, capital leverage, cashflow stability
and adequacy, financial flexibility and liquidity); (iv) management assessment (i.e.
corporate strategy, risk tolerance, financial policies, succession planning, credibility
and integrity; and (v) diversification factor (RAM, 2006).
Apart from the above, RAM's credit rating framework also factors in
corporate governance issues such as management integrity, related-party
transactions and disclosure policies (RAM, 2003). RAM's rating scales for a firm's
long-term credit profile rating (CPR) range from "AAA-Superior", "AA-Strong",
"A-Adequate", "BBB-Moderate", "BB-Fairly Weak", "B-Weak", "C-Very Weak",
and "D-Inferior" (RAM,2002).
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3.3.4.2 RAM's rating criteria vis-a-vis CLS riskpremium model
Note that RAM's rating criteria of industry business, and management
assessment risks, together with its diversificationfactor mentioned above, have been
perfectly captured by the CLS risk premium model's strategic25, macroeconomic26,
and normative risks. RAM's financial risk and corporate governance issues on
theother hand, have been referred to as tactical risk28 by the CLS model.
3.3.5 Hypotheses in Summary
This study has developed altogether twelve hypotheses for statistical testing
of their significances and strengths. Below are all the hypotheses in a glance that
have been developed:
Hi: ERM Implementation Intensity has a positive effect on Perceived
ERM Benefit Measures
H2: Implementation Challenge has a negative effect on ERM
Implementation Intensity
H3: ERM implementation has an effect on reducing cost of financial
distress
H4: ERM implementation has an effect on lowering tax burden
H5: ERM implementation has an effect on reducing cost for external
financing
H6: ERM implementation has an effect on improvingfirm's credit rating
25 Strategic risk includes firm-structure, resource-based, portfolio ofstrategic options (diversification,
merger andacquisition supply chain integration), and knowledge-based views of risk.
Macroeconomic risk includes market and pricerisks.
Normative risk includes risk ofno-compliance to industry norms.
Tactical risk includes risks ofgovernance, earning management, and liquidity management.
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H7: ERM implementation will be rewarded by the equity market
H8: ERM implementation will reduce informational asymmetries in the
firm
H9: ERM implementation will reduce agency problem in the firms
Hi0: ERM implementation will reducefirm's tactical risk
Hii: ERM implementation will reducefirm's strategic risk
Hi2: ERM implementation will reducefirm's normative risk
Hypotheses Hi and H2 are to test the validity of the theorized causal relationships
among the constructs in our proposed ERM practical framework. Hypotheses H3 to
H9 are to test the various value maximization theories of ERM. Among them, H3 to
H7 relate to the costof capital of the firm. Hypotheses Hjo to H,2 are to validate the
conceptualization of the strategic risk premium model referred to as the CLS risk
premium model in the thesis. The CLS risk premium model forms the conduit
through with the value creation transmission mechanism of our proposed ERM
framework takes place. This value creation transmission mechanism, which
conceptually connects the ERM practical framework to the end outcome of
shareholders value creation, completes the overall conceptual framework for our
advocated value-enhancing ERM model. Collectively, the testing of hypotheses H,
to H12 represents this study's attempt to substantiate the overall conceptual
framework for a value enhancing ERM framework as depicted in Figure 3.2.
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3.4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN
According to Malhortra (2004), the design of any research can be broadly
classified as either an exploratory or as aconclusive one. In principle, an exploratory
research is conducted primarily to provide insights into, and understandings of, the
problem situation confronting the researcher. On the other hand, a conclusive
research is designed to test specific hypotheses and examine relationships in order to
assist the decision maker in determining, evaluating, and selecting the best course of
action to take in a given situation. As for the latter research design, the information
needed is clearly defined and the process is formal and structured (Shukla, 2009;
Malhortra, 2004).
Malhotra (2004) further classifies conclusive research designs into two
categories, namely descriptive or causal. The descriptive type of research design is
used to describe market characteristics or functions whilst the causal one is
undertaken to determine cause and effect relationships (Shukla, 2009). As for this
study, the research design can be described as to embody both the descriptive as well
as the causal ones. For instance, the research design is based on a descriptive
research whose cross-sectional primary (survey) data is subjected to quantitative
analysis. Apart from that, the hypotheses that are being developed are also subject
to statistical tests using causal research methods.
To illustrate further, this study's conclusive research lies in the form of a
descriptive cross-sectional survey which was conducted to qualify and quantify how
implementation intensity of enterprise risk management will benefit companies,
hence the underlying causal relationship. This research also aims to determine the
relative salience of the factors of implementation challenge towards ERM
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implementation intensity. These factors of implementation challenge are identified
through a exploratory research.
Thus, this research design encompasses both the exploratory and conclusive
ones. In addition, it also covers both the descriptive and causal types. As such, the
classification for this research design is not suitably being referred exclusively to
justa particular type, but rather a hybrid ofa several categories.
3.5 THE POPULATION
The target population for this research is the companies listed on the
Malaysian stock market (Bursa Malaysia), or simply the public listed companies
(PLCs). PLCs are chosen for this study because compared to non-listed firms, they
are more aware and sensitive to the need for formalizing risk management program
within the enteiprise. This is due to the fact that as public listed entities, PLCs are
subjected to statutory regulation from the Securities Commission, market regulation
from the Bursa Malaysia, and face more pressure to impose self-regulation for
corporate best practices of good governance from the shareholders and interest
groups such as that of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG)29. The
research elements30 (respondents of survey) on the other hand, are the public listed
companies' senior officials who are in-charge of the firms' ERM program. These
senior officials include chief executive officer (CEO), managing director (MD).
chief risk officer (CRO), chief financial officer (CFO), general manager (GM),
29 MSWG is a shareholders activism organization whose primary objectives are to promote corporate
governance and to protect minority shareholders interests by sustaining shareholder value in
companies through engagement with relevant stakeholders.
"An element is the object about which orfrom which the information is desired. In survey research,
the element is usually therespondent" (Malhotra, 2004: 315).
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senior manager, and manager of the firms. Questionnaires are sent to all PLCs with
attention to these officials for their responses of agreement for the various
statements presented in the questionnaires in relation to their firms' ERM program.
As of June 2009, there were a total of 960 companies listedon the BursaMalaysia.31
3.6 THE SAMPLING FRAME AND SAMPLING SIZE
The sampling frame consisted of 960 elements32 (public companies listed on
Bursa Malaysia). The sampling frame is a list of all public listed companies'
correspondence contact details provided by the Bursa Malaysia. As such, this
sampling frame of 960 elements also represents the target population under study.
The number of elements required was initially kept at 400. This number represents a
sampling rate of 42 percent against that of the population under study. By a
convention standard of sampling size determination, this sampling rate was
considered to be acceptable (Malhotra, 2004, p.318). This required sampling
elements of 400 was decided upon in view of the fact that a higher number of
elements tends to increase the probability of misrepresentation of the survey
population (Babbie, 1990; Khong & Richardson, 2003). The decision was also
made based on the analytic model using structural equation modeling (SEM). The
analytical method and statistical procedure performed for data analysis using SEM
are discussed in detail in section 3.8 and Chapter 4. Referring to this type ofanalytic
model that employs SEM, Hair et al. (1998, p.605) suggested that the lower limit of
the required elements ina sampling frame should be between 100 and 150. As such,
31 Source: Bursa's Bulletin "BursaBytes", Issue 2, Vol 1, July 2009.
32 Based on the Bursa Malaysia's bulletin, "BursaBytes", Issue 2, Vol 1, July 2009.
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the data collection process was aimed at obtaining returned questionnaires of at least
100, hence meeting the minimum threshold of the data analysis requirement.
3.6.1 The Stratified Sampling Method
This study adopted a probability sampling technique called the stratified
sampling technique. Stratified sampling "is a two-step process in which the
population is partitioned into sub-populations, or strata" (Malhotra, 2004, p.327).
The criterion, or stratification variable, that was used to stratify the sample was the
market capitalization of the PLCs. Market capitalization is defined as the total
market share value of the PLCs. The value was computed by multiplying the share
price with the total common share outstanding of the PLCs. Under this stratification
condition, the PLCs in the Bursa Malaysia were divided into two sub-groups, or
stratums. The first stratum was the top 100 companies with the largest market
capitalization listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The second stratum was the remaining
PLCs. This also means that the required sampling elements of 400 were thus divided
into 100 elements for the first stratum and 300 elements for the second stratum. The
largest PLCs by market capitalization of the top 100 were chosen to be in the first
stratum because until 6 July 2009, these top 100 PLCs by market capitalization were
the component stocks in the Bursa Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur Composite Index, or
popularly known as the KLCI. KLCI was the market barometer index whose daily
movement was used as the proxy for the entire stock market performance for
Malaysia then. The 100-stock KLSE index's computation was replaced by the 30-
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>33stock FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI on 6 July 2009 which adopts the FTSE global
index standard.
The main reasons for using stratified sampling were "to increase precision
without increasing cost" and to obtain greater "effectiveness in controlling
extraneous sampling variation" (Malhotra, 2004, p.327). For instance, by targeting
the top ranking PLCs by market capitalization in the survey, the study practically
believes that more information were available for extraction due to the fact that the
chances are higher for this cluster of the PLCs having instituted proper and formal
ERM programs. In the same light, the chances were also higher that this stratum of
PLCs would have gained more experiences in terms of their own ERM
implementation processes as well as their ERM outcomes. Table 3.1 presents the
summary of the sampling design.
FTSE is an independentcompany jointly owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock
Exchange. FTSE indices are used extensively by a range of investors such as consultants, asset
owners, fund managers, investment banks, stockexchanges and brokers.
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All public listed companies (PLCs) on the
Malaysian stock market (Bursa Malaysia)
Correspondence list of public listed companies
provided by Bursa Malaysia
Stratified sampling by market capitalization with 2
stratums (i.e. stratum 1: top-100 largest PLCs by
market capitalization; stratum 2: the remaining
PLCs)
400 (100 for stratum 1 and 300 for stratum 2)
Allocate sample by strata, select random company
name from list for stratum 2 (cover the entire
elements for stratum 1), initiate contact through
phone calls or emails, send questionnaires to those
agree to participate in the survey
3.7 CONSTRUCTS MEASUREMENT AND VARIABLES SCALE
There are three constructs involved in the practical framework as depicted in
Figure 3.4. They are (i) ERM Implementation Challenge, (ii) ERM Implementation
Intensity, and (iii) Perceived ERM Benefit Measures. The measurement scale for












Figure 3.4: Constructs of the Practical Framework
3.7.1 ERM Implementation Intensity
The construct ERM Implementation Intensity is measured by a measurement
metric made up of survey statements presented to respondents for their assessment.
These survey statements come in the form of 5-point Likert's scale covering three
key dimensions of enterprise risk management framework, namely the process,
governance, and structure. There are fourteen statements in the questionnaire
relating to various ERM elements found in the firm, proxying the ERM
implementation intensity. The statements gauge respondent's agreement ratings in
regard to the description of various elements found in, or impacts resulted, from the
respondent's corporate risk management (CRM) or ERM process. They are to be
used as proxy in determining the effective implementation of the firm's ERM
program.
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The statements are (whether CRM or ERM): (1) provides common
understanding of the objectives of each CRM initiative, (2) provides common
terminology and set of standards of risk management, (3) provides enterprise-wide
information about risk, (4) Integrates risk with corporate strategic planning, (5)
Reduces risk of non-compliance, (6) Enables tracking costs of compliance, (7)
Quantifies risk to the greatest extent possible, (8) Integrated across all functions and
business units, (9) Enables everyone to understand his/her accountability, (10) CRM
strategy is aligned with corporate strategy, (11) Identifies key risk indicators (KRIs),
(12) Integrates risk with key performance indicators (KPIs), (13) Aligns CRM
initiatives to business objectives, (14) Provides the rigor to identify and select risk
responses (i.e. risk- avoidance, reduction, sharing and acceptance). The statements
above take reference from the COSO ERM guideline, the Pricewaterhouse-Cooper's
71 annual global CEO survey on ERM, and other literature on ERM practices
discussed in Chapter 2.
3.7.2 Statements for Construct 'ERM Implementation Intensityy Explained
3.7.2.1 ERM definition
These fourteen statements are deemed to be important and relevant for
respondents' evaluation. This is because they indicate the defining description of the
intensity, maturity, and the penetration level of ERM practices existed in the
respondents' corporations. For instance, it has been frequently mentioned in most of
ERM literature (Bailey et al., 2004; Kalita, 2004; Chapman, 2003; Hermanson,
2003; Kloman, 2003; Libenbereg et al., 2003) that one of the forefront challenges of
ERM implementation is to define what ERM really means to corporation. In the
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absence of standard definition for the meanings of the various terms used in ERM
initiatives and without the provision of a precious goal for its implementation, it is
difficult to envisage a successful implementation of ERM program. Hence, the
inclusion of statements (1) and (2) inthe questionnaire is to capture this essence.
3.7.2.2 Effective communication ofrisk and responsibilities
Besides, enterprise-wide risk management initiatives can only be
successfully implemented if everyone in the organization is clear about the type and
nature of risk relevant to the enterprise. Thus, all pertinent information about the
existing and potential risk faced by the enterprise must be effectively disseminated.
Channel of communication must be open to facilitate top-down and bottom-up
communication taking place to ensure all members of the firm understand their roles
and responsibility in regard to the risk (COSO, 2004; Chapman, 2003). The
inclusion of statement (3) and (9) is to serve this end.
3.7.2.3 Philosophy ofERM
Statements (4), (8), (10), and (13) are included to capture the philosophy of
ERM program. The essence and the very notion of ERM implementation are to
integrate risk with business objectives and to align risk management initiatives with
the overall corporate strategy in order to attain competitive advantages. This
alignment and integration of risk must pervasively envelop all business units in the
firm (Bailey et al., 2004; Lam, 2003; Hermanson, 2003; Chapman, 2003; Gulp,
2001).
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3.7.2.4 Risk identification and response
Statement (14) relates to ERM providing rigor to enterprise to enhance its
capability in identifying and selecting among alternative risk responses. The
responses include risk avoidance, reduction, sharing and acceptance. The ability and
efficiency of a firm to identify risk and subsequently respond to it are elements
which are integral to an effective corporate risk management program (Bierc, 2003).
3.7.2.5 Compliance cost
In the enterprise's day-to-day operating environment, among the many
business objectives, one of them more often than not, involves a compliance
objective to the applicable laws and regulations. This objective is especially
apparent in highly regulated industries such as the finance, banking, gaming, and
public utilities sectors. Besides, compliance can also relate to meeting firms' internal
corporate governance requirements. Owing to this, the cost incurred in such
compliance initiatives can make up a significant chunk of the overall business
operating cost. Hence, the inclusion of statements (5) and (6) in the questionnaire
gauges how far ERM enables the management to track such compliance cost and the
risk of non-compliance.
3.7.2.6 Risk quantification
Statement (7) relates to risk quantification. Before any specific response in
regard to risk can be undertaken, enterprise needs to quantify them. Most of the
quantification processes will involve the conversion of calculated risk into currency
denomination. This is to provide a precise perspective to facilitate decision rule in
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the light of potential loss or damages in monetary terms before any response
decision is made.
3.7.2.7 Performance measurement
Statements (11) and (12) relate to performance measurement. The
underpinning philosophy of implementing ERM program is to transform the entire
organization to an enterprise that is internalized with "risk-aware" culture. To this
end, it is imperative to identify key risk indicators (KRI) relevant to the firm's
business and to tie those KRIs to staff members' key performance indicators (KPI).
These KRIs and KPIs will enhance the firm's focus on balanced risk-reward trade
offs by effectively rewarding people for taking smarter risks (Bailey et al., 2004;
Rucker, 2002).
Table 3.2 summarizes the three dimensions of ERM implementation
framework, i.e. structure, governance, and process, with their corresponding
questionnaire statements and item codes covering the various areas within each
ERM dimension.
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Table 3.2: Dimensions and Areas of ERM Implementation Framework
Dimension Area Item Statement
Structure
ERM Definition
il provides common understanding of the
objectives of each CRM initiative
12 provides common terminology and set of
standards of risk management
Performance
measurement
- • ill Identifies key risk indicators (KRIs)




S3 provides enterprise-wide information
about risk
19 Enables everyone to understand his/her
accountability
Compliance
15 Reduces risk of non-compliance





14 Integrates risk with corporate strategic
planning
iS Integrated across all functions and
business units
ilO CRM strategy is aligned with corporate
strategy




Provides the rigor to identify and select
risk responses (i.e. risk- avoidance,
reduction, sharing and acceptance)
Risk quantification i7 Quantifies risk to the greatest extent
possible
3.7.3 Statements for Construct Perceived ERM Benefit Measures' Explained
The second construct in the practical framework is Perceived ERM Benefit
Measures. This perceived ERM benefit measures can also be interpreted as the
outcome derived from implementing ERM program. It can also be viewed as the
motives for firms to engage in enterprise risk management program.
There are twenty statements presented to respondents for their agreement
assessment in a 5-point Likert's scale fonnat. The statements are as follows (CRM
or ERM): (1) enhances enterprise's ability to take appropriate risks in value creation,
(2) strengthens management's confidence in business operations, (3) creates smooth
governance procedures, (4) improves monitoring of enterprise performance, (5)
enriches corporate reputation, (6) improves clarity of organization-wide decision
making and chain of command, (7) facilitates reporting to regulators, (8) improves
communicating to stakeholders / shareholders, (9) enhances managers' ability to
think entrepreneurially and innovatively, (10) boosts enterprise's profitability, (11)
assists in meeting enterprise's strategic goals, (12) reduces expected costs of
financial distress, (13) protects company's investments, (14) reduces volatility of
managers' bonuses and salaries, (15) reduces informational gap (asymmetries)
between management and shareholders, (16) Managers are risk conscious , (17)
CRM implementation has a positive impact on enterprise's credit rating, (18) CRM
helps our enterprise to be respected within the industry, (19) CRM can minimize
agency problem/cost, (20) Implementing CRM program will be rewarded by the
equity market.
These statements are drawn from the (i) CLSriskpremium model as has been
discussed extensively in Chapter 3; (ii) PricewaterhouseCooper's 7th Annual Global
CEO Survey on ERM; (iii) COSO framework of ERM; and (iv) literature on the
motives for corporate risk management such as those of Belmont (2004); Doherty
(2000); Cummins et al. (1998); Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997b); Ahmed,
Beatty, and Takeda (1997); Tufano (1996); Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993);
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993); Mayers and Smith (1982). These literatures
189
among others, touch on financial distress cost hypothesis, costly external financing
hypothesis, informational asymmetries hypothesis, and corporate tax minimization
hypothesis.34
For instance, the CLS risk premium model posits that apart from
macroeconomic risk, a firm's expected returns are also sensitive to tactical,
strategic, and normative risks, hence affecting its risk premium. Tactical, strategic,
and normative risks are classes of firm-specific risk defined by the CLS risk
premium model. Thus, it follows that the outcomes of managing these risks are to
lower investors' expectation on the firm's risk premium. In this light, statements (3),
(7), and (8) relate to the governance aspect of the tactical risk whilst statements (4),
(10), (12), (13), and (14) relate to the earning-liquidity management of the tactical
risk. Statements (5), (6), and (9) relate to the firm-structure view ofthe strategic risk
whilst statements (1), (2), and (16) relate to the knowledge-based view of the
strategic risk. Statements (11) and (15) reflect the overall management of strategic
riskand tactical risk respectively whilst statements (7) relate to the normative risk of
the firm.
3.7.4 Statementfor Construct 'ERM Implementation Challenge' Explained
The third construct in the practical framework as depicted in Figure 3.4
involves ERM Implementation Challenge. This construct is proxied by nine
statements measured in 5-point Likert's scale presented to respondents for their
agreement rating in regard to the challenges faced during ERM implementation
process. This construct is presented to the practical framework as a factor to
34 See section 2.3 and 2.4 in Chapter 2.
190
potentially affect ERM implementation intensity construct. The construct attempts to
highlight the fact that various challenges faced by a firm during ERM
implementation will affect its implementation intensity and hence, its outcomes or
success, i.e. perceived ERM benefit measures. These implementation challenges can
be attributed to such limitations and constraints as in the areas of organizational
structure, financial and human resources, information technology infrastructure,
and expertise. ERM implementation should be seen as a program within a broader
context of business process reengineering (BPR) and organizational change. Hence,
the nine statements measuring ERM challenges construct are drawn from strategy,
BPR, and change management literature such as those of Graf (2004), Khong &
Richardson (2003), and Graver et al. (1995). These nine statements are: (1) people
is an area posing bigchallenge, (2) timeliness of information is a problem, (3) there
is lack of information needed, (4) over-regulation in organization hinder ERM
implementation, (5) there is strong competition from other type of management
techniques to be implemented, (6) there is wide discrepancy between expectation
and practices in ERM implementation, (7) there is inadequate technology support
(i.e. installation of information technology system for risk identification and
assessment), (8) the organization structure deters ERM implementation, (9) there is
insufficient necessary level of investment for ERMimplementation.
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3.7.5 Statements for Variables Measuring Various ERM Value Maximization
Theories
Unlike the multiple statements contained in the questionnaire that are used to
measure each of the three constructs in the proposed ERM implementation
(practical) framework as mentioned above, only a single statement representing an
individual variable is used to test each of the various value maximization theories of
ERM respectively. These statements are presented to the respondents for their
agreement assessment in a 5-point Likert's scale format. The statements describe the
outcomes of risk management processes. Based on their understanding and
experiences in regard to the enterprise risk management implementation processes,
the respondents are expected to rate their agreement to each of the outcome as a
result of ERM implementation. The statements which correspond to their respective
hypotheses are presented below.
3.7.5.1 Statementfor CostofFinancial Distress Hypothesis
For the cost of financial distress hypothesis, which reads,
H3: ERM implementation has aneffect onreducing cost offinancial distress,
thecorresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM can minimize cost offinancial distress
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3.7.5.2 Statementfor Lower Tax Burden Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the lower tax burden, which reads,
H4: ERM implementation has an effect on lowering tax burden,
the corresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM can lower tax burden
3.7.5.3 Statementfor Costfor External Financing Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the cost for external financing, which reads,
H5: ERMimplementation has an effect on reducingcostfor external
financing,
the corresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM can avoid costly externalfinancing
3.7.5.4 Statementfor Firm's Credit Rating Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the firm's credit rating, which reads,
H& ERM implementation has an effect on improvingfirm's credit rating,
the corresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM implementation hasapositive impacton enterprise's creditrating
3.7.5.5 Statementfor Equity Market Reward Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the equity market reward, which reads,
H7: ERMimplementation will be rewarded bythe equity market,
the corresponding statementthat is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
Implementing ERMprogram will be rewardedby the equity market
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3.7.5.6 Statementfor Informational Asymmetries Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the informational asymmetries, which reads,
H8: ERM implementation willreduce informational asymmetries in thefirm,
the corresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM helps reduce information gap between managers and investors
3.7.5.7 Statementfor Agency Problem Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the agency problem, which reads,
Hg: ERM implementation will reduce agencyproblem in thefirms,
the corresponding statement that is presented to respondents is worded as follows:
ERM implementation will reduce volatilityofmanagers' bonusesand
salaries
3.7.6 Statements for the CLS Risk Premium Model Constructs
Similar to the hypotheses testing on the ERM implementation (practical)
framework which involves three constructs in the framework, the hypotheses testing
on the CSL risk premium model also involves three constructs, i.e. tactical risk,
strategic risk, and normative risk. The measurement for each of these three
constructs is based on multiple statements contained in the questionnaire. These
statements are presented to the respondents for their agreement assessment in a 5-
point Likert's scale format. The respondents are expected to rate in regard to the
cited situations that have transpired in their firms. The statements which correspond
to their respective hypotheses are presented below.
194
3.7.6.1 Statementfor Tactical Risk Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the tactical risk in the CLS risk premium model,
which reads,
Hi0: ERM implementation will reducefirm's tacticalrisk,
the construct tactical risk is measured by five statements. The six statements are (1)
there is a minimum information friction (gap) between the management and the
shareholders, (2) there is a minimum gap of risk preference between the
management and shareholders of firm's investment undertaking, (3) there is a
satisfactory liquidity/free float of firm's shares traded in the stock exchange, (4)
company uses hedging strategy heavily, (5) hedging strategy employed by firm is
effective in meeting its intended objectives, and (6) the use of real options to reduce
firm's earning surprises is effective and satisfactory.
Referring to the above, statement (1) is derived from the information
(asymmetries) management literature, statement (2) is from the governance
management literature, statement (3) is from the liquidity management literature,
statements (4) and (5) are from the hedging literature and statement (6) is from the
real options literature. The hedging and real options literatures are subsets of the
earnings management literature (see section 2.10.2).
3.7 6.2 Statementfor Strategic RiskHypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the strategic risk in the CLS risk premium model,
which reads,
Hu: ERM implementation will reduce firm's strategic risk,
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the construct strategic risk is measured by nine statements. The nine statements are
(1) management is effective in isolating firm's earnings from market
forces/uncertainty, (2) management is effective in shaping the firm to attain and
sustain its structural advantages, (3) management is effective in isolating its earnings
from rivals attacks through attaining structural advantages, (4) our enterprise has
attained resource-based advantages, (5) our enterprise's resource-based advantages
have helped isolate it from market pressures, (6) our enterprise has attained
knowledge-based advantage (i.e. attain superior information from competitors
regarding market situation and resources to protect earnings fluctuation), (7) our
firm is able to absorb, interpret, and commercialize critical information on a timely
basis which has helped to isolate its earnings from rival attack, market pressure, and
technological obsolescence, (8) our firm has attained strategic options advantages
(i.e. ability to diversify business line, expand market reach and product offering,
acquire key supplier), and (9) our firm possesses a portfolio of strategic options (i.e.
ability to diversify business line, expand market reach and product offering, acquire
key supplier) which has enabled it to mitigate macroeconomic and industry
disturbances risk.
Referring to the above, statement (1) is derived from the literature on
earnings shock isolation argument, statements (2) and (3) are from the firm-structure
view literature, statements (4) and (5) are from the resource-based view literature,
statements (6) and (7) are from the knowledge-based view literature, and statements
(8) and (9) are sourced from the strategic options view literature (see section 2.10.3).
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3.7.6.3 Statementfor Normative Risk Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis for the strategic risk in the CLS risk premium model,
which reads,
Hj2: ERM implementation will reduce firm's normative risk,
the construct normative risk is measured by four statements. The four statements are
(1) our enterprise is successful in complying with industry and regulatory rules, (2)
our firm will face higher risk premium if we fail to comply with industry or
institutional norms (i.e. those market rules expected by investors, regulators, interest
groups), (3) our firm's competitive advantages achieved through implementing
strategic risk management (i.e. structure, resource, knowledge advantages) will be
quickly matched by our competitors, and (4) our firm's competitive advantages
achieved through implementing tactical risk management (i.e. hedging and options)
will be quickly matched by our competitors.
Referring to the above, statements (1) and (2) are derived from the literature
on norms violation penalty argument, statements (3) and (4) are sourced from the
literature on diminishing competitive advantages argument (see section 2.10.4).
3.7.7 Statement for ERM Implementation
We have discussed in sections 3.7.5 through 3.7.6 above on the definition or
measurement statements on the respective dependent variables for the various cited
hypotheses to be tested, i.e. H3 to H]2. These hypotheses share a common
independent variable (construct), namely the ERM Implementation. As for the
measurement of this construct (ERM Implementation), we proxy it by adopting the
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ERM Implementation Intensity construct as in the ERM practical framework defined
in sections 3.7.1 -3.7.2.
To recapitulate, the construct ERM Implementation Intensity is measured by
a measurement metric made up of survey statements presented to respondents for
their assessment. These survey statements come in the form of5-point Likert's scale
covering three key dimensions ofenterprise risk management framework namely the
process, governance, and structure. There are fourteen statements in the
questionnaire relating to various ERM elements found in the firm, proxying the
ERM implementation intensity (see section 3.7.1 for the description of the fourteen
statements and see sections 3.7.2.1 - 3.7.2.7 for the theoretical underpinning for each
of the fourteen statements). The statements gauge respondent's agreement ratings in
regard to the description of various elements found in, or impacts resulted, from the
respondent's ERM process.
3.8 THE ANALYTICAL MODEL OF THE ERM PRACTICAL
FRAMEWORK
This section and the sections that follow (sections 3.9 - 3.13) describe the
analytical model, i.e. the statistical procedures and measures used to find causal
relationships between the constructs of the ERM practical framework, namely ERM
Implementation Intensity, Perceived ERM Benefit Measures, and Implementation
Challenge (see Figure 3.4). Below depicts in chronological order, the procedures
and measures that have been performed:




(ii) Exploratory factor analysis using SPSS:
• Principal component extraction with Varimax rotation method
(iii) Confirmatory factor analysis
(iv) Second-Order Factor Analysis Model
(v) Modeling and hypothesis testing using SPSS AMOS, a statistical
software used for the following objectives:
• Developing theoretically based model
• Constructing a path diagram of causal relationships
• Converting the path diagram into a set of structural and
measurement models
• Choosing the input matrix type and estimating the proposed
model
• Assessing the identification of the structural model
• Evaluating goodness-of-fit criteria




Reliability is the "extent to which a variable or set of variables is consistent
in what it is intended to measure" (Hair et al., 1998, p 90). In the context of creating
a summated scale, which is done by adding up several individual variables into a
single composite or sum measure, reliability test is "an assessment of the degree of
consistency between multiple measurements of a variable" (Hair et al., 1998, p 117).
The benefit of creating a summated scale (to become one variable) from several
variables is to achieve data reduction purpose (Hair et al., 1998). For instance,
'Quantifies risk to the greatest extent possible' and 'Integrate risk management
across all functions and business units' are variables that measure 'ERM
Implementation Intensity'. If these two variables are reliable, they measure the true
value of 'ERM Implementation Intensity' and their measurement will be consistent
and error free (Hair et al, 1998; Khong & Richardson, 2003). For example,
consistent values underlie a common response towards how 'Quantifies risk to the
greatest extent possible' and 'Integrate risk management across all functions and
business units' can affect 'ERM Implementation Intensity'. If reliability of some
observed variables cannot be established, their measures on a construct will be
erratic (Khong & Richardson, 2003; Hair et al., 1998).
Reliability analysis ought to be performed to ensure consistent data results
before further multivariate analysis to be conducted. This analysis evaluates the
reliability of the survey instrument; i.e. the questionnaire (Khong and Richardson,
2003). Reliability analysis can take two forms. They are the test-retest and internal
consistency (Hair et al., 1998). According the Hair et al. (1998), the test-retest
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reliability analysis is used to measure consistency between responses for a
respondent in different point in time. On the other hand, the internal consistency
reliability analysis is for consistency among the variables in a summated scale.
According to Hair et al. (1998), the internal consistency is more commonly used
measure of reliability test. High internal consistency reliability shows that items
measuring the same scale (construct) are highly intercorrelated (Hair et al., 1998;
Khong & Richardson, 2003).
3.9.2 Cronbach 's Alpha
Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used technique to measure internal
consistency (Hair et al., 1998; Khong & Richardson, 2003). The Cronbach's alpha
values range from 0 and 1.0 (Hair et al, 1998). The higher values indicate higher
degrees of homogeneity among items measuring a scale (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &
Richardson, 2003). In our context, the Cronbach's alpha values gauge if the
questionnaire measures the 'ERM implementation intensity', 'perceived ERM
benefit measures', and the 'implementation challenge' in a useful manner. It also
gauges the extent of intercorrelation among items (inter-item correlations) within a
scale/construct. Items with low Cronbach's alpha values will be omitted for further
analysis to improve reliability of the scale. A rule of thumb suggests that acceptable




Item-total correlation measures "the correlation of the item to the summated
scale score" (Hair et al, 1998, p 118). It was used to gauge the relationship of one
variable with the rest in the set of measures or scale. In other words, the test
provided information whether the variables share a common core in measuring up a
scale/construct. Variables with unsatisfactory item-total correlation score were
discarded for further analysis to ensure high reliability of the scale or construct. A
rule of thumb suggests that acceptable item-total correlation value should exceed 0.5
(Hairetal, 1998, p 118).
Reliability analysis was performed using SPSS program. The derivation and
interpretation of the SPSS output were based on the default settings recommended
by the SPSS Application Guide (Anon, 1999; Khong & Richardson, 2003).
3.10 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
As Arnau (1998) described, factor analysis deals with extraction of factors
from a matrix of associations between variables under study. According to Hair et al.
(1998, p 580), exploratory factor analysis (EFA) investigates "possible relationships
in only the most general form and then allows the multivariate technique to estimate
relationships". EFA is performed to establish a factor model from a set of variables
to identify the underlying "structure of relationships between either variables or
respondents" (Hair et al, 1998, p 95) without setting a preconceived structure on the
outcome (Suhr, 2009). This is done by investigating the correlations matrix or
variance-covariance matrix between the variables and the respondents (Hair et al,
1998, p.95; Arnau,1998). A factor model enables researchers to reduce the many
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variables to a more manageable, smaller set of new, composite dimensions or
variates (factors) with a minimum loss of information (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &
Richardson, 2003). In EFA, no constraints will be set on the variable loadings in
order to let "the method and the data define the nature of the relationships" (Hair et
al, 1998, p 580). In a nutshell, EFA is performed for summarizing the data and
reducing it.
3.11 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a special form of factor analysis used
to verify the factor structure of a set of observed variables (Suhr, 2009). It is used to
examine thenumber of factors and the loadings of variables. Opposite to exploratory
factor analysis (EFA), where all loadings are free to vary, CFA allows for the
explicit constraint of certain loadings to be zero, hence total control of which
variables describe the factor (Hair et al, 1998; Khong & Richardson, 2003). CFA is
performed to analyze construct validity and to establish the measurement model in
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis. It is used in the third step of SEM,
i.e. converting the path diagrams into a set of measurement model (Hair et al, 1998,
p 581; Khong & Richardson 2003). CFA allows the researcher to test hypothesis of
a significant relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent
constructs (Suhr, 2009).
20:
3.12 SECOND-ORDER FACTOR ANALYSIS MODELS
The primary goal of performing factor analysis is to "summarize data so that
the empirical relationships can be grasped by the human mind" (Gorsuch, 1983, p.2;
Arnau, 1998). This is done by identifying the underlying factor structure among the
variables under study (Hair et al, 1998; Suhr, 2009). After extraction, one of the
many available rotation procedures available can be performed on the factors. This
is done by redistributing the "variance contributed by the variables to the factors in a
way that yields a more understandable structure" (Arnau, 1998, p.4). Arnau (1998)
pointed out that if an oblique rotation is used, this will result in factors that are
themselves correlated. Hence, there would be a factor correlation matrix where by
itself, could be factor analyzed. The factors that are extracted from such an analysis
are called "higher-order" or "second-order" factors (Arnau, 1998).
In comparison, the factor analysis models (EFA and CFA) which have been
discussed earlier are known as, first-order factor models (Hair et al, 1998). In the
discussion of the CFA model in section 3.11, only one level of factors (the first
order) that are correlated is specified by the researcher. The researcher assumes that
the factors, albeit correlated, are separate constructs (Hair et al, 3998, p 625). Itmay
happen that a particular construct has several facets or dimensions. In our context,
examples are such as ERM implementation intensity, perceived ERM benefit
measures, and implementation challenge. In such cases, it is imperative for the
researcher to demonstrate the structural relationships between the facets and
dimensions of these constructs, hence specifying the second-order structural
relationship for the respective construct. Specifying this second-order structural
relationship would enable the researcher to provide a stronger statement in terms of
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the dimensionality of the constructs under study, e.g. ERM implementation
intensity, perceived ERM benefit measures, and implementation challenge (Hair et
al, 1998).
According to Hair et al. (1998), the second-order factor model has two
unique characteristics. One of them is that the second-order factor becomes the
exogenous construct, whilst the first-order factors are endogenous. This means that
"the second-order factor "causes" the first-order factors" (Hair et al, 1998, p.626).
Hair et al. (1998) also noted that the second unique characteristic of the second-
order factor model is that the second-order factor is completely latent, hence it does
not possess any indicator.
For instance, we can further hypothesize that the construct ERM
implementation intensity possesses three dimensions or facets, e.g. governance,
structure, and process. Under this circumstance, we can develop a three-factor
model (first-order) for this particular construct. The specification of the structural
relationships between this three-factor model with the construct itself, i.e. ERM
implementation intensity, is identified as the second-order factor model. Figure 3.5
portrays this second-order model for the construct ERM implementation intensity in
which each of the first-order factors, i.e. governance, structure, and process are now























Figure 3.5: Path Diagram ofSecond-Order Factor Analysis of
ERM Implementation Intensity
3.13 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING
3.13.1 Introductory
As mentioned insection 3.8 regarding the research analytics, we employ path
analysis using structural equation modeling or SEM to test our research framework's
theoretical veracity. SEM is a technique combining elements of multiple regression
and factor analysis to perform complex interrelated dependence relationships.
SEM's vigor is in its ability to incorporate the effects of measurement error on the
structural coefficients whilst performing the multiple regression and factor analyses
(Hair et al, 1998). SEM enables researchers to validate theory by testing the total,
direct, and indirect effects of latent or unobserved and manifest or observed factors
(variables). It also allows investigation for the effect of mediation (intervention) that
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exists among variables (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al, 1998; Chin, 1998;
Hoe, 2008). In other words, SEM involves the specification of an underpinning
linear regression-type model which incorporates the relationships between the latent
variables together with a number of observed or measured indicator valuables.
Examining the co-variation between the observed variables enables us to: (1)
estimate the values of the coefficients in the underpinning linear model; (2)
statistically test the adequacy of the model to adequately represent the process(es)
being studied; and (3) if the model is adequate, conclude that the postulated
relationships are plausible (Palaniappan, 2008).
SEM consists of measurement model or confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
and structural model (Hoe, 2008). Measurement model in SEM refers to the process
of specifying indicators for each construct and the assessment of the each
construct's reliability in estimating the causal relationship. Structural model, on the
other hand, refers to the set of one or more dependence relationships linking the
hypothesized model's constructs (Hair et al, 1998). Hair et al. (1998, p.628)
proposed the undertaking of SEM analysis in seven-stage process. They include:
Stage 7-Develop a Theoretical Based Model; Stage 2-Construct a Path Diagram;
Stage 5-Convert the Path Diagram; Stage 4-Choose the Input Matrix Type; Stage 5-
Assess the Identification of the Mode; Stage tf-Evaluate Model Estimates and
Goodness-of-Fit; Stage 7-Model Modification (Hair et al, 1998).
This thesis organizes the discussion of the practical framework's analysis in
tandem with this seven-stage process. The discussion at each stage illustrates the
relevant issues and interpretation of the practical framework in the context of its
SEM. The details are presented in the ensuing sections 3.13.2 to 3.13.7.
207
3.13.2 SEMStage 1: Developing A Theoretically Based Model
Hair et al (1998) noted that causal relationships are the basis in SEM
analysis. These causal relationships explain how changes in variables (predictors)
will result in changes in other variables (dependent variables) (Khong &Richardson,
2003). In our context, SEM explains how implementation intensity of ERM will
affect perceived ERM benefit measures. In addition, how challenges in ERM
implementation process affect both ERM implementation intensity and the perceived
benefit measures. The assertion for causation among variables has to be done
through theoretical determination. Without theoretical basis, any causal assertion in
a research framework will be rendered invalid (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &
Richardson, 2003; Trochim, 2008). The theoretical based models in SEM
comprised of the structural model and the measurement model (Hair et al, 1998;
Khong & Richardson, 2003).
3.13.3 SEMStage 2: Constructing A Path Diagram OfCausal Relationships
A path diagram is a diagram that pictorially represents a structural model in
portraying causal relationships (Kenny, 2003; Khong & Richardson, 2003). It
provides researchers an overall view of the causal relationships of the structural and
measurement models. A path diagram that consists of a number of measured (i.e.
observed) variables and unmeasured (i.e. latent) variables connected together by
single-headed and double-headed arrows (see Figure 3.6). Path diagram depicts a
clear distinction between measured and unmeasured variables. For instance, latent,
unmeasured, or unobserved variables are denoted in path diagram by enclosing them
in a circle whereas manifest, measured or observed variables are enclosed in
208
rectangles or squares. In a path diagram, straight arrows represent direct causal
relationships whilst curved lines between constructs represent correlation between
constructs. Apart from that, double-headed arrows mean reciprocal relationship
between constructs. In a path diagram, the model's exogenous constructs are
"predictors or cause for other constructs". On the other hand, the model's
endogenous constructs are "dependent or outcome" which are caused by one or
more exogenous constructs (Hair et al, 1998, p.580; Khong & Richardson, 2003).
Figure 3.6 depicts an example of a path diagram.
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Figure 3.6: Example of a path diagram
3.13.4 SEM Stage 3; Converting The Path Diagram Into A Set OfStructural And
Measurement Models
The path diagram in Figure 3.6 provides the basis for specification of the
structural equations and the proposed correlation (1) between exogenous constructs
and (2) between structural equations. From the path model, we construct a series of
structural equations (one for each endogenous construct) to constitute the structural
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model It follows with the specification of measurement model whereby indicators
are assigned to each construct (exogenous and endogenous) such that each construct
contains variables depicted by the equations. The purpose of these equations
specification is to measure the theoretical rationale empirically. Hence, assessment
can be made on the reliability of each construct for estimating the causal
relationships. Test ofthe measurement model is conducted using confirmatory factor
analysis. (Hair et al, 1998, pp 596-601; Khong & Richardson, 2003). Appendix 5
illustrates the specification of structural and measurement models into a series of
equations for the study of this thesis.
3.13.5 SEMStage 4: Choosing The Type Of Input Matrix And Estimating The
Proposed Model
In contrast to other multivariate techniques, SEM uses only variance-
covariance or correlation matrix as its input data (Hair et al, 1998, p.601). Variance-
covariance matrix was selected because it is essential in theory testing, i.e. to
investigate how ERM implementation intensity affects the ERM perceived benefit
measures of Corporate Malaysia (Khong & Richardson, 2003). Data entry was done
through AMOS which is a module for estimating SEM in a statistical software
package SPSS. In variance-covariance testing, rather than focusing on individual
observations, pattern of relationships across respondents was examined instead. As
such, individual observations were converted into either the variance-covariance or
correlation matrix before estimation was performed. This would facilitate the
measurement model in specifying "which indicators correspond to each construct",
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and in computing the latent construct scores in the structural model (Hair et al,
1998,p.601).
In employing SEM, the following assumptions and settings are observed.
Firstly, we assume that the data collected are independently observed, the sampling
ofrespondents is random, and all relationships are linear. Secondly, the missing data
are incorporated into SEM using listwise method35. Thirdly, estimation of the
proposed model is done using 'direct estimation'36. Fourthly, the estimation
procedure employs 'maximum likelihood estimation'37 (MLE). MLE is used "to
seek parameters that best reproduce the estimate population variance-covarianee
matrix (Thompson, 2000, p.267). According to Wright (2000), by using the
observed variance-covarianee matrix, MLE's results yield the highest probability of
an event that actually happening (Khong & Richardson, 2003). Finally, the sample
size used is in between 100 to 150. This is in accordance with the recommendation
when using MLE to directly estimating the overall model (Ding et al, 1995; Hair et
al, 1998, p.605; Khong & Richardson, 2003).
3.13.6 SEMStage 5;Assessing The Identification Of The Structural Model
In SEM analysis, problem may arise when the proposed structural is unable
to generate unique estimates. This is referred to as an identification problem. An
identification problem arises from the fact that the model has lesser equations than
the number of unknowns to be estimated. Hence, the researcher wants to ensure that
35 A method thatomits cases thathave missing values for any of the variables named (see Hair et al
1998,p.603).
The most common estimation process whereby an overall model is estimated directly with a
selected estimation procedure and the confidence interval (and standard error) ofeach parameter
estimate isbased on sampling error (see Hair et al., 1998, p.580).
The most common estimation procedure which iteratively improves parameter estimates to
minimize a specified fit function (see Hair et al., 1998, p.581).
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the size of the co-variance or correlation matrix used in the analysis is larger than the
number of coefficients to be estimated in the proposed model. This difference in the
matrix size and the number of coefficients is referred to as degree of freedom (df)
(Hair et al, 1998). As Hair et al (1998, p.608) noted, a degree of freedom is "an
unconstrained element of the data matrix". A proposed model's number of df is
given by
df= ^Kp + qXp + q+lM-t
where:
p = the number of endogenous indicators,
q = the number of exogenous indicators,
t = the number of estimated coefficients in the proposed model (Hair et al,
1998, p.608).
A model with exactly zero degrees of freedom is called a just-identified
model. A model with positive number of degrees of freedom is termed as an
overidentified model. Conversely, a model with negative number degrees of freedom
is referred to as an underidentified model. The researcher would look for a high df
in his structural equation model while striving for a good model fit. A large number
of dfwill entail the generalizability of the model (Hair et al, 1998).
3.13.7 SEM Stage 6: Evaluating Goodness-Of-Fit Criteria
Goodness-of-fit tests ascertain if the model under examination should be
accepted or rejected (Garson, 2008). This stage involves two steps. Firstly, to
examine "offending estimates" to ensure the proposed model can be established.
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Common "offending estimates are negative error variances, standardized
coefficients exceeding or very close to 1.0, or very large standard errors" (Hair et al,
1998, p 633). Secondly, to assess the proposed model's goodness-of-fit. This is to
be done for the overall model, structural and measurement models (Hair et al,
1998). Fit refers to a model's ability to reproduce the data (Kenny, 2003). In other
words, goodness-of-fit "measures the correspondence of the actual or observed input
(covariance or correlation) matrix with that predicted from the proposed model"
(Hair et al.,1998, p. 610). There are literally hundreds ofmeasures of fit available to
researchers (Kenny, 2003). Nonetheless, the major goodness-of-fit measures can be
categorized into three groups, namely (1) absolute fit measures, (2) incremental fit
measures and (3) parsimonious fit measures (Hair et al, 1998; Kenny 2003; Garson,
2008).
According to Hair et al. (1998, p.611), absolute fit measures "assess only the
overall model fit (both structural and measurement models collectively)". The
various absolute fit indexes are based on fitting the specified model to sample
moments. The test is done by comparing the observed covariance matrix to the one
being estimated. The test assumes that the model being tested is true (Garson, 2008).
Incremental fit measures, on the other hand, compare the specified
(proposed) model to some baseline model. The baseline model is usually the null or
independence model (Hair et al, 1998; Garson, 2008). The null or independence
model has a maximum chi-square (Garson, 2008). Hair et al. (1998) suggested that
the null model should be "some realistic model which all other models should be
expected to exceed" (p.657). According to Hair et al. (1998) again, more often than
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not, the null or independence model "is a single-construct model with all indicators
perfectly measuring the construct" (p.657).
Hair et al (1998) pointed out that parsimonious fit measures "adjust the
measures of fit to provide a comparison between models with differing numbers of
estimated coefficients" (p.611). Models lack of parsimony will be penalized by
parsimonious measures. This is because more complex models (less parsimony)
will, all other things being equal, generate better fit than less complex ones (Garson,
2008). As such, the primary objective of the parsimonious fit measures is to examine
if model fit has been attained by "overfitting the data with too many coefficients"
(Hair et al., 1998, p.658). Incremental fit measures and parsimonious fit measures
are also used to inspect the proposed and the competing model indetermining which
is better.
Each group of goodness-of-fit measures consists of several indices to serve
their respective measurement purposes. Table 3.3 presents these major indices.
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The definition and meaning for each of these measures are presented in the
following sections 3.13.7.1 to 3.13.7.13.
3.13.7.1 Likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square Statistic (x2)
The likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic is also referred to as discrepancy
function or simply model chi-square (Garson, 2008). According to Hair et al. (1998),
the likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic is the most fundamental measure of overall
fit of the specified model However, according to Garson (2008), model chi-square
is very conservative, i.e. prone to Type II error, and sensitive to sample size (Hair et
al, 1998). Hence, Garson (2008) suggested researchers to discount a negative model
chi-square result in the presence of other model fit measures that support the
specified model A large value of chi-square means that the observed and estimated
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matrices differ considerably. In other words, the chi-square value should not be
significant if there is a good model fit (Garson, 2008). As such, statistical
significance levels (small p-values) are situations that researchers do not want to
obtain. It indicates lack ofsatisfactory model fit. Low chi-square values on the other
hand, which translate into significance levels greater than .05 or .01 (statistically
insignificant at <x=05 and .01 levels), signify that the actual and predicted input
matrices are not statistically different (Hair et al, 1998). Hair et al. (1998)
suggested the minimum acceptable level of nonsignificance is at .05 and that the
levels of 0.1 and 0.2 should besurpassed before nonsignificance is confirmed.
3.13.7.2 Goodness-ofiFit Index (GFI)
The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) provides the overall degree of fit (the
squared residuals from prediction compared with the actual data) (Hair et al, 1998,
p.655). This index ranges from value 0, indicating poor fit, to 1.0, representing
perfect fit. It is, however, not adjusted for the degrees of freedom. Although higher
values of the index are desirable for a model's better fit, there is no established
specific threshold levels for the model's acceptability (Hair et al, 1998).
3.13.7.3 RootMean Square Residual (RMSR)
The root mean square residual (RMSR) is an unstandardized coefficient of
the square root of the mean of the squared residuals. It results from the amounts by
which the sample variances and covariances differ from the corresponding estimated
variances and covariances on the assumption that the specified model is correct
(Garson, 2008; Hair et al, 1998). RMSR has a lower bound of zero but since it is
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unstandardized, it has no upper bound. The upper limit will be determined by the
scale of the measured variables. Hence the closer RMSR is to 0, the better the model
fit. Literature indicated various rules of thumb for an acceptable model fit reference
such as < 0.10, or 0.08, or 0.06, or 0.05, or even 0.04 (Garson, 2008). According to
Hair et al. (1998), researchers can evaluate "the practical significance of the
magnitude of the RMSR in light of the research objectives and the actual
covariances or correlations" (p.656).
3.13.7.4 Root Mean Square Error ofApproximation (RMSEA)
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) attempts to
overcome the problem of chi-square statistic which is sensitive to large sample.
RMSEA rectifies the tendency of the chi-square statistic "to reject any specified
model witha sufficiently large sample" (Hair et al, 1998, p.656). Thevalue between
0.05 and 0.08 are considered acceptable. Models whose RMSEA is 0.10 or more are
deemed to have poor fit (Hair et al, 1998; Kenny, 2003). The values represent the
model's expected goodness-of-fit if it were estimated in the population. This differs
from the case of root mean square residual (RMSR) index, where the estimation is
drawn from the sample (Hair et al. 1998).
3.13.7.5 Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI)
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) is a variant of goodness-of-fit index
(GFI) which adjusts GFI for the ratio of degrees of freedom of the proposed model
to the degrees of freedom for thenull model (Hair et al, 1998; Garson, 2008). AGFI
> 1.0 indicates that the model is just-identified and also that the model is with almost
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perfect fit. On the other hand, AGFI < 0 represents extremely poor fit model, or as a
result that based on small sample size. A rule of thumb suggests an acceptable value
to be greater than or equal to 0.90 (Hair et al, 1998; Garson, 2008). AGFI is
sensitive to sample size (Kenny, 2003; Garson, 2008). Its values tend to be small
(biased downward) when degrees of freedom are large relative to sample size.
Exception to this is when the number ofparameters is very large (Garson, 2008).
3.13.7.6 Normed Fit Index (NFI)
Normed fit index (NFI) also referred to as the Bentler-Bonett index (Garson,
2008). It is a relative comparison of the proposed model to the null model (Hair et
al, 1998). The null model (independence model in AMOS) is defined as a model
whereby all of the correlations or covariances are zero (Kenny, 2003). NFI
manifests the fraction by which the proposed model improves fit in comparison to
the null model. For example, NFI = 0.60 indicates the proposed model improves fit
by 60% compared to the null model (Garson, 2008). According to Hair et al. (1998),
there is no absolute value indicating an acceptable level of fit. By convention,
however, literature indicate that NFI values above 0.95 are considered good,
between 0.90 and 0.95 deemed acceptable, and values below 0.90 represent a need
to respecify the model (Garson, 2008).
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3.13.7.7 Relative FitIndex (RFI)
The relative fit index (RFI) is also known as rhol (Garson, 2008; Amosl6.0,
2007). The index represents comparison between the estimated model and the null
(independence) model For instance, RFI - 1- [(chi-square for the default model /
degrees offreedom for the default model) / (chi-square for the null model / degrees
of freedom for the default model)]. RFI values lie between 0 and 1.0. Values close
to 1indicate a good fit (Garson, 2008; Hair et al, 1998).
3.13.7.8 Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
The incremental fit index (IFI) is also known as Delta2 (Garson, 2008;
Amosl6.0, 2007). Similar to the RFI, the incremental fit index (IFI) denotes
comparison between the estimated model and the null (independence) model. The
convention suggests that IFI values of equal to or greater than 0.90 indicate
acceptable model fit. IFI is a favored incremental fit measure as it is relatively
independent of sample size Garson, 2008).
3.13. 7.9 Non-Normed FitIndex (NNFI) or Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
The non-normed fit index (NNFI) is also called the Tucker-Lewis index
(TLI) (Hair et al, 1998; Garson, 2008). The NNFI and TLI are also referred to as
rho2 (Garson, 2008; Amos 16.0, 2007). NNFI/TLI is similar to the normed fit index
(NFI), but it "penalizes for model complexity" (Garson, 2008). Marsh et al. (1998)
revealed that TLI is relatively independent of sample size. According to Garson
(2008), NNFI/TLI close to 1 represents a good fit. Garson (2008) also pointed out
that some authors had used a cutoff as low as .80 given the fact that TLI tends to run
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lower than the goodness-of-fit index (GFI). However, other authors such as Hu and
Bentler (1999) and Schumaeker and Lomax (2004) suggestedthe cutoff to be greater
than or equal to 0.95. Hair et al (1998) pointed out that a commonly recommended
value is 0.90 or greater. Garson (2008) suggested that NNFI/TLI values below 0.90
indicate a need to respecify the model.
3.13.7.10 Parsimonious Normed FitIndex' (PNFI)
The parsimonius normed fit index (PNFI) is a modified normed fit index
(NFI) which incorporates the number of degree of freedom used to obtain a fit level
(Hair et al, 1998). Parsimony is defined as "achieving higher degree of fit per
degree of freedom used (one degree of freedom per estimated coefficient)" (hair et
al, 1998, p.658). This measure penalizes the specified model if it is closer to the
saturated model. The saturated model is an all-explaining but trivial model (Garson,
2008). Thus researchers look for more parsimony model. According to Garson
(2008), by arbitrary convention, PNFI values greater than 0.60 indicate good
parsimonious fit. Garson (2008) also noted that some authors used a PNFI threshold
value of 0.50 to indicate a good parsimonious fit.
3.13.7.11 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
The alkaike information criterion (AIC) is a parsimonious fit measure that
based on statistical information theory. It is a comparative measure between models
with various numbers of constructs (Hair et al, 1998). In other words, AIC
manifests the differences between model-implied and observed covariance matrices.
It adjusts model chi-square to penalize for model complexity, i.e. lack of parsimony
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and "overparameterization" (Garson, 2008). AIC values closer to zero reflect better
fit and greater parsimony (Hair et al, 1998; Garson, 2008). According to Hair et al.
(1998), small chi-square values with fewer estimated coefficients will result in
small AIC values.
3.13.7.12 Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
The comparative fit index (CFI) compares the existing model fit with a null
model The null model assumes that the latent variables in the model are
uncorrected (Garson, 2008). The test compares "the covariance matrix predicted by
the model to the observed covariance matrix, and compares the null model
(covariance matrix of 0's) with the observed covariance matrix, to gauge the percent
of lack of fit which is accounted for by going from the null model to the researcher's
SEM model" (Garson, 2008). The concept behinds the CFI test is similar to that of
normed fit index (NFI) but it penalizes for sample size. The CFI is also identical to
the McDonald and Marsh's (1990) relative noncentraiity index (RNI) (Amosl6.0,
2007). The values of CFI range from 0 to 1. Values close to 1 indicate a very good
fit. By convention CFI values equal to or greater than 0.90 indicate acceptable model
fit (Garson, 2008).
3.13.7.13 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI)
The parsimony goodness of fit index (PGFI) is a variant of goodness-of-fit
index (GFI) which adjusts GFI for the parsimony of the estimate model (Hair et al,
1998; Garson, 2008). The PGFI value varies from zero to 1.0. Values close to 1.0
indicate greater model parsimony (Hair et al, 1998). According to Garson (2008),
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by arbitrary convention, PGFI values greater than 0.60 are considered as having
good parsimonious fit. However, Garson (2008) also pointed out that some authors
used the value of greater than 0.50 to indicate the same.
It is necessary to examine the various goodness-of-fit indices simultaneously
because there is no single fit measure that is able to provide a conclusive assessment
of the goodness of fit of the overall model Besides, different measures exhibit
different degrees of biasness and sensitivity to factors like number of cases involved
in analysis and the size of the correlations in the model, to name a few (Kenny,
2003). Hence, in order to provide a better view and solicit more consensus and
acceptability, researchers ought to examine and discuss more than one of these
measures. (Garson, 2008; Khong & Richardson, 2003; Hair et al, 1998).
3.13.8 SEM Stage 7: Interpreting and Modifying The Two Models
In this final stage, once the model is deemed acceptable, the researcher will
examine the results to see if major relationships specified in the proposed model
underscored by the theory are supported by the empirical data (statistically
significant) (Hair et al, 1998). Should the results indicate insignificant causal
relationships of the variables and constructs, or display unsatisfactory model fit, the
initial model may subject to re-specification. Under this situation, the researcher
will then explore alternative models with the re-specification in the hope that they
will offer more insight by making some alteration to the initial proposed model.
Model re-specification involves the adding or omitting of the causal relationships in
the proposed model. The re-specified model is known as the competing model or
modified model in SEM. However, this alteration or re-specification to the structural
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model has to be done with the support and justification by the theory. In other
words, the researcher has to be mindful of not distorting the underiying theory with
the re-specification. The statistical procedures and measures in section 6.1 will be
repeated in the process of estimating the competing model Intuitively, the
competing model should exhibit improved causal relationships than that of the initial
proposed model. Once the re-specified model is finalized, all hypotheses will then
be examined to see if causal relationships are in the hypothesized directions, i.e.
positive or negative (Hair et al, 1998).
In our case, the interpretation of the two models will be based on the results
from AMOS. We will examine the hypotheses that ERM implementation challenge
will have a negative impact on the implementation intensity. In turn, implementation
intensity will have a positive effecton the perceived benefitmeasures.
3.14 CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES TESTING
To test the hypotheses for the ERM value maximization theories, i.e. H3 to
H9, and the ERM value creation transmission mechanism (CSL risk premium
model), i.e. Hi0 to Hi2 (see section 3.3.4), this study employed correlation analysis to
test the strength or significance of the association between the two metric variables
involved in each hypothesis testing. On the one side of each hypothesis testing was
the independent variable, i.e. ERM Implementation, and on the other side was the
respective variable measuring the relevant hypothesis involved (see sections 3.7.5-
3.7.7). Below depicts in chronological order, the procedures and measures that have
been performed:
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(i) Reliabilityanalysis using SPSS:
a. Cronbach's alpha
b. Item-total correlation
(ii) Product momentcorrelation using SPSS:
• Pearson correlationcoefficient analysis
(hi) Significance of association analysis
3.15 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
3.15.1 Introductory
The meaning and definition of reliability analysis has been presented earlier
in section 3.9.1. To recapitulate, reliability analysis ought to be performed to ensure
consistent data results before further multivariate analysis to be conducted. This
analysis evaluates the reliability of the survey instrument; i.e. the questionnaire
(Khong and Richardson, 2003). The internal consistency reliability analysis is
performed to ensure consistency among the variables in a summated scale. For
instance, inthe hypotheses testing relating to the CSL risk premium model (H10, Hi u
and Hi2), three constructs are involved for the dependent variables, i.e. tactical,
strategic, and normative risks. Since all ofthese constructs are measured by multiple
statements making up their respective summated scale, the internal consistency
reliability for each summated scale has to be ascertained. High internal consistency
reliability shows that items measuring the same scale (construct) are highly
intercorrelated (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &Richardson, 2003).
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3.15.2 Cronbach's Alpha
Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used technique to measure internal
consistency (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &Richardson, 2003). The Cronbach's alpha
values range from 0 and 1.0 (Hair et al, 1998). The higher values indicate higher
degrees ofhomogeneity among items measuring a scale (Hair et al, 1998; Khong &
Richardson, 2003). In our context, the Cronbach's alpha values gauge if the
questionnaire measures the 'tactical risk', 'strategic risk', and the 'normative risk' in
a useful manner. It also gauges the extent ofintercorrelation among items (inter-item
correlations) within a scale/construct. Items with low Cronbach's alpha values
within each scale will be omitted for further analysis to improve reliability of the
scale. A rule of thumb suggests that acceptable Cronbach's alpha values should
exceed 0.7 (Hairet al, 1998; Khong & Richardson, 2003).
3.15.3 Item-Total Correlation
Item-total correlation measures "the correlation of the item to the summated
scale score" (Hair et al, 1998, p 118). It was used to gauge the relationship of one
variable with the rest in the set of measures or scale. In other words, the test
provided information whether the variables share a common core in measuring up a
scale/construct. Variables with unsatisfactory item-total correlation score were
discarded for further analysis to ensure high reliability of the scale or construct. A
rule of thumb suggests that acceptable item-total correlation value should exceed 0.5
(Hair et al, 1998, p 118). Reliability analysis was performed using SPSS program.
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3.16 PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION
Product moment correlation is a statistic summarizing the strength of
association between two metric variables (Malhotra, 2004). It is a measure (index or
coefficient) of the linear dependence between two variables X and Y. The index
indicates the degree to which the variation in one variable, X, is related to the
variation in another variable, Y. The product moment correlation statistic was
developed by Karl Pearson and therefore it is also known as Pearson correlation
coefficient. Mathematically, the correlation coefficient between two variables is
defined as the covariance of the two variables divided by the product of their
standard deviations. The coefficient is typically denoted by a symbol r and takes a
value between +1 and -1 inclusive. According to Malhotra (2004), the correlation
coefficient is an absolute number and is not expressed in any unit of measurement. A
value of 1 indicates a perfect linear relationship between X and Y, implying that Y
increases as X increases in the same magnitude of percentage on a line where all
data points are lying. On the other hand, a value of -1 indicates that Y decreases as
X increases in the same magnitude of percentage. A value of 0 implies that there is
no linear correlation between the variables. The value 0, however, does not mean
that the two variables are unrelated. There is still possibility that a nonlinear
relationship could exist between them (Malhotra, 2004).
3.17 TEST STATISTIC FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSOCIATION
To test the statistical significance of the relationship between two variables
measured by using the product moment correlation as discussed in section 3.16
above, the following hypotheses are developed:
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H0: p = 0
H,: p^O
From the above, the null hypothesis, H0, proposes that there is no linear relationship
(relationship - 0) between two variables. The alternative hypothesis, Hi, on the
otherhand proposes there is linear relationship between the two variables.
The test statistic is given by;
t= r[(n-2)/(l-r2)]I/2
where t = calculated t-value
r = product moment correlation coefficient
n = number of cases under examination
The above test statistic has a t distribution with n - 2 degree of freedom. We can
refer to t distribution table providedby a statistical reference to determine the critical
value of t for a two-tailed test at a particular confidence level, i.e. a=0.05. After
having determined the critical value of t, we compare it with the calculated t value
derived from the formula as shown above to determine its statistical significance
(Maholtra, 2004). Many software applications such as SPSS software package offers
a convenient way to performthe above test statistic for significance of association.
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CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
From the research population of 960 public listed companies (PLCs), a total
of 400 telephone and email contacts were made to the selected PLCs (the elements)
identified through stratified sampling process to solicit their participation in the
survey. Out of the 400 contacts made, 100 were to the top-100 largest PLCs by
market capitalization, i.e. the stratum 1 of the stratified sampling (see section 3.6),
and the remaining 300 contacts were made to the randomly selected elements
(PLCs) of the stratum 2 sampling. Out of these contacts made, 200 questionnaires
were sent out through either postal mail or email to the respondents following their
verbal agreement to participate in the survey. Appendix 1 presents a sample of the
questionnaire. The telephone calls made and the emails sent out to the selected
respondents in the sampling were meticulously done in such a way that they reached
the 'right persons' within the selected companies to answer the questionnaires. The
'right persons' means senior company officials (managers and above) who had had
experiences in implementing or participating in enterprise risk management
initiatives within their organizations.
4.1.1 Survey Execution: The Targeted Respondents
The execution of the survey was carried out to deliberately target the firms'
chiefrisk officers or enterprise risk managers. However, not all targeted firms had
the above position designations created within their organizational hierarchy.
Neither did all firms have a dedicated risk management department within their
corporate structure. Nevertheless, this did not mean that enterprise risk management
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initiatives were absent from the organizations' managerial activities. In such
instances, ERM initiatives were usually carried out together or embedded with other
corporate initiatives. Further more, the ownerships of such ERM programs were also
assumed by a department other than a dedicated enterprise risk management
department. The reason for not having a dedicated enterprise risk management
department within the organizational structure was mainly to conserve corporate
financial and human resources. For instance, this study found that it is rather
common in some firms that the function of ERM was parked in the firms' internal
audit department. There were also instances where the role of the chief risk officer
was assumed by the chief executive officer. As such, the definition of the above
'right persons' profile was the next best alternative available to otherwise the ideal
chief risk officers orenterprise risk managers to answer the survey questionnaires.
4.1.2 Questionnaires in 2 Batches
The questionnaires were sent out in two batches. Additional questions were
added to the questionnaires sent out for the second batch respondents. The additional
questions were incorporated to enable the study to test the ERM value maximization
hypotheses and the strategic risk premium (CLS model) hypotheses. There were
altogether 21 additional questions (statements) included in the second batch
questionnaires. Out of the additional questions, 2 questions were for describing the
ERM implementation outcome. They are (1) reduces company's expected taxes, and
(2) reduces the cost for external financing. The other 19 additional questions were to
cover the variables measuring the conceptualization of the strategic risk premium
framework, i.e. the CLS model. These statements described the various situations
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that were transpiring in the firms inregard to the ERM implementation. They are (1)
ERM implementation helps reduce company's overall risk premium, (2) there is
minimum information friction between the management and the shareholders, (3)
there is minimum gap of risk preference between the management and shareholders
of firm's investment undertaking, (4) there is satisfactory liquidity/free float of
firm's shares traded in the stock exchange (5) hedging strategy employed by firm is
effectively meeting its intended objectives, (6) the use of real options to reduce
firm's earning surprises is effective and satisfactory, (7) management is effective in
isolating firm's earnings from market forces/uncertainty, (8) management is
effective in shaping the firm to attain and sustain its structural advantages, (9)
management is effective in isolating its earnings from rivals attacks through
attaining structural advantages, (10) our enterprise has attained resource-based
advantages, (11) our enterprise's resource-based advantages has helped isolate it
from market pressures, (12) our enterprise has attained knowledge-based advantage,
(13) our firm is able to absorb, interpret, and commercialize critical information on a
timely basis which has helped to isolate its earnings from rival attack, market
pressure, and technological obsolescence, (14) our firm has attained strategic options
advantages (i.e. ability to diversify business line, expand market reach and product
offering, acquire key supplier), (15) our firm possesses a portfolio of strategic
options (i.e. ability to diversify business line, expand market reach and product
offering, acquire key supplier) which has enabled it to mitigate macroeconomic and
industry disturbances risk, (16) our enterprise is successful in complying with
industry and regulatory rules, (17) our firm will face higher risk premium if we fail
to comply with industry or institutional norms (i.e. those market rules expected by
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investors, regulators, interest groups), (18) our firm's competitive advantages
achieved through implementing strategic (i.e structure, resource, knowledge
advantages) risk management will be quickly matched by our competitors, (19) our
firm's competitive advantages achieved through implementing tactical (hedging and
options) risk management will be quickly matched by our competitors.
Appendix 2 .presents these additional questions that were incorporated in the
batch 2 questionnaires. These additional questions were utilized to perform the
bivariate correlation tests on the hypotheses in regard to the ERM value
maximization theory and the CLS model of strategic risk premium hypotheses (see
sections 3.3.2-3.3.3 on these hypotheses development). There were 31 answered
questionnaires collected from the second batch survey exercise.
4.1.3 Respondents' Designation Profile
From the two batches of questionnaires sent out (totaling 200), a total of 128
questionnaires were returned, constituting 32.0% response rate of the telephone calls
made and 64.0% of the questionnaires sent out respectively. Out of these
questionnaires received, 22 of the respondents (17%) carried the position
designations of, or similar to that of (senior) risk manager; 18 of them (14%) were
internal auditors; 6 of them (5%) were either chief financial officers (CFO) or
financial controllers; another 6 of them (5%) were either executive directors or vice
presidents (VC); 4 of them (3%) were either chief operating officers (COO) or
general managers (GM); 2 of them (1%) were either managing director (MD) or
chief executive officer (CEO); and the rest 70 of them (55%) were managers or
senior officials of the surveyed firms holding various titles such as senior process
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engineer, operations manager, group planning manager, senior finance manager,
corporate planning manager, customer service manager, and compliance manager.
Figure 4.1 presents the graphical breakdown of the respondents' positi








Figure 4.1: Survey respondents' designation breakdown
4.1.4 Surveyed Firms byMarket Sectors
The public listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia's main market are
categorized into market sectors in accordance to the industries in which these firms
conducted their main business activities. Among others, the main purpose of this
classification is to facilitate the computation of stock indices along these market
sectors. There are eleven market sectors as per the Bursa Malaysia's classification,
namely (1) construction, (2) consumer product, (3) finance, (4) industrial product,
(5) mining, (6) plantation, (7) properties, (8) technology, (9) trading/service, (10)
hotels, and (11) infrastructure project. From the received questionnaires, 48 of the
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surveyed firms were in trading/services sector; 23 were in consumer product and
industrial product sectors respectively; 16 were in finance sector; 5 were in
construction sector, 7 were in properties sector; 3 were in plantation and technology
sectors each; and none was in mining, hotels, and infrastructure project sectors. The
distribution of the surveyed firms in each market sector generally reflects the
population distribution of the PLCs on the BursaMalaysia's main market. Names of
the companies participated in the survey are not presented to maintain the
confidentiality of them as a condition agreed upon during the survey exercise. Figure
4.2 portrays the breakdown by Bursa Malaysia's market sectors of the received
questionnaires.
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Figure 4.2: Breakdown of surveyed PLCs in each market sector
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4.1.5 Incomplete and OffendingData
Upon examination of the returned questionnaires, six questionnaires (cases)
and seven variables (i6, c4, c9, bl5, bl7, bl9, and b20) were omitted for further
analysis in the structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis due to incomplete or
offending data (see Hair et al, 1998, p.51). Incomplete data happened because many
respondents did not answer or give rating to a particular statement in the
questionnaire. For instance, upon inspection, the six questionnaires (cases) omitted
for further analysis mentioned above presented many unanswered statements by the
respondents involved. Further more, after close examination, seven statements
(variables) in the questionnaires presented many instances where they were not rated
by the respondents. Forexample, variables bl7 and b20 were only answered by the
batch 2 respondents which numbering only 31 cases. Other omitted variables were
rated in less than 122 cases. The number 122 became the accepted threshold of cases
for analysis in the structural equation modeling for the ERM framework as it falls
within the recommended range of number of cases for SEM analysis by Hair et al.
(1998). Under such circumstances, in order to preserve the overall integrity and
robustness of the collected data for the SEM analysis, it is advisable and deemed
appropriate to simply discard the problematic cases and variables (Hair et al, 1998).
As such, only 122 questionnaires were accepted for the analysis. Table 4.1 displays










Table 4.1: The deleted offending variables
Statement
Enables tracking costs of compliance
Over-regulation in organization hinder ERM implementation
There is insufficient necessary level of investment for ERM
impiementation
Reduces Information gap between managers and investors
ERM implementation has a positive impact on enterprise's credit rating
ERM can minimize agency cost
Implementing ERM program will be rewarded by the equity market
There were many potential explanations that could be associated with the
above statements not being rated as frequently as others. Apart from the reason that
they were presented only to the batch 2 respondents (numbering only 31), the other
primary reason could be due to the fact that respondents encountered difficulty to
associate, or to quantitatively rate the situation transpired in their firms with that of
being described by the statements. As a result, for expediency to complete
answering the rest of the questionnaire, the respondents would have just skipped or
ignored these statements.
Notwithstanding their omission from the SEM analysis, variables bl5, bl7,
bl9, and b20 were utilized for hypotheses testing on the value maximization theory
ofERM program implementation in bivariate correlation analysis.
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4.1.6 Accepted Questionnaires by Sampling Stratums
Ofthe 122 accepted questionnaires, 42 ofthem were from the top 100 largest
listed companies in Bursa Malaysia by market capitalization, i.e. the stratum 1
sampling. These respondent companies were also component companies in the 100-
stock Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) before the index's computation was
replaced by the 30-stock FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI on 6 July 2009. The
remaining 80 were from elements in the stratum 2 sampling. Together, these 122
questionnaires constituted about 13% sampling size ofthe total 960 listed companies
(the population) on the Bursa Malaysia.38 Figure 4.3 depicts the information on the














Questionnaires received and accepted
122
-Mi.. 42
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Iota
•Received
Accepted
Figure 4.3: Information on questionnaires received and accepted
Source: Bursa's Bulletin "BursaBytes", Issue 2, Vol 1, July 2009.
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In view of the design, length and respondents' incentive of the survey
instrument, this response rate was considered acceptable (Hague & Jackson, 1999;
Churchill, 1995; Khong & Richardson, 2003). Further more, the sample size fell
within the required 100-150 (see sections 3.6 and 3.13.5). Table 4.2 summarizes the
survey execution information.
Table 4.2: Survey Respondents' Information
Sampling
Targeted Population






• by overall population
• average








4.1.7 Organization ofData Analysis
What follow in this chapter are discussions on the findings of data analysis
of the survey exercise. The discussions are organized into four main parts, which in
turn are divided into the various sections as described below.
Section 4.2 (part 1) presents analysis of the depth of penetration of ERM
practices among the PLCs. The mean scores of all fourteen statements in the
questionnaire measuring ERM implementation intensity (items il, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6,
i7, i8, i9, ilO, ill, il2, il3, and il4) (see Appendix 1) are computed. Descriptive
frequency distribution analysis of the mean scores is performed along the various
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dimensions and areas of the ERM implementation framework that had been
articulated as in section 3.7. The mean scores are examined and interpreted based
on a semantic scale that has been developed to describe the intensity of ERM
implementation.
Sections 4.3 to 4.10 (part 2) discuss the analysis and findings of the SEM
model of the proposed ERM implementation framework (practical framework)
highlighting the causal relationships among constructs (and their respective factors)
ERM Implementation Intensity, Perceived ERM Benefit Measures, and
Implementation Challenge. Theoutcome of this powerful SEM analysis has enabled
the proposed ERM framework to serve as a predictive model for a successful ERM
implementation program for enterprises. The hypotheses being tested are H, and H2
as defined in section 3.3.1.
Section 4.11 (part 3) discusses analysis and findings of hypotheses testing on
the value maximization theory of ERM program implementation. The hypotheses
being tested are H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, and H9 as defined in section 3.3.2 (also sub
sections 3.3.2.1-3.3.2.5). The hypotheses are tested using bivariate correlation
analysis.
Section 4.12 (part 4) discusses analysis and findings ofhypotheses involving
the ERM value creation transmission mechanism through the conceptualization
of the strategic risk premium model (the CLS model). The hypotheses being tested
are H!0, Hn, and Hi2 as defined in section 3.3.3 (also sub-sections 3.3.3.1-3.3.3.3).
The hypotheses are tested using bivariate correlation analysis.
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4.2 DESCRIPTIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS OF ERM
PENETRATION LEVEL
4.2.1 Introductory
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the penetration level of
ERM practices among the PLCs in Malaysia. In sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 this thesis
has described the ERM Implementation framework and its measurement metric. To
recapitulate, ERM implementation intensity metric is measured by fourteen
statements proxying three dimensions of ERM implementation framework, namely
structure, governance, and process. Each dimension of the ERM implementation
framework can be further articulated into separate areas. And each area is measured
by one or more statements (items) in the questionnaire. For instance, the structure
dimension is articulated to be covering two areas, i.e. ERM definition, and
performance measurement, and these two areas are measured by four statements in
the questionnaire. Similarly, the governance dimension is measured by four
statements covering two areas, i.e. information and roles, and compliance. On the
other hand, the process dimension is measured by six statements covering three
areas, i.e. integration of business strategy and objectives, risk identification and
response, and risk quantification. Table 3.2 in chapter 3 presents the relevant
statements measuring each corresponding area in the respective dimensions of the
ERM implementation framework.
To examine the depth of ERM practices penetration among the public listed
companies, this study analyzed the frequency distribution of mean scores for the
summated scales of the various dimensions and areas of the ERM implementation
intensity metric provided by the PLCs through questionnaires. To provide a clearer
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perspective and better interpretation of the PLCs' ERM implementation intensity,
this thesis develops a descriptive semantic scale as shown in Table 4.3 to provide a
reference to the corresponding ranges of mean scores of the summated scales that
are computed from the 5-point Likert's scale.
'TaMe 4.3: Semantic Scale for ERM Implementation Intensity
Mean score











Results of the mean scores for each ERM implementation dimension, its
overall average mean score, and their corresponding semantic scale interpretations
are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Mean Score Analysis Results ofERM Implementation Intensity
. Dimensions










Results in Table 4.4 indicate the overall average mean score gauging the PLCs'
ERM implementation intensity is 3.82. This value falls within the semantic scale of
'good' as defined in Table 4.3. As a result, we can infer that the overall ERM
penetration level among the PLCs is rather encouraging. The detailed results of the
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descriptive frequency distribution analysis for each area ofthe ERM implementation
intensitydimensionare presented below.
4.2.2 TheStructure Dimension ofERM
Table 4.5 presents the mean scores for each item (statement) in the
questionnaire that are measured in 5-point Likert's scale gauging the structure
dimension ofERM implementation framework. There are four items measuring this
dimension, i.e. il, i2, ill, and il2. Two items covering an area each. As shown in
Table 4.5, the mean scores range from 3.70 to 4.06, all falling within the 'good'
category of the semantic scale interpretation (refer to Table 4.3).
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Figure 4.4 depicts the frequency distribution of respondents' rating responses
for the pertinent items in the questionnaire covering the two areas, i.e. ERM
definition and performance measurement, which measure the structure dimension
of ERM implementation framework. The X-axis displays four ranges of the average
mean scores of the summated scale of ERM definition and performance
measurement. The X-axis also presents the corresponding semantic scale
interpretation as per definition in Table 4.3. On the other hand, the Y-axis indicates
the frequency of cases that falls within each rating range or semantic scale. Higher
rating scores signify situations where ERM implementation is in high intensity. In
other words, the higher the score, the more penetrated are ERM practices among the
PLCs. For instance, referring to Figure 4.4, there are approximately 80 respondents
whose mean score rating for the statements measuring ERM definition and
performance measurementof the structure dimension of ERM implementation falls
within the range of '4.0 - 5.0'. This is equivalent to an 'excellent' situation of ERM
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Figure 4.4: Respondents' Rating in 2 Areas of ERM Framework's
Structure Dimension
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4.2.3 The Governance Dimension ofERM
Table 4.6 displays the mean scores for four items, i.e. i3, i9, i5, and i6, which
measure the governance dimension of ERM implementation framework. Out of
these four items, two items (i3 and i9) cover the area of information and roles whilst
another two items (15 and i6) cover the area of compliance. Results in Table 4.6
indicate that the average mean scores for the two areas in the governance dimension
are 3.98 and 3.52, the values of which are within the 'good' category of the semantic
scale interpretation (refer to Table 4.3).
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Figure 4.5 depicts the frequency distribution of respondents' rating responses
for the two areas in the governance dimension of ERM implementation framework,
i.e. information and roles, and compliance. Referring to Figure 4.5, majority of the
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Excellent Good Satisfactory Poor
Figure 4.5: Respondents' Rating in 2 Areas of ERM Framework's
Governance Dimension
4.2.4 The Process Dimension ofERM
Table 4.7 presents the mean scores for six items, i.e. i4, i8, ilO, il3, i!4, and
i7. These six items measure the process dimension of ERM implementation
framework. Out of these six items, four items (i4, i8, ilO, and 113) cover the area of
integration of business strategy and objectives whilst one item (114) measures the
area of risk identification and response and another item (i7) gauges risk
quantification. Results in Table 4.7 indicate that the average mean scores for all the
three areas in this process dimension of ERM implementation framework are within
the 3.5 to 4.0 range of implementation intensity, which corresponds to the 'good'
category of the semantic scale interpretation (refer to Table 4.3).
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Figure 4.6 portrays the frequency distribution of respondents' rating
responses for the three areas in the process dimension of ERM implementation
framework, i.e. integration of business strategy and objectives, risk identification
and response, and risk quantification. Similar to the frequency distribution of the
previous two dimensions, majority of the respondents rated the mean scores of the
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Figure 4.6: Respondents' Rating in 2 Areas of ERM Framework's
Process Dimension
4.2.5 Conclusion
The mean scores of all fourteen statements in the questionnaire measuring
ERM implementation intensity (i.e. items il, 12, i3, i4, i5, 16, i7, i8, i9, ilO, ill, il2,
il3, and il4) were computed. The average mean scores were examined for the depth
of penetration of ERM practices among the respondents. Analysis of the mean
scores along the three dimensions and the various areas of the ERM implementation
framework was also performed.
Results of the analysis indicate that the intensity of ERM program
implementation among the respondents is 'good', with the average mean score of
3.82 on the 5-point Likert's scale. Hence, it can be concluded that the penetration of
ERM practices among Malaysian listed companies are relatively encouraging. This
is so considering that Malaysiadoes not have specific laws governing corporate risk
management like that of SOX in the United States. Obviously, it would seem to be
in the best interest of shareholders if the results would have been in the category of
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"excellent". Nonetheless, by placing the findings in a bigger scheme of things (vis
a-vis the regulatory requirement for ERM in Malaysia), it seems that ERM practices
among the PLCs are heading in the right and desirable directions.
4.3 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
SPSS was used to perform reliability analysis to calculate Cronbach's alpha
on the variables. The analysis was to test the degree of consistency of variables
when measuring the indicators for ERM implementation intensity, implementation
challenge, and perceived ERM benefit measures for the ERM practical framework.
The indicators were denominated alphabetically and numerically in a systematic
manner. For instance, indicators for the three constructs: implementation intensity,
implementation challenge, perceived benefit measures were denoted il, i2, i3, etc;
cl, c2, c3, etc; and bl, b2, b3, etc respectively. The corresponding indicators for the
three constructs are shown in Table 4.8a, 4.8b and 4.8c. As described in section
3.9.2, a rule of thumb suggests that.the acceptable Cronbach's alpha value should
exceed 0.7 (Hair et al, 1998, p 118). The Cronbach's alpha value was 0.900 (see
Appendix 3) implying the questionnaire was measuring the ERM implementation
intensity, implementation challenge, and perceived ERM benefit measures in a
useful manner. Hence, all variables were retained. The calculation of reliability
analysis was based on the recommended default settings of the SPSS Application
Guide (Anon, 1999a).
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Table 4.8a: Indicators for construct ERM Implementation Intensity
ERM Implementation Intensity
il Provides common understanding of the
objectives of each ERM initiative
i2 Provides common terminology and set
of standards of risk management
i3 Provides enterprise-wide information
about risk
i4 Integrates risk with corporate strategic
planning
i5 Reduces risk of non-compliance
i7 Quantifies risk to the greatest extent
possible
i8 Integrated across all functions and
business units
i9 Enables everyone understands his/her
accountability
ilO ERM strategy is aligned with corporate
strategy
ill Identifies key risk indicators (KRIs)
il2 Integrates risk with key performance
indicators (KPIs)
il3 Aligns ERM initiatives to business
objectives
il4 Provides the rigor to identify and select
risk responses (i.e. risk- avoidance,
reduction, sharing and acceptance)
Table 4.8b: Indicators for construct Implementation Challenge
Implementation Challenge
cl People is an area posing big challenge
c2 Timeliness of information is a problem
c3 There is lack of information needed
c5 There is strong competition from other
type of management techniques to be
implemented
c6 There is wide discrepancy between
expectation and practices in ERM
implementation
c7 There is inadequate technology
support
c8 The organization structure deters ERM
implementation
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Table 4.8c: Indicators for construct Perceived ERM Benefit Measures
bl
Perceived ERM Benefit Measures
Enhances enterprise's ability to take b9 Enhances managers' ability to think
appropriate risks in value creation entrepreneurial^ and innovatively
b2 Strengthens management's confidence blO Boosts enterprise's profitability
in business operations bll Assists in meeting enterprise's
b3 Creates smooth governance procedures strategic goals
b4 Improves monitoring of enterprise bl2 Reduces expected costs of financial
performance distress
b5 Enriches corporate reputation bl3 Protects company's investments
b6 Improves clarity of organization-wide bl4 Reduces volatility of managers'
decision-making and chain of command bonuses and salaries
b7 Facilitates reporting to regulators bl6 Managers are risk conscious
b8 Improves communicating to bl8 ERM helps our enterprise to be
stakeholders / shareholders respected within the industry.
4.4 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Exploratory factor analysis was performed using SPSS with reference to the
recommended processes as described in section 3.3. Only factor loadings with
values above 0.3 were displayed (Coakes & Steed, 2001, p. 158; Khong &
Richardson 2003) (see Appendix 4) whilst only factor loadings above 0.5 were
considered significant39 based on the concept of statistical power given the sample
size between 120 and 150 (Hair et al., 1998, p.112). These insignificant variables
were c3, b5, b6, bl3, bl6 and they were dropped for further analysis. Exploratory
factor analysis had provided insight to the researchers in regard to how many factors
could be extracted for each construct based on the designed survey instrument.
Factors extraction method followed latent root criterion whereby only factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1 were considered significant (Hairet al., 1998).
39 "Significance is based on a .05 significance level (a), apower level of80 percent, and standard
errors assumed tobe twice those conventional crrelation coefficients" (see Hairetal., 1998, p.l 12).
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The results showed nine factors were extracted for all the variables. These
nine factors together accounted for almost 70 percent of the data variance.
Examination of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy
showed a coefficient of0.821, which was above the acceptable level of0.7 (Hair et
al., 1998, p. 99). The Bartlett's test of sphericity, which is a statistical test for the
overall significance of all correlations within a correlation matrix (Hair et al., 1998,
p.88), was also statistically significant at a - 0.01 level. Out of the nine factors, two
factors were extracted for ERM implementation intensity (denoted II and 12), two
factors for implementation challenge (denoted CI and C2), and five factors were
extracted for perceived ERM benefit measures (denoted Bl, B2, B3, B4, and 85).
The nine factors extracted and their respective indicators are shown in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9: Nine-factor model extracted using
Principal Component Analysis and Varimax Rotation.
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The result indicated a minor departure from that of anticipated by the
researchers in which three factors for ERM implementation intensity and four
factors for perceive ERM benefit measures had been expected based on the literature
review.
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4.5 RELIABILITY OF THE FACTORS' SCALES
After factors were extracted from the exploratory factor analysis, reliability
test was conducted again on the respective factor scale. Statistically, it involved the
item-total correlation for variables within a scale or factor. Table 4.10 presents the
results of the item-total correlation. The cut-off point of an acceptable item-total
correlation is 0.5 or above (Hair et al, 1998, p 118). As Table 4.10 indicates,
variables bl2, bl8, and c8, failed to attain item-total correlation above the 0.5
threshold. Hence, these variables were omitted for further analysis. Note that
variable c5 initially did not make the cut for the 0.5 threshold for factor CI,
subsequent scale reliability test after deleting c8 however, revealed that c5's
Cronbach's alpha in factor CI was 0.504. As such we retained c5 in factor CI for
further analysis.
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2 ilO 0.573 0.552 11
3 ill 0.666 0.532 11
4 112 0.770 0.664 11
5 il3 0.633 0.524 11
6 il4 0.577 0.577 11
7 i2 0.601 0.584 12
8 13 0.686 0.664 12
9 i4 0.641 0.650 12
10 i5 0.579 0.594 12
11 i7 0.639 0.541 12
12 iS 0.796 0.742 12
13 i9 0.537 0.538 12
14 bl 0.780 0.664 Bl
* Not significant (< 0.5)
* Excludedfor further analysis
^" \:iri:ihlr I <i:nliiiM In-in i• •r.-11
ruiTrl:i!iMii
!-:u-|..i
lj uz. U.oBo 0./ZU Bl
16 b3 0.623 0.680 Bl
17 b4 0.631 0.653 Bl
18 b7 0.760 0.598 B2
19 b8 0.666 0.598 B2
20 b9 0.681 0.577 B3
21 blO 0.751 0.618 B3
22 bll 0.573 0.593 B3
23 bl2 0.567 0.402* B4
24 blfi
.0.773 0.402* B4
25 c5 0.728 0.491* CI
26 c6 0.739 0.600 CI
27 c7 0.830 0.572 CI
28 cS 0.612 0.450* CI
Table 4.11 shows the Cronbach's alpha statistic for the factor scales of the
retained variables. The Cronbach's alpha value for each factor scale is above the
recommended value of 0.7, indicating the scales' internal consistency (Hair et al,
1998, p 118).
Table 4.11: Cronbach's Alpha statistic for factor scale
FiH'lor
• 'BBWI'iBS
lnrlk'iilors No of items Scale Cronbach's
Alpha
11 il, ilO, ill, il2, il3, il4 6 0.804
12
Bl
i2, i3, H, iS, 17, i8, i9 7 0.855
bl, b2, b3, b4 4 0.844
B2 b7, b8 2 0.748
B3 b9, blO, bll 3 0.764
CI c6, c7, c8 3 0.718
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After two rounds of data reduction process, i.e. through exploratory factor
analysis' factor loadings analysis and item-total correlation's coefficient analysis,
the study had eliminated a total of eleven variables. This means only twenty five
variables were retained for further analysis.
4.6 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
As described in section 3.11, confirmatory analysis provided total control
over which variables describe the factors. Hair et al. (1998, p.lll) suggested that
factor loading 0.5 and above to be considered as practically significant with the
sample size 100 or larger40. As Hair et al. (1998) put it, "the researcher should
realize that extremely high loadings (.80 and above) are not typical and that the
practical significance of the loadings is an important criterion" (p. 111). Hence, with
reference to the data reduction criterion discussed thus far, coupled with the
guidance from the literature review, we retain altogether twenty five variables which
make up of six remaining factors for further analysis. These factors also known as
latent constructs after confirmatory factor analysis. Variables were assigned to the
specific constructs shown in Table 4.12.
40 »
a .50 loading denotes that 25 percent ofthe variance is accounted for by the factor. The loading
must exceed .70 for the factor to account for 50 percent ofthe variance" (see Hair et al., 1998, p.] ]1).
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Table 4.12: The indicators extracted ofthe respective constructs for SEM analysis
< onstruti II: I
I Provides common understanding of die objectives of each ERM initiative
10 ERM strategy is aligned with corporate strategy
II Identifieskey risk indicators (KRIs)
12* Integrates riskwith key performance indicators (KPIs)
13 Aligns ERM initiatives to business objectives
14 Provides the rigor to identify and select risk responses (i.e. risk- avoidance,
reduction, sharing and acceptance)
(onxinici |2:
|2 Provides common terminology and set ofstandards ofrisYmanagement
i3 Provides enterprise-wide information about risk
i4 Integrates risk with corporate strategic planning
i5 Reduces risk of non-compliance
i7 Quantifies risk to the greatest extent possible
i8* Integrated across all functions and business units
i9 Enables everyone understands his/her accountability
< iiiistriu'i HI:
bl * Enhances enterprise's ability to take appropriate risks in value creation
b2 Strengthens management's confidence in business operations
b3 Creates smoothgovernance procedures
b4 Improves monitoring of enterprise performance
Construct B2:
Facilitates reporting to regulators
b8 Improves communicating to stakeholders / shareholders
( onslriicl 153:
b9 Enhances managers' ability to think entrepreneurially and innovativeiy
blO* Boosts enterprise's profitability
bl 1 Assists in meetingenterprise's strategic goals
( nnsinil-1 < 1:
c5 There isstrong competition from other type of management techniques to
be implemented
c6 There is wide discrepancy between expectation and practices in ERM
implementation
c7* There is inadequate technology support
^Highest loading in the construct (factor)
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4.7 NAMING OF THE FACTORS
With the derivation of the above six-factor solution (i.e. two ERM
implementation intensity constructs, II, 12; three perceived benefit measures
constructs, Bl, B2, B3; and one implementation challenge factors, CI, we could
attempt to name those factors in order to assign some meaning to each of it. Naming
of the factors was not done arbitrarily. The process involved "substantive
interpretation of the pattern of factor loadings for the variable" (Hair et al., 1998,
p.126). It also helps with a prior knowledge of what to expect after extensive
literature review in order to give a bigger picture of what those constructs represent.








Table 4.13: Naming of the Factors
r^r^r^T?Ts-TT™r
Construct name
performance & target setting
business function 8t process integration
risk taking capability & confidence building
effective stakeholders communication
enterprise 8t managerial excellence
implementation challenges
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4.8 MODELING AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
4.8.1 SEMStage 1: Developing a Theoretically Based Model
This section puts forth an ERM model to examine how the two factors of
ERM implementation intensity affect the three factors of perceived ERM benefit
measures of Malaysian public listed companies or PLCs. At the same time, our
model also investigates if the PLCs find the one factor of ERM implementation
challenge significantly affect their ERM implementation intensity. The examination
is performed using structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. All of the above
factors are extracted from factor analyses discussed in the previous section which
altogether comprised of 25 variables. These extracted variables are shown in Table
4.12.
In our model, constructs CI is the exogenous constructs while constructs II,
12, Bl, B2, and B3 are the endogenous constructs. In order to examine the
relationships between the dimensions of (1) the ERM implementation intensity and
the perceived ERM benefit measures, (2) ERM implementation challenge and ERM
implementation intensity, the following hypotheses are tested:
Ho: The overall model has a good fit
Ha: The overall model does not have a good fit
H]A: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct Bl.
HiB: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct B2.
Hie: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct B3.
Hi D: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B1.
H]E: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B2.
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H]F: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B3.
H2a: Construct CI has a negative effect on Construct II.
H2b: Construct CI has a negative effect on Construct 12.
Note that hypotheses H]A, H]B, Hie, H1D, HiE, HiF are subsets of hypothesis Hi
which hypothesizes that ERM Implementation Intensity has a positive effect on
Perceived ERM Benefit Measures. On the other hand, hypotheses H2A and H2B are
subsets of hypothesis H2 which hypothesizes that Implementation Challenge has a
negative effect on ERM Implementation Intensity. Hypotheses Hi and H2 are first
defined in section 3.3.1.
In SEM analysis, we looked forward not to reject the null hypothesis. The
null hypothesis is written in that there is no significant difference between the
observed model and the estimated model (Garson, 2008). A model with a good fit
indicates that the overall model can predict the observed variance-covarianee matrix
(Hair et al, 1998). Hypotheses H]A to HiF are developed to investigate the impact of
the two dimensions (factors) of ERM implementation intensity on the three aspects
of perceived ERM benefit measures respectively. Accepting any of the hypotheses
would mean that the particular dimension of the implementation intensity would
have a positive impact on the correspondingperceived benefit measure. On the other
hand, hypotheses H2A and H2B examine the negative impact of ERM implementation
challenge on the implementation intensity. Accepting any of these hypotheses
would mean that implementation challenge would have a negative impact on the
corresponding implementation intensity dimension.
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From the results of investigating these hypotheses, the researcher could
establish a generalization for the Malaysian PLCs, of the effects of successful ERM
implementation towards the perceived ERM benefit (value enhancing) measures,
and that of the negative impact of ERM implementation challenge towards its
implementation intensity.
4.8.2 SEM Stage 2: Constructing apath Diagram ofCausal Relationships
Figure 4.7 and 4.8 present two path diagrams portraying the predictive
relationships among the constructs under discussion (see Appendix 5 for actual
output offull path diagram from software AMOS). For instance, Figure 4.7 depicts
that Construct CI will impact constructs II and 12. The latter constructs in turn, will






Figure 4.7: Briefpath diagram ofpredictive and associative relationships
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Where: • Beta (p„„) is the relationships of endogenous constructs to endogenous
constructs
• Gamma (y„m) is the relationships of exogenous constructs to endogenous
constructs
• Phi ((|w) is the correlation among exogenous constructs
• Lambda-X (kx pm) is the loadings of exogenous indicators
• Lambda-Y (Xy q„) is the loadings of endogenous indicators
• %m is the exogenous construct
• n„ is the endogenous construct
• X is the exogenous indicator
• Y is the endogenous indicator
• m is number of exogenous constructs
• n is number of endogenous constructs
• p is number of exogenous construct indicators
• q is number of endogenous construct indicators
• C,,b and s are measurement errors
In Figure 4.8, construct CI is labeled §Ci, whilst constructs II, 12, Bl, B2,
and B3 are labeled r)n, T|i2, m.bi, 11B2, and nB3 respectively. In addition to the above,
Figure 4.8 also depicts the indicators (manifest variables) for each latent construct.
The indicators for each latent construct were derived (extracted) through
confirmatory factor analysis as previously discussed. For instance, £Ci is measured
and represented by three indicators labeled as c-5, c6, and c7. In addition, each
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indicator variable is associated with a measurement error, i.e. C„ zor 5. For instance,
C, is associated with the endogenous construct while s and 8 are associated with the
indicator variables (endogenous and exogenous respectively).
4.8.3 SEM Stage 3: Converting the Path Diagram into a Set of Structural and
Measurement Models
The path diagram in Figure 4.7 provides the basis for specification of the
structural equations and the proposed correlation (1) between exogenous constructs
and (2) between structural equations. From the path model, we construct a series of
structural equations (one for each endogenous construct) to constitute the structural
model. It follows with the specification of measurement model whereby indicators
are assigned to each construct (exogenous and endogenous). The generic forms of
the structural and measurement equations are as follows:
StructuralModel Equations:


















Structural Equation Correlations among Exogenous Constructs:
Exogenous Constructs
Where
Beta (p„„) is the relationships of endogenous to endogenous constructs
Gamma (ynm) is the relationships of exogenous to endogenous constructs
Phi (§mm) is the correlation among exogenous constructs
Lambda-X (Xxpm) is the loadings of exogenous indicators
Lambda-Y (Xy q„) is the loadings of endogenous indicators
4m is the exogenous construct
r\„ is the endogenous construct
X is the exogenous indicator
Y is the endogenous indicator
m is number of exogenous constructs
n is number of endogenous constructs
p is number of exogenous construct indicators
q is number of endogenous construct indicators
£, 5 and s are measurement errors
Source: Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L. & Black, W.C. (1998). Multivariate Analysis (5'h
Ed). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
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4.8.3.1 SpecifyingStructural Equation
The specification of a structural equation for each endogenous construct is to
specify the relationships of them to both the exogenous constructs and the other
endogenous constructs (Hair et al., 1998). In our model, we have five endogenous
constructs and one exogenous construct. Out of the five endogenous constructs, two
of them (Tin, r)I2) are proposed to be the predictors for the other three endogenous
constructs (nBi, r\m^ t|b3). Apart from that, an exogenous construct (£Ci) is proposed
to bethepredictors for endogenous constructs (r\]h ni2) (see Figure 4.8).
4.8.3.2 Specifying the Measurement Model
The measurement model specifies the correspondence of indicators to
constructs (Hair et al., 1998). The number of indicators measuring up the
endogenous and exogenous constructs in our model is shown in Table 4.14 below.
The indicators measuring up each endogenous and exogenous construct are
reflecting the dimensions discussed previously. The specific indicators
corresponding to each construct have been presented in detail earlier in this chapter




















No. of indicators Indicators
c5, c6, c7
il, ilO, ill, il2, il3, il4




In the measurement model equation, we retained the following variables: il,
i2, i3, i4,i5, il, i8, i9, HO, ill, U2, U3, il4, bl, b2, b3, b4, bl, b8, b9, blO, bll, c5,
c6, and c7. Among them, variables c5, c6, and cl, were assigned as exogenous
indicators whilst il, i2, i3, i4 ,i5, il, i8, i9, HO, ill, il2, il3, il4, bl, b2, b3, b4, bl,
b8, b9, blO, and bll as endogenous indicators. Table 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 present








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We do not see the instances where indicators should be correlated, thus no
measurement error correlations are hypothesized. This assumption will hold true for
the initial model as well as for the model modifications. The eight most important
coefficients to be estimated in the structural equation are listed in Table 4.15; i.e.
YnCl§Ci,yi2Cl?Cl,pBinTlll, pBU2Tll2, pB2IlTlii, PB2I2r|l2, pB3,mil, and PB3I2T1I2-
4.8.4 SEM Stage 4: Choosing The Type of Input Matrix and Estimating The
Proposed Model
According to Hair et al. (1998, p.631), covariances would be the preferred
input matrix type when testing a series of causal relationships. Furthermore, in
theory testing, a variance-covarianee matrix is essential. Once constructs are
identified and the measurement model specified, the proposed model is estimated
using AMOS. "Direct estimation", "Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)",
"standardized indicators scale" are chosen as criteria for the selected estimating
process and procedure.
4.8.5 SEM Stage 5: Assessing The Identification of The Structural Model
As discussed in section 3.13.6, examining the identification of the structural
model is crucial. This is done through the assessment of the degree of freedom (df)
of the data matrix. Positive number of degree of freedom is desirable to ensure the
highest generalizability of an over-identified model (Hair et al, 1998, p.608-609).
As such, the higher the df the lower the identification problems. The results
indicated that the df of our data matrix was 244. Therefore, there is no identification
problem and the generalizability was high. In addition, evaluation of other indicators
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also suggests the identification problems of the structural model are minimal. The
indicators are as follows:
(a) The standard errors are reasonably small (between 0.080 and 0.145).
(b) Correlations among constructs are below 0.90 (see Table 4.18).
(c) All except one construct are manifested by three or more indicators in the
model41 (see Figure 4.8).
4.8.6 SEM Stage 6: Evaluating Goodness-of-Fit Criteria
The evaluation of GFI begins with the examination of 'offending estimates'
such as "negative error variances, standardized coefficients exceeding or very close
to 1.0, or very large standard errors" (Hair et al, 1998, p.633; Khong & Richardson,
2003). The examinations reveal none of these problems (see Table 4.18, Appendix 6
and Appendix 1).
These indications are based on the suggestions by Hair et at (J 998, pp 609 - 610).
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Table 4.18: SEM Results: Standardized Parameter Estimates
for the Structural Model










T|B1 0.458 + 0.560
(4.265)** (5.396)**
+ 0.168
Wc^j^^^-'^^t^i^-^:^; ^:0.441;.;; ::.'••:.•::>', 0.377-:. . +. .0.224
KEHffi -'•: (3:339.)** • '• ••'
nB3 = 0.563 + 0.393 + 0.252
(4.297)** (2.130)**
**Significant at a = 0.01 level
mmBmmm
As already discussed in section 3.13.7, the overall model fit of the proposed
model is measured with three types of GFI measures, namely (1) absolute fit
measures, (2) incremental fit measures and (3) parsimonious fit measures (see Table
4.19). These GFIs measure "the correspondence of the actual or observed"
covariance input matrix "with that predicted from the proposed model" (Hair et al.,
1998, p.611). We make reference to the recommended values (rule of thumb) of
these GFIs by Hair et al. (1998), Garson (2008), Kenny (2003), and AMOS
Reference Guide42 (version 16.0.1) in interpreting the overall model fit. It is
imperative to keep in mind, however, that the recommended values are just
guideline rather than that which requires a strict adherence to in validating the
proposed model. As Khong and Richardson (2003) put it, these GFI measures
42 AMOS Reference Guide is contained in AMOS software version 16.0.1
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guideline are not "mandatory axioms". Furthermore, no single GFI measure will
hold exclusivity over the others in providing an authoritative interpretation. The
recommended GFI values nonetheless, are important in determining the
acceptability of the proposed model. At the very least, these GFI measures help
researchers to conclude if the proposed model fits the existing observed variance-
covarianee well.
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Table 4.19: GFI Measures for SEM
Absolute Fit Measures




Root mean square residual (RMSR)






Normed fit index (NFI)
Relative fit index (RFI)
Incremental fit index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis coefficient (TLI) / (NNFI)
Parsimonious Fit Measures
Normed %2 (x2/df)
Parsimonious normed fit index (PNFI)
Akaike information criterion (AIC)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Parsimony adjusted CFI (PCFI)



























































Referring to Table 4.19, the model chi-square (x2 /7-Ievel) is significant
indicating lack of satisfactory model fit. The significant chi-square statistic means
that the given model's covariance structure is significantly different from the
observed covariance matrix (Garson, 2008). However, the model chi-square statistic
is prone to Type II error. It is also bias against the size of the correlations in the
model, meaning that the larger the correlations, the poorer the fit (Kenny, 2003).
This is confirmed by the results of parameter estimates of the structural and
measurement models (see Table 4.18 and Appendix 5). It is due to these short
comings of chi-square statistic that alternative measures of fit have been developed
(Kenny, 2003). Garson (2008) asserted that if other model fit measures support the
model, researchers could discount a negative model chi-square for the overall model
fit interpretation. Apart from the model chi-square statistics, the other absolute fit
measures such as the RMSR and RMSEA indices indicate satisfactory model fit.
The GFI measure, however, wasjust slightly below the recommended value of 0.9.
Among the incremental fit measures, the IFI and TLI indices show
satisfactory model fit whilst the AGFI, NFI, and RFI were marginally below the
recommended value (see Table 4.19).
On the other hand, the parsimonious fit measures present acceptable overall
model fit. All except the PNFI and CFI measures, which are just slightly below the
recommended values, indicate satisfactory model fit.
The overall results of the absolute, incremental, and parsimonious model fit
analysis discussed above can be concluded to suggest marginally acceptable model
fit, indicative of having a room for model modification. As such, at this stage there
seems to have some evidence to reject Ha {The overall model does not have a good
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fit) and to accept the null hypothesis, H0 {The overall model has a goodfit), of our
ERM practical SEM model. Nevertheless, in striving for the best, this study makes
some modification to the structural relationships of the initial proposed model in an
attempt to improve the overall model fit. The model modification is discussed in the
following section.
4.8.7 SEM Stage 7: Interpreting and Modifying the Model
As discussed in section 3.11, test on the measurement model in SEM is a
form of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). As Hair et al. (1998) noted that the
objectives of CFA are two fold, firstly is to verify the proposed factor structure and
secondly, is to examine if any significant modifications are needed. Examination on
the SEM results indicates that the factor loadings and correlation coefficients of all
indicators (variables) to their respective assigned constructs are significant. As such,
this finding confirms the results to the factor analysis on the same variables done
earlier.
Examination on the structural (path) coefficients reveals that all causal
relationships are significant. Table 4.20 displays the results of the causal
relationships of the structural model:
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Uj2 with nB3 0.01










































From the results in Table4.20, we conclude the followings:
4.8.1.1 Exogenous Construct CI
Results showed that at all significance level, Construct CI has a negative and
significant association with Construct II (parameter estimate (PE) = -0.624; t = -
5.444; p = 0.000). Similarly, at all significance level, this construct also has a
negative and significant association with Construct 12 (PE = -0.622; t = -5.607; p =
0.000).
4.8.1.2 Endogenous Construct II
At all significance level, Construct II has a positive and significant
association with Construct Bl (PE = 0.458; t - 4.265; p = 0.000), B2 (PE = 0.441; t
= 3.582; p = 0.000), and B3 (PE = 0.563; t = 4.297; p - 0.000).
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4.8.1.3 Endogenous Construct 12
At all significance level, Construct 12 has a positive and significant
association with Construct Bl (PE = 0.560; t = 5.196; p = 0.000), B2 (PE = 0.377; t
= 3.339; p = 0.000), and B3 (PE = 0.365; t = 3.393; p = 0.000).
4.8.1.4 Model Re-Specification
The examination of the proposed model's goodness-of-fit measures discussed in
section 4.8.6 turned out to be slightly lack of satisfactory. This had prompted us to
explore modifying the proposed (structural) model (see Figure 4.9) in an attempt to
obtain a better overall model fit indices.










Figure 4.9: Model Re-specification -Path Diagram of a
Second-Order Factor Analysis Model
Construct Bl
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Figure 4.9 above portrays a path diagram of a second-order factor analysis
Model (see Appendix 8 for a detailed path diagram). As elaborated in sections 3.1
and 3.2 in relation to the ERM conceptual and practical frameworks, our factor
model as depicted by Figure 4.7 and 4.8 can be remodeled for a "higher-model".
The factor model shown in Figure 4.7 or 4.8 is known as a. first-order factor model.
Although correlated, these factors in the first-order factor model are assumed to be
separated (Hair et al., 1998, p.625). The modified model shown in Figure 4.9 is a
higher-order factor model and is known as a "second-order" factor model. As
depicted in Figure 4.9, our modified model now includes three additional constructs
namely, ERMIntensity, Implementation Challenge, and Perceived BenefitMeasures.
These three constructs (second-order factors), are constructs with several facets or
dimensions manifested by their respective first-order factors. For instance, construct
ERM Intensity has two dimensions manifested by constructs II and 12. Likewise,
constructs Bl, B2, and B3 are the multiple facets of a higher-order construct named
Perceived Benefit Measures (see Appendix 9 for output from AMOS software of full
path diagram of the modified model). This first- and second- order factor
relationship can be obtained through factor analyzing the factor correlation matrix of
the first-order factors itself (see section 3.12) or on a priori grounds (Hair et al,
1998; Suhr, 2009; Arnau, 1998; AMOS Reference Guide, version 16.0.1).
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4.8.1.5 Results ofModel Re-specification
Table 4.21 tabulates the results of model fit analysis of the modified model.
Comparison of the goodness-of-fit measures between the modified and the proposed
model are also given. As indicated in Table 4.21, the goodness-of-fit measures at all
fronts, namely the absolute-, incremental-, and parsimonious- fit measures show a
marked improvement. Further more, all goodness-of-fit measures except NFI and
RFI meet the recommended values. Even then, the NFI and RFI values are only
slightly below the recommended value of 0.90. As such, we can conclude from the
rather satisfactory overall model fit measures that the modified model is structurally
more superior.
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Table 4.21: Comparison of GFI Measures between proposed and modified models
Absolute Fit Measures




Root mean square residual (RMSR)






Normed fit index (NFI)
Relative fit index (RFI)
Incremental fit index (IFI)
The Tucker-Lewis coefficient (TLI)43
Parsimonious Fit Measures
Normed %2 (x2/df)
Parsimonious normed fit index (PNFI)
Akaike information criterion (AIC)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Parsimony adjusted CFI (PCFI)




















1 <r/df<2 1.943 1.779*
>0.60 0.596 0.756*




100 <N< 150 122 122
* indicates improvementfrom theproposed model
43 Also known as Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI)
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Table 4.22 tabulates the structural (path) coefficients among the constructs of
the modified model. The coefficients' respective significance values are also
presented.












Implementation ERM Intensity -
-
Challenge (constrained to 1)
ERM Intensity Perceived Benefit 0.932 6.122 0.000***
-Measures
0.773 5.713 0.000***
ERM Intensity > 12 0.765 6.112 0.000***
Perceived Benefit Bl 0.890 6.291 0.000***
Measures
Perceived Benefit p. P? 0.760 5.643 0.000***.
Measures






***Significant at a=0.01 level
Examination of the measurement model (no change from that of proposed
model) of the modified model indicated significant positive eorrelationship between
the constructs and all their respective indicators (coefficient above 0.5). In effect, the
coefficient values did not vary much from that of the proposed model. Hence, the
second-order factor model in the modified model did not have any practical negative
impact on the construct-indicators eorrelationship of the underlying measurement
model.
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In summary, the results of the model re-specification analysis were
encouraging. The modified model not only delivered satisfactory overall model fit
measures, its path coefficients also indicated strong associations among all
constructs under examination. As such, we could conclude that the modified model
is well supported by the concept, theory, and empirical data.
4.9 EXAMINING THE HYPOTHESES OF THE PROPOSED SEM
MODEL
4.9.1 Introductory
We have discussed the interpretation of the hypotheses testing of the ERM
practical framework's SEM model in sections 4.8.7.1 to 4.8.7.3. The results are
encouraging on the underlying causal relationships among all constructs under
examination as per the proposed model. The empirical results of our ERM practical
model were in line with the conceptual and theoretical framework discussed in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. For instance, results show that ERM implementation
intensity (construct II & 12) has a significant positive impact on the perceived ERM
benefit measures (construct Bl, B2, and B3). In addition, ERM implementation
challenge (construct CI) has a (albeit insignificant in the proposed model) negative
effect of ERM implementation intensity (construct II and 12). Figure 4.10 presents
the parameter estimates of the causal relationships and their respective t-values (in





**Significance at a=0.01 level
Figure 4.10: Path diagram and values of parameter estimates and
t-values (in brackets) of the proposed model
Following are the hypotheses for our ERM practical framework's SEM model which
have been presented in section 4.8.1:
Ho: The overall model has a good fit
Ha: The overall model does not have a good fit
HiA: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct Bl.
Hib: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct B2.
Hie: Construct II has a positive effect on Construct B3.
Hid: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B1.
Hie: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B2.
Hif: Construct 12 has a positive effect on Construct B3.
H2a: Construct CI has a negative effect on Construct II.
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H2b: Construct CI has a negative effect on Construct 12.
The impacts of the two dimensions of ERM implementation intensity on the three
dimensions of perceived ERM benefit measures are hypothesized by Hi a, Hib, Hic,
Hid, Hie, Hif whilst the negative effects of ERM implementation challenge on the
two dimensions of ERM implementation intensity are represented by hypotheses
H2A, and H2B.
Table 4.23: Hypotheses of the causal relationships among constructs












T|n with rjBi 0.458 4.265 *** Yes H1A Accepted
tin with T|B2 0.441 3.582 #** Yes H1B Accepted
Tin With T|B3 0.563 4.297 *** Yes Hie Accepted
nnwithriBj 0.560 5.196 *** Yes Hid Accepted
r|i2 with r|B2 0.377 3.339 *** Yes Hie Accepted
T|i2 With TJB3 0.365 3.393 *** Yes Hif Accepted
£ci with tin -0.624 -5.444 *** Yes H2A Accepted
£ci withrjE -0.622 -5.607 *** Yes H2b Accepted
***Significant at all level
4.9.2 Examining Ho and Ha
As indicated in Table 4.19, the chi-square {% ) value of 518.754 with 267
degree of freedom is statistically significant at the .000 significance level. Since the
sample size of 122 did not overly affect the sensitivity of this measure, we shall
conclude that significant differences exist between the observed and predicted
variance-covarianee matrix. However, given that the correlations in the proposed
model are rather high, the % statistics could have been bias against this in giving a
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poor model fit (see explanation in section 4.8.6). The RMSR and RMSEA values
were within the recommended value of less than 0.8 whilst GFI value of 0.867 fell
just outside the acceptable range of 0.9. Apart from these absolute fit measures,
other incremental fit measures i.e. IFI, TLI, and parsimonious fit measure i.e. AIC,
PCFI, PGFI, indicated that the model is acceptable whilst indices like AGFI, NFI,
RFI (incremental fit measures) and PNFI, CFI (parsimonious fit measures) fell just
marginally outside the recommended values (see Table 4.19). As such H£l was
rejected indicating that the proposed model has an acceptable fit.
4.9.3 Examining Hia
The results indicated that performance and target setting (construct II) of
ERM implementation intensity (see the naming of constructs/factors in section 4.7)
had a significant positive impact (parameter estimate (PE) = 0.458; t = 4.265; p =
0.000) on risk taking capability and confidence building (Construct Bl) of the
perceived ERM benefit measures. Since the significance was at all levels, there was
strong evidence to assert HiA. 'Integrating risk with key performance indicators',
'Identifying key risk indicators', 'Aligning ERM initiatives to business objectives',
'Providing common understanding of the objectives of each ERM initiative', 'ERM
strategy is aligned with corporate strategy', and 'Providing the rigor to identify and
select risk responses (i.e. risk- avoidance, reduction, sharing and acceptance)' were
the essential elements in performance and target setting of ERM implementation
intensity that would eventually contribute to risk taking capability and confidence
building of the perceived ERM benefit measures. 'Enhancing enterprise's ability to
take appropriate risks in value creation', 'Strengthening management's confidence
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in business operations', 'Creating smooth governance procedures', and 'Improving
the monitoring of enterprise performance' were the specific perceived ERM benefit
measures of risk taking capability and confidence building.
4.9.4 Examining Hjg
The results also showed that performance and target setting of ERM
implementation intensity (construct II) had a significant positive impact (PE =
0.441; t = 3.582; p = 0.000) on effective stakeholders communication (Construct
B2). The significance was at all levels. As such, there was also strong evidence to
accept Hie- 'Facilitating the reporting to regulators' and 'Improving communication
with stakeholders / shareholders' were the perceived benefit measures of effective
stakeholders communication.
4.9.5 Examining Hic
The results indicated that performance and target setting of ERM
implementation intensity (construct II) had a significant positive impact (PE =
0.441; t - 3.582; p = 0.000) on enterprise and managerial excellence (Construct
B3). The significance was at all levels. As such, there was strong evidence to assert
Hie- 'Boosting enterprise's profitability', 'Enhancing managers' ability to think
entrepreneurially and innovativeiy', and 'Assisting in meeting enterprise's strategic
goals' were the specific perceived benefit measures of enterprise and managerial




The results indicated that business function and process integration
(construct 12) of ERM implementation intensity had a significant positive impact
(PE = 0.560; t = 5.196; p = 0.000) on risk taking capability and confidence
building (Construct Bl) of the perceived ERM benefit measures. Again, the
significance was at all levels. As such, there was no reason to reject Hip. The
specific elements of business function and process integration dimension of ERM
implementation intensity were 'Integrating ERM across all functions and business
units', 'Providing common terminology and set of standards of risk management',
'Providing enterprise-wide information about risk', 'Integrating risk with corporate
strategic planning', 'Reducing risk of non-compliance', 'Quantifying risk to the
greatest extent possible', and 'Enabling everyone to understands his/her
accountability'. The specific ERM benefit measures of risk taking capability and
confidence building has been previously described in section 4.9.3.
4.9.7 Examining Hie
The results showed that business function and process integration
(construct 12) of ERM implementation intensity had a significant positive impact
(PE = 0.377; t = 3.339; p = 0.000) on effective stakeholders communication
(Construct B2) of the perceived ERM benefit measures. Again, the significance was
at all levels. As such, there was strong evidence to assert Hie- The specific
implementation intensity elements of 12 and the benefit measures of B2 have been
defined in section 4.9.6 and section 4.9.4 respectively.
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4.9.8 Examining Hif
Similar to that of Hie, the results indicated that business function and
process integration (construct 12) of ERM implementation intensity had a
significant positive impact (PE = 0.365; t = 3.393; p = 0.000) on enterprise and
managerial excellence (Construct B3) of the perceived ERM benefit measures. The
significance was also at all levels. Again, there was no evidence to reject Hif.
4.9.9 Examining H2A
On the other perspective, the results found that ERM Implementation
Challenges (construct CI) had a negative effect on Performance and Target
Setting (construct II) of ERM implementation intensity (PE = -0.624; t = -5.444; p
= 0.000). The negative effect was statistically significant at all levels. Owing to this,
H2A was accepted. 'There is inadequate technology support', 'There is strong
competition from other type of management techniques to be implemented', and
'There is wide discrepancy between expectation and practices in ERM
implementation' were the essential elements in ERM Implementation Challenges
that impeded the implementation intensity of Performance and Target Setting.
4.9.10 Examining H2B
In tandem with that of H8, the results also indicated that ERM
Implementation Challenges (construct CI) had a negative and significant effect on
business function and process integration (construct 12) of ERM implementation
intensity (PE = -0.622; t = -5.607; p = 0.000). Hence, H2B was also accepted.
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4.10 EXAMINING THE MODIFIED SEM MODEL
Although the initial results of the overall goodness-of-fit analysis of the
proposed model reveal that not all indices of the goodness-of-fit measures fall within
the recommended range of values, subsequent goodness-of-fit measures of the
modified model (with the inclusion of a second-order factor model) had nevertheless
shown significant improvement of the values which indicated satisfactory and
acceptable overall model fit (see Table 4.21 and Figure 4.11). All three goodness-
of-fit criteria, i.e. absolute fit, incremental fit, and parsimonious fit showed superior
measures. This essentially means that the modified model is able to predict the
observed variance-covarianee matrix (Hair et al., 1998, p.610). Note that the
inclusion of the second-order factor model in the modified model (highlighted by the
dotted-line rectangular in Figure 4.11) did not alter the underlying measurement
model of the proposed model. The modified model had just explicitly clustered a
number of related factors under a higher-order factor to offer a better perspective for
more generalizability of the overall model (Arnau, 1998). Figure 4.11 also depicts
the structural coefficients for all causal paths. All coefficients are significance at all
levels (p-value = .000). Note that all paths have positive parameters except that of
between Implementation Challenge and ERM Intensity, indicating that the higher
the challenges faced in the implementation environment, the lower the ERM



















Figure 4.11: Path diagram and values of parameter estimates
(structural coefficients) of the modified model
4.11 EXAMINING THE ERM VALUE MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESES
4.11.1 Introductory
The review of literature in chapter 2 presented a number of theories in regard
to the value maximization justification for engaging in enterprise risk management
particularly in the area of managing unsystematic risk of the firms. Evidences were
also presented lending support to the argument of positive effect for managing
firms' (unsystematic) risk. The proposition for implementing ERM program in order
to enhance shareholders value is against the backdrop of the neo-classical finance
theory which postulates that managing firms' specific risk is of no value to the
shareholders.
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In view of the above, this study tested hypotheses H3, H4, H5, He, H7, Hg, and
H9 in an attempt to empirically examine the pertinent value maximization theories
with data represented through the public listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia.
The testing of hypotheses H3, H4, H5, He, H7, Hg, and H9 involved bivariate
correlation test with ERM Implementation being the independent variable. ERM
Implementation was presented as a construct and it was measured by 14 variables
(statements) contained in the questionnaire (see sections 3.7.7 and 3.7.1). On the
other hand, the dependent variable for each bivariate correlation test was a single
variable presented to respondents as a statement in the questionnaire for their rating
in 5-point Likert's scale. Each statement described the pertinent dependent variable.
Table 4.24 presents the relevant hypotheses with their corresponding value
maximization theory of ERM implementation, and their pertinent statements
described in the questionnaire. Sections 4.11.1 to 4.11.7 present the results of these
empirical tests.
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Table 4.24: The Hypotheses, the Theory, and the Questionnaire Statements
H
H3








ERM reduces expected costs of financial
distress
H4 Lowering tax burden b21 ERM reduces company's expected taxes
H5 Cost for external
financing
b22 ERM reduces the cost for external financing




b20 Implementing ERM program will be
rewarded by the equity market
H8
as^r^jStpies;:;;^fi^S^R,
:^^^;: ERM .reduces information gap between
^m:anagers;a.nd investors :
H9 Agency problem bl4 ERM reduces volatility of managers' bonuses
and salaries
Before the bivariate correlation hypotheses tests were performed, the test for
scale reliability was conducted on the ERM Implementation construct. The ERM
Implementation's summated scale was constructed using 14 statements in the
questioimaire as described earlier. Table 4.25 presents the result of the reliability
analysis with the Cronbach's alpha score of 0.855.
Table 4.25: Result of Scale Reliability Test On ERM Implementation
Vnk No. of Item Cronbach's Alpha
ERM Implementation 14 .855
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The coefficient alpha of above 0.6 indicates satisfactory internal consistency
reliability of the summated scale of the 14 items for construct ERM Implementation
(Malhotra, 2004). With this result, we could confidently run the tests on the
formulated hypotheses in relation to the construct.
In the bivariate correlation analysis, hypotheses H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, Hg, and
H9 were tested using the product moment correlation statistic as has been described
in section 3.14. The product moment correlation statistic, also known as Pearson
correlation coefficient, summarizes the strength of association between two metric
variables. The coefficient is usually denoted as r. The r values above 0.5 are
considered to be indicating strong association between an independent and
dependent variables (Malhotra, 2004). Further more, the linear relationship between
a particular two independent and dependent variables is statistically tested for its




with the null hypothesis, Ho, implies that there is no linear relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. The alternative hypothesis, H[, implies that
there is a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables (fi\ / 0)
and the association is statistically significant (Malhotra, 2004).
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4.11.2 Examining H^
In the test of hypothesis H3, which reads, ERM implementation has an effect
on reducing cost offinancial distress, the results indicate that ERM Implementation
has a positive and significant association with the reduction in cost of financial
distress. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.548. The t statistic two-tailed
test is significant at all level with p = 0.000.
Hence, the null hypothesis of no relationship between ERM implementation
and reduction in cost of financial distress is rejected. By the same interpretation, H3
is accepted. The Pearson coefficient, r, of 0.548 indicates a rather strong association
between ERM implementation and the reduction in cost of financial distress for the
firms. The positive value of the Pearson coefficient also indicates that the effect of
the eorrelationship exists in tandem with the ERM value maximization theory.
4.11.3 Examining H4
The bivariate correlation test on H4 which reads, ERM implementation has
an effect on lowering tax burden, indicates a very weak linear association between
ERM implementation and lowering tax burden for the firms with r —0.044. Besides,
the 2-tailed p-value of 0.815 also indicates the association between the independent
and dependent variables is insignificant at a = 0.10 level. Hence, the null hypothesis
of no relationship between ERM implementation and lowering tax burden reduction
is accepted (Ho: Pi= 0). By the same interpretation, H3 is rejected.
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4.11.4 Examining Hs
In the test of hypothesis H5, which reads, ERM implementation has an effect
on reducing cost for external financing, the results indicate that the independent
variable ERM Implementation has a positive and significant association with the
reduction in cost for external financing, which is the independent variable. The
Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.692. The t statistic two-tailed test is
significant at all levels with p = 0.000. Hence, the null hypothesis of no relationship
between ERM implementation and reduction in cost for external financing is
rejected (H0: pi= 0). By the same interpretation, H5 is accepted. The Pearson
coefficient, r, of 0.692 indicates a rather strong association between ERM
implementation and its effect on reducing the cost for external financing for the
firms. The positive value of the Pearson coefficient also indicates that the effect of
the eorrelationship between the independent and dependent variables happens in
tandem with the proposition by the ERM value maximization theory.
4.11.5 Examining H$
In the test of hypothesis He, which reads, ERM implementation has an effect
on improvingfirm's credit rating, the results indicate that ERM Implementation has
a positive and significant association with the credit rating improvement of the
firms. The t statistic two-tailed test is significant at all level with p = 0.000. The
Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.304. Hence, the null hypothesis of no
relationship between ERM implementation and reduction in cost of financial distress
is rejected. By the same interpretation, He is accepted. However, the Pearson
coefficient, r, of 0.304 indicates a rather weak association between ERM
294
implementation and its effect on improving the firms' credit rating in the financial
markets. Nevertheless, the positive value of the Pearson coefficient indicates that the
effect of the eorrelationship between the independent and dependent variables
happens in line with the proposition by the ERM value maximization theory.
4.11.6 Examining H7
In the test of hypothesis H7, which reads, ERM implementation will be
rewarded by the equity market, the results indicate that ERM Implementation has a
positive and significant association with the firms being rewarded by the equity
market. The t statistic two-tailed test is significant at all level with p = 0.000. The
Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.338. Hence, the null hypothesis of no
relationship between ERM implementation and its impact in causing the firms being
rewarded by the equity market is rejected. By the same interpretation, H7 is
accepted. However, the Pearson coefficient, r, of 0.338 indicates a weak association
between the independent variable, ERM implementation, and its effect on reducing
informational asymmetries in the firm, which is the dependent variable. Albeit so,
the positive value of the Pearson coefficient indicates that the effect of the
eorrelationship between the independent and dependent variables happens in tandem
with the proposition by the ERM value maximization theory.
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4.11.7 ExaminingHg
In the test of hypothesis Hs, which reads, ERM implementation will reduce
informational asymmetries in thefirm, the results indicate that ERM Implementation
has a positive and significant association with its effect in avoiding or reducing
informational asymmetries in the firms. Informational asymmetries are defined as
the disparity, gap of information or miscommunication that exist among the firms'
stakeholders in regard to, among others, company's risk profile, investment
preference, financing choice and the likes, that are affecting the firms. The /
statistic two-tailed test is significant at all level with p = 0.000. The Pearson
correlation coefficient, r, is 0.315. Hence, the null hypothesis of no relationship
between ERM implementation and its impact in reducing informational asymmetries
in the firms is rejected. By the same interpretation, Hg is accepted. However, the
Pearson coefficient {r) of 0.315 indicates that the effect of ERM implementation in
reducing informational asymmetries in the firms is not strong. Nevertheless, the
positive value of the Pearson coefficient indicates that the effect of the
eorrelationship between the independent and dependent variables exists in line with
the proposition by the ERM value maximization theory.
4.11.8 Examining H9
The test of hypothesis H9, which reads, ERM implementation will reduce
volatility of managers' bonuses and salaries, involves examination of the agency
problem theory. The agency problem theory postulates that managers are motivated
to manage firms' risk because they have personal interests in the firms. One of the
main interests involved is to stabilize their remuneration provided by the firms,
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which are their employers. Hence hypothesis H9 is developed. The results indicate
that ERM Implementation has a positive and significant association with it impact to
stabilize managers' remuneration. The / statistic two-tailed test is significant at all
level with p = 0.000. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.401. Hence, the null
hypothesis of no relationship between ERM implementation and its effect to reduce
volatility of managers' bonuses and salaries is rejected. By the same interpretation,
H9 is accepted. Nevertheless, the Pearson coefficient, r, of 0.401 indicates that the
strength of the association is at best marginal. On the other hand, the positive value
of the Pearson coefficient indicates that the effect of the eorrelationship between the
independent and dependent variables happens in tandem with the proposition by the
ERM value maximization theory.
4.11.9 ERM Value Maximization Hypotheses in Summary
There are together seven hypotheses being tested for the value maximization
theory of ERM implementation. Out of the seven hypotheses testing, all excepts one
show positive and significant associations between the independent and dependent
variables. Table 4.26 presents these findings.
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***significant at a=0.01 level
Dependent
Variable
Reducing cost of financial distress
Lowering tax burden
Reducing cost for external financing
Improving firm's credit rating














From the six significant associations, the strengths of two associations are
considered to be strong with the Pearson coefficient (r) values above 0.5 (H3 and
Hg). The strength of associations of the other four can be described as, at best,
marginal. The r values of these four associations range from 0.304 to 0.401(H4, H6,
H7, H8, and H9).
4.12 EXAMINING THE ERM VALUE CREATION TRANSMISSION
HYPOTHESES
4.12.1 Introductory
Apart from the value maximization theory propositions of ERM
implementation as mentioned in section 4.11.1 earlier, the literature review in
chapter 2 also presented a strategic conceptualization of risk premium which is
being referred to as the CLS model in this thesis (see sections 2.12). In our ERM
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conceptual framework as depicted by Figure 4.12 (reproduced from Figure 3.2), this
CLS model acts as a value creation transmission mechanism through which the
strategic conceptualization of risk premium exerts its efficacy and impact to enhance

















*Sotid arrow lines connect constructs in thepracticalframework
Figure 4.12: Value Creation Transmission Mechanism Diagram
The CLS model classifies firms' unsystematic risks into three classes
namely, tactical, strategic and normative risks. The CLS further postulates that by
managing these three classes of unsystematic risks well, the risk premium of the
firms expected by the debtholders will be reduced, thus reducing the cost of capital
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for the firms. This in turn, is a form of value creation to the shareholders since the
shareholders can now share less of the company's earnings with the debtholders in











Figure 4.13: CLS risk premium model
To test the above argument postulated by the CLS risk premium model, this
study develops hypotheses Hio, Hn, and HJ2 in an attempt to empirically examine
the association between ERM implementation with its impact in reducing /
improving the firms' three classes of unsystematic risk with data represented
through the public listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia. The testing of
hypotheses Hi0, Hn, and Hj2 involved bivariate correlation test between ERM
Implementation, which is the independent variable, with the three classes of
unsystematic risk, i.e. tactical, strategic, and normative, which separately become
the dependent variables. The construct ERM Implementation is the same as that of in
the value maximization hypotheses testing as described in sections 4.11.2 to 4.11.8
which is represented by 14 variables (statements) contained in the questionnaire.
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On the other hand, dependent variables tactical risk, strategic risk, and
normative risk are measured by seven, nine, and four items respectively. Each item
describes the pertinent nature or situation in regard to the corresponding
unsystematic risk. Each item was presented to respondents as a statement in the
questionnaire for their rating in 5-point Likert's scale. Table 4.27a, 4.27b, and 4.27c
present the corresponding items (questionnaire statements) measuring each of the
three classes of unsystematic risk (dependent variables) of the CLS model. Table
4.27d presents the attached note that was incorporated in the questionnaires which
provides additional explanation on the meaning of several highlighted terms for the
benefit of the respondents' understanding
V.
1
Table 4.27a: Tactical Risk and Its Measurement Items
Item* Mnlemcnts
d2 rh-'MC i-. mini mini m|..n•-•.:!m-, friction (gap) between the








There is satisfactory liquidity/free float of firm's shares traded in
the stock exchange
Company uses hedging strategy heavily
Hedging strategy employed by firm is effectively meeting its
intended objectives
The use of real options {see Note1) to reduce firm's earning
















Table 4.27b: Strategic Risk and Its Measurement Items
Statements
Management is effective in isolating firm's earnings from market
forces/uncertainty
Management is effective in shaping the firm to attain and sustain its
structuraladvantages {see Note2)
Management is effective in isolating its earnings from rivals attacks
through attaining structural advantages
Our enterprise has attained resource-based advantages {see Note"
Our enterprise's resource-based advantages has helped isolate it from
market pressures
Our enterprise has attained knowledge-based advantage
(i.e. attain superior information from competitors regarding market
situation and resources to protect earningsfluctuation)
Our firm is able to absorb, interpret, and commercialize critical
information on a timely basis which has helped to isolate its earnings
from rival attack, market pressure, and technological obsolescence
Hl?MS^W;|i^i^;'^ ^tame<S; .^tmt^^^bpiwn^ advantages (i.e. ability to
$/v§pfc product offering,
Our firm possesses a portfolio of strategic options (i.e. ability to
diversify business line, expand market reach and product offering,
acquire key supplier) which has enabled it to mitigate macroeconomic











Our enterprise is successful in complying with industry and regulatory
rules
Our firm will face higher risk premium if we fail to comply with
industry or institutional norms
(i.e. those market rules expected by investors, regulators, interest
groups)
Our firm's competitive advantages achieved through implementing
strategic risk management (i.e. structure, resource, knowledge
advantages) will be quickly matched byour competitors.
Our firm's competitive advantages achieved through implementing
tactical risk management (i.e. hedging and options) will be quickly
matched by our competitors.
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Table 4.27d: Attached Note inQuestionnaire for Additional Explanation onTerms
Note:
1Real option
Real options are contingent commitments made by a firm that grant it the
right to secure non-commodity resources at a later date.
Structural advantage
Firm's market positioning in the industry resulting in advantages against its
competitors in areas such as supplier power, threat of substitutes, degree of
rivalry, buyer power, and barriers to entry.
3Resource-based advantage
Firm's strategy and competitive advantage in reducing demand- and supply-
side risk.
Demand side risk - a firm strategize customer loyalty program such as offering
better quality good and services at lower cost than its rivals to ride through
cyclical downturns.
Supply-side risk - a firm forges strategic alliances with its suppliers and
manage its factors of production and supply chain more effectively.
The data that was used to test the efficacy of the CLS model was collected
during the second batch survey exercise. In the second batch survey exercise, there
were 31 cases of answered and accepted questionnaires which provided the
information on the respondent firms' ERM implementation and their tactical,
strategic, and normative risks situations. Table 4.28 presents the formulated
hypothesis statements, i.e. H10, Hn, and Hi2. Also indicated in Table 4.28 are the
respective unsystematic risks classified by the CLS risk premium model which serve
304
as the dependent variables in the bivariate correlation tests. The measurement items
for each class of unsystematic risk are also shown.
Table 4.28: Hypotheses of the Shareholders Value Creation Transmission
Mechanism with ERM Implementation
Cl.isses








Hio ERM implementation will reduce firm's
tactical risk






'12 Normative Risk dl7,dl8, ERM implementation will reduce firm's
dl9, d20 normative risk
The aims of the bivariate correlation tests on Hio, Hn, and Hl2 are to
ascertain the efficacy of the shareholders value creation transmission mechanism
which is underpinned by the conceptualization of the risk premium model (CLS
model). This is performed by way of examining the associations between ERM
implementation (independent variable) and its impact on reducing the three classes
of unsystematic risks, i.e. tactical, strategic, and normative risks (dependent
variables). Sections 4.12.3 to 4.12.5 present the results of these empirical tests.
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4.12.2 Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Tests On Constructs
As with the situation in section 4.11.1, before the bivariate correlation
hypothesis tests could proceed, the test for scale reliability was conducted on the
constructs ERM Implementation, Tactical Risk, Strategic Risk, and Normative Risk.
Table 4.29 presents the result of the reliability analysis with the respective
Cronbach's alpha scores for each of the constructs' summated scales.
Table 4.29: Result of Scale Reliability Test on ERM Implementation and
the CLS model
Scale No. of Item Cronbach's Alpha
ERM Implementation 14 .904
Tactical Risk 7 .868
Strategic Risk 9 .921
Normative Risk 4 .781
As shown in Table 4.29, the Cronbach's alpha coefficients are all above the
recommended value of 0.6. These results indicate that the summated scales of all the
four constructs possess satisfactory internal consistency reliability (Malhotra, 2004).
With these results in sight, the study could confidently proceed with the running of
the bivariate correlation tests on the formulated hypotheses in relation to the
constructs.
4.12.3 Test Statistic for Association Significance
Similar to the bivariate correlation analysis for the ERM value maximization
hypotheses as discussed in section 4.11.1, hypotheses Hio, Hn, and H]2 were tested
using the product moment correlation statistic as has been described in section 3.14.
To recapitulate, the product moment correlation statistic, also known as Pearson
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correlation coefficient, is an index that is being used to ascertain whether a linear
relationship exists between an independent and a dependent variables (Malhotra,
2004). The index is commonly denoted as r. A rule of thumb would suggest that r
values above 0.5 to indicate considerable association between an independent and
dependent variables. A r value of 1.0 indicates perfect eorrelationship between the
independent and dependent variables (Malhotra, 2004).
Apart from the product moment correlation statistic to examine association,
the linear relationship between an independent and a dependent variable is also
statistically tested for its significance using t statistic. The test for significance is
performedby examiningthe following hypotheses:
H0:Pi-0
H,:pi#0
with the null hypothesis, Ho, implies that there is no linear relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. The alternative hypothesis, H,, implies that
there is a linear association between independent and dependent variables (pi ^ 0)
and the association is statistically significant (Malhotra, 2004).
4.12.4 Examining Hio
In the test of hypothesis Hi0, which reads, ERM implementation will reduce
firm's tactical risk, the results indicate that ERM Implementation has a positive and
significant association with its effect to reduce firms' tactical risk. The CLS risk
premium model defines the nature of tactical risk as that associated with the
uncertainty in firms' expected earnings. CLS risk premium model posits that
investors are averse to earnings surprises owing to information asymmetries in the
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market between managers and investors. Thus, investors will request lower risk
premium from firms who can stabilize earnings or minimize firms' earnings
surprises (Chatterjee et al., 1999) (see section 2.12.2 for detailed explanation).
The t statistic two-tailed test is significant at a = 0.05 level with p-value =
0.037. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.376. Hence, the null hypothesis of
no relationship between ERM implementation and its impact in reducing firms'
tactical risk is rejected. By the same interpretation, H!0 is accepted. Despite so, the
Pearson coefficient (r) of 0.376 indicates that the ERM implementation impact in
shareholders value creation through reducing firms' tactical is not very strong.
Nevertheless, the positive value of the Pearson coefficient proves the existence of a
linear association between the independent and dependent variables. It also
statistically ascertains the efficacy of the value creation transmission mechanism of
the CLS risk premium model via the tactical risk dimension.
4.12.5 ExaminingHji
The test results of hypothesis HM, which reads, ERM implementation will
reduce firm's strategic risk, indicate that ERM Implementation has a positive and
significant association with its effect to reduce firms' strategic risk. The CLS risk
premium model defines the nature of strategic risk as "the probability that a firm can
isolate its earnings from macroeconomic and industry-specific disturbances"
(Chatterjee et al, 1999:560). The source of strategic risk originated from the
imperfections in resource and output markets which cause uncertain performance
outcomes from the firm's committed resources. As such, firms undertake to manage
strategic risk in formulating strategy to commit and deploy their scarce yet precious
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resources. This will ensure firms continue to attain and sustain competitive
advantage in the marketplace (Chatterjee et al., 1999). Section 2.12.3 provides
detailed description on CLS model's strategic risk.
The / statistic two-tailed test is significant at a = 0.10 level with p-value =
0.055. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.348. Hence, the null hypothesis of
no relationship between ERM implementation and its impact in reducing firms'
strategic risk is rejected. By the same interpretation, Hn is accepted. Nonetheless,
similar to that of in Hi0, the Pearson coefficient (r) of 0.348 does not indicate a very
strong linear correlation between ERM implementation and its impact in reducing
firms' strategic risk. Albeit so, the positive value of the Pearson coefficient attests
the existence of the shareholders value creation transmission effect through ERM
implementation. The results in testing Hn statistically substantiate the perceived
value creation efficacy of managing firms' strategic risk.
4.12.6 ExaminingHa
The test of hypothesis H[2, which reads, ERM implementation M'ill reduce
firm's normative risk, yields an insignificant linear association between ERM
Implementation and its effect in reducing firms' normative risk. The CLS risk
premium model defines the nature ofnormative risk as the risk premium (or penalty)
that a firm is subjected to if it fails to comply with its institutional norms or rules
that it is expected to follow (Graf, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1999). These norms
represent the common expectations of the firm's stakeholders, i.e. investors,
regulators, interest groups, with regards to its behavior (Graf, 2004). The CLS model
posits that any risk premium advantages attained through active management of
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tactical and strategic risks will be soon neutralized owing to competitive forces.
These competitive forces will prompt competitors to quickly imitate the advantages
attained by the firms (Chatterjee et al., 1999; Scott, 1995; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994)
(see section 2.12.4 for detailed explanation).
The t statistic two-tailed test is insignificant at a = 0.10 level withp-value =
0.191. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is 0.241. Hence, the null hypothesis of
no linear relationship between ERM implementation and its impact in reducing
firms' normative risk is accepted, i.e. H0: p\= 0. By the same interpretation, H,2 is
rejected. The results imply that there is no adequate evidence to indicate the
importance of managing firms' normative risk as defined by the CLS risk premium
model in creating value to shareholders by way of is impact in reducing firms risk
premium. Thus, no value creation is being transmitted in managing this dimension
of firms' unsystematic risk.
4.12.7 ERM Value Creation Transmission Hypotheses in Summary
The hypotheses tests for ERM value creation transmission mechanism
through the conceptualization of the strategic risk premium of the firms yielded
































*Significant at a = 0.10 level
**Significant at a = 0.05 level
As can be seen in Table 4.30, the tests for Hi0 and Hn yielded results in the
hypothesized direction. Inother words, the results are in support for the proposition
made by the CLS risk premium model. On the contrary, the test of H12 revealed a
result that pointed to the opposite direction of the hypothesis. Thus, hypotheses H10
and Hn are accepted whilst Hi2 is rejected. In addition to this, it is worth pointed
out that although the test results for H,0 and HH are statistically significant, the
strength of associations between the independent and dependent variables are not
very strong. This phenomenon is revealed by the Pearson coefficients (r) which are
below the value of 0.5. We discuss the plausible reasons for these observations in
chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 INTRODUCTORY
Research in ERM is still relatively new, especially at the empirical level.
This is more so in Malaysia. As such, the effort described in this thesis should make
a valuable contribution to the ERM research especially in the Malaysia's setting.
The SEM measurement model for ERM implementation intensity and perceived
ERM benefit measures developed in this thesis should also provide enrichment to the
development of ERM research. This research contributes to the literature of
enterprise (corporate) risk management by presenting empirical results and findings
of an ERM implementation model which encompasses the causal relationships
among pertinent constructs with their respective factors and corresponding variables.
The proposed and modified models (of the SEM models) featured in this thesis are
an encouraging output of this research. These models should provide a reference
and spur additional interest to further improve understanding as well as to further
refine research into ERM practices by the firms.
This study has not only successfully integrated risk management theory with
traditional financial theory as asserted by Mehr and Forbes (1973) (see section 2.2.2)
inproposing the ERM implementation model, but it has also managed to incorporate
strategy theory with the former two theories in theorizing the value creating
transmission mechanism in making sense of instituting an ERM framework within
the firm's organizational structure. For instance, the merging of traditional financial
theory and strategy theory with the risk management theory has provided holistic
and enterprise-wide perspectives of managing risk and developing a risk
management model for the firm through ERM. The advocacy for ERM has involved
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the rebuttal ofthe neo-classical finance theory's capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
which holds antithetical views of the value in managing firm-specific risks as
compared to those ofthe classical financial theory as well as the strategy theory. The
strategic view of managing firm-specific risk expounds the strategic
conceptualization of risk premium model for the firm which espouses the
management of the firm's tactical, strategic, and normative risks.
It is worth highlighting that the analytic model using the stringent SEM test
in this study is a powerful statistical technique to validate the posited concept or
theory, i.e. the causal relationships among constructs and factors theorized by this
thesis. Furthermore, the analysis results of the two SEM models (the proposed and
modified models) developed in this thesis are consistent with the many literatures
being reviewed in Chapter 2. The two models represent an ERM practical
framework in the Malaysia setting, which have demonstrated consistency with the
conceptual framework expounded by those literatures44. The contribution of the
ERM practical framework is significant in that it achieves consistency with the
conceptual framework even in the midst of the potential effect of a cross-cultural
difference inherent in the Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) with those of
being referred to in the reviewed literatures.
44 Consistency in the significance of the structural paths at the very least, although indicators in the
measurement model may have showed some variations as a result of the dynamism of data reduction
in the factor analysis.
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5.2 FINDINGS RELATED TO THE CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL
FRAMEWORK
The principal aim of this study is to examine how an effective
implementation process of enterprise risk management (ERM), i.e. implementation
intensity, will bring about value-enhancing outcome, i.e. perceived ERM benefit
measures, to Malaysian corporations (the PLCs). In addition, this study also
examines whether the challenges of ERM implementation process will negatively
affect such implementation intensity, hence, creating a perceptual causal relationship
model relating these variables. The factor analysis yielded a factor model which
enriched these causal relationships in the proposed model (the practical framework).
Hypotheses of these causal relationships among variables were tested on the
proposed model. Findings revealed that all hypothesized causal relationships are
statistically significant. The modified model which incorporated a second-order
factor model further enhanced the perspective and generalizability of the overall
causal relationships of the factors in the model. The modified model did not alter the
underlying measurement model of the proposed model.
The proposed and modified models serve as useful instruments in that they
help identify areas in the ERM implementation process where relevant initiatives to
enhance ERM intensity may gain further value-enhancing benefits for the enterprise.
In other words, the two SEM models can be adopted as predictive models by
researchers andpractitioners to simulate a successful ERM implementation program
for enterprises. With the insights provided by these models, an enterprise can plan,
strategize, implement and monitor its ERM initiatives and increase the chances of
achieving a successful ERM program.
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For instance, an enterprise that attempts to boost its ERM implementation
intensity may turn to the two SEM models for insights. The models suggest that the
firm to look into two dimensions or factors of ERM implementation, namely (1)
performance and target setting, and (2) business function and process integration
(see Table 4.13). Further more, the models also reveal that in order to cope with the
performance and target setting dimension, for example, an enterprise should put in
place initiatives such as (i) providing common understanding of the objectives of
each ERM initiative, (ii) aligning ERM strategy with corporate strategy, (iii)
identifying key risk indicators, (iv) integrating risk with key performance indicators,
(v) aligning ERM initiatives to business objectives, and (vi) providing the rigor to
identify and select risk responses (i.e. risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk sharing,
and risk acceptance). All of these initiatives are indicators for the performance and
target setting factor of the ERM implementation intensity (see Table 4.12). In the
same light, the models also disclose that an enterprise ought to cover the dimension
of business function andprocess integration by putting in place initiatives such as
(i) integrating risk across all functions and business units, (ii) providing common
terminology and set of standards of risk management, (iii) providing enterprise-wide
information about risk, (iv) integrating risk with corporate strategic planning, (v)
reducing risk of non-compliance, (vi) quantifying risk to the greatest extent possible,
and (vii) enabling everyone to understand his/her accountability (see Table 4.12).
Enterprises can examine on the areas suggested by the models to enhance
their ERM implementation whilst being wary of the potential challenges that may
impede their implementation intensity. Enterprises can take heed from the models of
these negative effects and strive to manage them well so that maximum benefits can
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be obtained from the enterprises' ERM program. It is worth mentioning here that
the negative elements of implementation challenges pointed out by the models, i.e.
(i) there is strong competition from other type of management techniques to be
implemented, (ii) there is wide discrepancy between expectation and practices in
ERM implementation, ad (iii) there is inadequate technology support (see Table
4.12) are of internal constraints to the organization. Nonetheless, enterprises should
also be aware that extraneous variables such as political stability, economic growth,
technology, shareholders expectation, government policies and regulations can also
be factors potentially impeding their ERM implementation intensity. Analyses of
these extraneous factors however, are beyond the scope of this study.
5.3 DISCUSSION ON THE FACTOR MODEL OF THE ENDOGENOUS
CONSTRUCTS OF THE SEM MODEL
5.3.1 The Theorized ERM Practical Framework
To recapitulate the discussion in section 4.3 to 4.6 in relation to the findings
of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, the proposed (modified) SEM
model embodies a factor model as depicted by Figure 5.1. For instance, the second-
order endogenous construct ERM Implementation Intensity contains two first-order
factors, namely performance and target setting (construct II), and risk
integration to business function and process (construct 12). On the other hand, the
second-order endogenous construct Perceived ERM Benefit Measures yields three
first-order factors, namely risk taking capability and confidence building
(construct Bl), effective stakeholders communication (construct B2), and
enterprise and managerial excellence (construct B3). Each first-order factor
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(construct) in turn, is measured by several indicators or variables. Appendix 8
provides graphical representation of these relationships between the first- and
second-order factors as well as their respective indicators. The manifestation of
these causal relationships among constructs and indicators which are derived from
the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis as well as the SEM analysis
constitutes the theorizedERMpracticalframework of this study.
Against the backdrop of the absence of an universally-accepted definition of
ERM, the theorized ERM practical framework (Figure 5.1), in which all of the
posited causal relationships among the constructs (in the structural model) and their
indicators (in the measurement model) have been validated by the SEM analysis, has
provided insights to firms (especially PLCs on Bursa Malaysia) on how to ensure an
effective implementation intensity of ERM, i.e. what elements and initiatives to be
put in place, as well as what to expect out of a successful ERM program, i.e. what
benefits to be obtained. The proposed ERM implementation model (practical
framework) highlights that the objective of an effective implementation of ERM
program is to provide an integrated, comprehensive assessment of all the risks that
an enterprise is exposed to during its course of business operations. The model
meticulously points to two dimensions of (constructs II and 12) of an effective and
satisfactory implementation of an ERM program which characterize various
pertinent initiatives (the indicators). Furtherdiscussionon these aspects is presented






































Figure 5.1: Factor Model in the Proposed Model
5.3.2 Endogenous Constructs On ERM Implementation Intensity
5.3.2.1 Performance and Target Setting (Construct II)
The first dimension of 'effective implementation intensity' in the theorized
ERM practicalframework would entail an enterprise to clearly set its performance
measure and target for the enterprise's ERM program (construct II in Figure 5.1).
To this end, the enterprise should ensure that its ERM program has a common
language and view of risk across the organization. This also means that the ERM
program has to provide common understanding of the objectives of each ERM
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initiative to beundertaken by the enterprise. This is crucial because together with the
industry knowledge that the enterprise has in its possession, the above ERM element
forms the foundation for the enterprise to fully understand its risk profile.
For a conglomerate which operates in multiple industries or business lines,
the risk faced by its diverse business units can be assessed using common risk
profiling and compared to its corporate strategic goals. An effective implementation
of ERM program also enables the enterprise to assess in a comprehensive manner its
risk exposure which is associated with the introduction ofa new product line or the
undertaking of a new investment. By ensuring ERM strategy to be aligned with
corporate strategy as well as aligning ERM initiatives to business objectives, the
proposed ERM framework provides the rigor for theenterprise to identify risk and to
subsequently select the appropriate risk response, e.g. risk avoidance, risk reduction,
risk sharing, or risk acceptance. This element of ERM capability allows the
enterprise to better understand its risk appetite and to gain clearer picture of its
overall risk level.
To maintain the objectivity and clarity of ERM implementation intensity, it
is imperative to identify key risk indicators (KRIs). Identifying these KRIs would
facilitate risk profiling and the comprehension of the correlations and dependencies
that might exist across various products, functions and operations. Furthermore, the
identified KRIs should be incorporated into the key performance indicators (KPI) of
the enterprise.
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5.3.2.2 Integrate Risk to Business Function and Process (Construct 12)
The second dimension of 'effective implementation intensity' of the
theorized ERM practical framework calls for the enterprise to engage in initiatives
to integrate risk to all business functions and processes (construct 12 in Figure
5.1). The principal objective of this implementation intensity is to create a risk-
aware culture throughout the enterprise. For starters, common terminology and
standards of risk management must be set. This element of the implementation
intensity would facilitate the development of risk policies for the enterprise. Once
policies are in place, they should be communicated throughout the organization so
that every member ofthe organization understands,his or her role and accountability.
The communication task must encompass the provision of enterprise-wide
information about risk to the concerned parties in the organization and this effort
should be carried out continuously as well as ina timely manner. The availability of
enterprise-wide information about risk in this fashion would in turn, help the
quantification of risk to the greatest extent possible. All of the above implementation
elements are integral parts for risk governance and control. Having all the above
elements in place, an enterprise would have attained the capability to minimize risk
of non-compliance towards the prescribedprocedures and standards.
The successful creation of a risk-aware culture throughout the enterprise
would definitely provide a fertile ground for an effective risk control mechanism
within the organization. Under this circumstance, risk can be easily integrated across
all business units and functions. On the risk governance front, the board of directors
should assume the ultimate oversight responsibility of the enterprise's risk
management. The board members must discharge their fiduciary duties by becoming
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more activists in risk management and to be potentially more risk averse as well.
This trend will augur well for ail boards of directors of the PLCs so that they
become sensitive and responsive in ensuring that risk to be integrated within their
respective corporate strategic planning.
5.3.3 Endogenous Constructs On Perceived ERM Benefit Measures
5.3.3.1 Risk Taking Capability and Confidence Building (Construct Bl)
The theorized ERM practical framework relates the successful ERM
implementation intensity to three areas of the 'perceived ERM benefit measures'.
The first area of benefits points to the enhancement of risk taking capabilities and
confidence building (Construct Bl in Figure 5.1). This element of managerial
capability is crucial especially in the midst of unprecedented turbulence seen in the
global marketplace in recent years which has consequently changed the environment
in which firms operate. The confluence of many events such as volatility in the
financial, properties, energy and other commodities markets has resulted in
uncertainty in the global economic outlook. This economic scenario, coupled with
the sometimes strained political relations among countries, have borne serious
repercussion in the world trade. This phenomenon has underscored the need for
heightened yet enhanced risk management capabilities from the firms.
Nonetheless, these political-economic circumstances are the manifestation of
a basic principle in finance discipline whereby risk and return are generally
correlated. It is an axiom that holds pertinent to both the firms that operate locally as
well as to the multinational corporations which operate globally. It is therefore
imperative for the firm's leadership to be able to provide strategic direction in
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relation to business decision-making by making explicit the level of risk that the
firm is willing to take. This amounts to building up the firm's capacity and
capability to take and manage risk. This dimension of the firm's managerial
capability entails the management to become more actively involved in
understanding the risk faced by the firms, in assessing and approving organizational
risk appetite and tolerance; create smooth governance procedures; provide increased
oversight over business decision-making and performance; as well as to
meticulously consider relevant risk management issues (Deloitte, 2009). Having
these risk management capacity and capability not only enable the firm to help avoid
and minimize losses during adverse economic conditions, they also enable the
demonstration of superb managerial quality and attribute which form the building
blocks for boosting the managers' confidence when dealing with any unfavorable
operating situations.
5.3.3.2 Effective Stakeholders Communication (Construct B2)
The second area of the 'perceived benefits measures' theorized by the ERM
practicalframework is the effective stakeholders communication (Construct B2 in
Figure 5.1). The evidence from the study indicates that implementation of ERM
program facilitates PLCs' reporting to regulators, i.e. to the Bursa Malaysia and the
Securities Commission. As public listed entities, the PLCs have to comply with
many listing rules and regulations imposed by the authorities. Among others, these
rules include providing quarterly financial statements and making public
announcement of any development of material information about the firm in an
unambiguous and timely manner. Any compliance lapses to the rules will not only
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potentially cost the PLCs monetary loses (e.g. fine or compound), but just as badly
is the loss of the firms' reputation in the eyes of the investing public. An effective
ERM implementation will avoid this regulatory compliance breaches as initiatives
are put in place to capture and provide all the relevant information for reporting
purposes as well as to minimize any supervisory oversight for not reporting what are
supposed to be reported.
Besides, an effective ERM implementation framework will also ensure good
communication between the various stakeholders of the firms. This is because ERM
program calls for the setting up of an effective and efficient communication channel.
This can minimize the risk of informational asymmetries especially between the
managers and the shareholders as well as between the firm and the creditors.
Improving communication and maintaining good public relations with shareholders
have become an increasingly important job for the firms. It should be realized that
shareholders possess the power to express both their approval (satisfaction) and
disapproval (dissatisfaction) of the firms' management team through the buying and
selling of their shares holdings. This activity in the share market will obviously
affect the companies' share prices. A high level of approval will mean that
shareholders will acquire more of the companies' shares, thus increasing the demand
and pushing up the share prices. Conversely, a low level of approval will result in
companies' shares being sold down, hence causing a downward pressure to the
companies' share prices.
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5.3.3.3 Enterprise and Managerial Excellence (Construct B3)
The third area of the 'perceived benefits measures' attainable from the
theorized ERM practical framework is the enterprise and managerial excellence
(Construct B3 in Figure 5.1). The proposed framework indicates that an effective
implementation of ERM will enhance managers' ability to think entrepreneurially
and innovativeiy. These managerial qualities are cultivated through the
internalization of risk-aware culture, which characterizes the infusion of risk
management into performance objectives and business decisions. The effective
implementation of ERM program enables managers to gain a more comprehensive
view of the risks facing their organizations. In addition, it also enables managers to
comprehend the intertwining of the various sources of risk in their organizations.
This understanding of risks augurs well for the enterprises to meet their strategic
goals. Achieving the latter, in turn, in which the PLCs can build their core
competency through risk management, will put the PLCs in a good position to
compete in the marketplace as wellas to boost their resilience and profitability.
5.4 DISCUSSION ON THE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK OF FIRM'S RISK
PREMIUM
Figure 5.2 depicts the theorized conceptual framework of the shareholders
value creating ERM model as has been discussed in sections 3.1 to 3.3. Referring to
Figure 5.2, the proposed ERM practical framework sits at the upper portion of the
overall theorized value creation ERM conceptual framework. At the middle portion
of the framework sees the ERM value creation transmission mechanism. At the core
of this ERM value creation transmission mechanism set a dynamic framework of
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firm's risk premium embodying the strategic conceptualization of risk premium
referred to in this thesis as the CLS risk premium model (CLS model). At the
lower portion of the framework spots the manifestation of shareholders value
creation in areas characterized by two constructs, i.e. lower cost of capital and
businessperformance.
The tests to validate the shareholders value creation characterized by the
construct lower cost of capital was performed with the bivariate correlation
hypotheses analysis ofthe CLS risk premium model in relation to the management
of the firm's tactical, strategic, and normative risks. On the other hand, the
validation of the shareholders value creation characterized by the construct business
performance was undertaken with the bivariate correlation hypotheses tests on the
various ERM value maximization theory which highlights those hypotheses as
reducing cost offinancial distress, lowering cost for external financing, reducing tax
burden, improving firm's credit rating, reward by equity market, reducing






















*Solid arrow lines connect constructs in the ERM SEM model (practical framework)
"Dotted arrow lines represent value creation transmission effects
Figure 5.2: Conceptual framework ofshareholders value creating ERM model
Figure 5.3 depicts the CLS risk premium model (CLS model) as has been
discussed in section 2.12. To recapitulate, the CLS model was developed by
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999). The CLS model postulated three classes
of firm-specific (unsystematic) risk, namely tactical, strategic, and normative risk
are relevant to firms and their shareholders, thus should become the targets for
enterprise risk management. The CLS model pointed out that tactical risk exists
mainly in information asymmetries, whilst strategic risk comes from imperfections
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in the resource and output markets, and finally normative risk presents itself in the
forces that define institutional norms. The CLS model further advocated that the
effective management of these three classes of risk would lead to the reduction of
the firm's risk premium (see detailed discussion in section 2.12). Note that apart
from the three classes of firm-specific (unsystematic) risk, the CLS model also
relates the conventional macroeconomic (systematic) risk to the firm's risk premium
(see Figure 5.3). Nevertheless, the emphasis ofthis study is on examining the three
classes of firm-specific risk.
Tactical risk






Figure 5.3: CLS risk premium model
The bivariate correlation tests on the hypotheses relating to the CLS model's
postulation of the three classes of firm-specific risk indicate that managing the
tactical and strategic risk have significant correlation to reduce firms' risk premium.
The test on managing normative risk, however, does not yield similar significant
eorrelationship.
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Further analysis is undertaken to individually examine the significance of
associations between the construct ERM implementation with the respective items
which make up the summated scale of the construct normative risk in the CLS
model. The objective of this further analysis is to find out which of the four items of
the normative risk has contributed to the non-significance of the construct's
association with ERM implementation. Table 5.1 tabulates the results of the
analysis. The results reveal that even in their individual context, none of the items
indicates statistically significant correlation with the independent variable, i.e. ERM
Implementation, in the bivariate Pearson correlation tests. Thus, this further
examination concludes that the proposed ERM implementation framework does not
have significant impact in reducing any of the four elements, i.e. items dl7, dl8,
dl9, and d20, of the firms' normative risk as shown in Table 5.1. Items dl7 and dl8
represent the compliance and penalty aspects of the normative risk management
effect whilst items dl9 and d20 represent the diminishing effect of attained
competitive advantages through strategic and tactical risk management as posited by
the CLS model.
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Table 5.1: Results of Bivariate Correlation Test Between ERM Implementation
with Tnd:vid::n, Normative Risk Items
No Items Staterrents Pearson p-valuo
Coefficient (2-tailed)
(r)
1 dl7 our enterprise is successful in complying with -116 .534
industry and regulatory rules
2 dl8 Our firm will face higher risk premium if we fail
to comply with industry or institutional norms -251 .174
(i.e. those market rules expected by investors,
regulators, interest groups)
3 dl9 Our firm's competitive advantages achieved
through implementing strategic risk -142 .445
management (i.e. structure, resource,
knowledge advantages) will be quickly matched
by our competitors.
4 d20 Our firm's competitive advantages achieved
through implementing tactical risk -230 .213
management (i.e. hedging and options) will be
quickly matched by our competitors.
One plausible explanation for the primary reason of the insignificance
correlation between ERM implementation and its effect in reducing any of the four
elements of firms' normative risk is perhaps due to the fact that the scope of the
defined ERM framework is relatively wide in tandem with its inherently holistic
nature. For instance, in the context of this study, the ERM implementation model is
made up of fourteen items (variables) where each item indicates an aspect
embodying the ERM implementation model. As a result, the impact of the
implementation framework's collective efficacy through its various aspects toward
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the four items of normative risk may have been diluted when examined in its
totality. For example, the ERM's impact (in its totality) on item dl7 (of normative
risk) is not so obvious, conceivably because ofitem dl7, i.e. to comply with industry
and regulator rules, is generally achievable through an exclusive and more narrowly
defined internal control mechanism ofthe PLCs as opposed to the proposed ERM
program. Similar verity may have also been at play for items dl8, dl9, and d20 of
the normative risk vis-a-vis the defined ERM implementation model.
5.5 IMPLICATIONS
5.5.1 Introductory
The crux of this study is to validate the theorized conceptual framework of
the shareholders value creating ERM implementation model as portrayed in Figure
5.2. In the midst of the numerous skepticisms regarding the effectiveness and
efficacy of a practical and functional ERM implementation model, the empirical
evidences from the structural equation modeling and bivariate correlation
investigations performed inthe analytic model of this study have provided revelation
(in Malaysia scenario) and attestation ofsuch a functional ERM model. This study
has offered insights into an ERM practical framework which attests to a predictive
model (perceptual causal relationship model among pertinent constructs and their
variables) for a successful implementation of ERM program by the PLCs. The ERM
practical framework generates its value creation transmission through (i) the
strategic risk premium CLS model, and (ii) the various aspects of ERM value
maximization theory. The manifestation of this ERM's shareholders value creation
is characterized by the (i) lowering of the cost of capital for the firms (lowered risk
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premium), and (ii) attainment of several measures of business performance (see
Figure 5.1 and 5.2).
5.5.2 Implication ofERMPenetration Level Among PLCs
The mean scores frequency distribution analysis in examining the depth of
ERM practices penetration among the PLCs on the Bursa Malaysia indicated that the
implementation intensity is 'good' based on our semantic scale (see Table 4.3 in
Chapter 4). The corresponding implementation intensity's average mean score is
3.82 on the 5-point Likert's scale; which falls in the 75th percentile of the scale. The
result offers an interesting insight into the penetration level of ERM practices. The
result reveals that the penetration depth is rather encouraging amidst the seemingly
lack ofa mandatory regulatory requirement, e.g. the Bursa's Listing Requirements,
for ERM program to be put in place within the PLCs' management structure. Recall
that in the Malaysian regulatory environment, there is no specific regulatory
framework in the sense of a specific rule or code for ERM. The closest reference one
can get from the existing regulatory framework is perhaps the corporate risk
management requirement which is 'embedded' in the Code of Governance as well as
in the company's system of internal control as stipulated by the Bursa's Listing
Requirements. But even then, the requirement for such a risk management
framework is not a specific reference to ERM implementation. For instance,
although the Corporate Governance Guidelines which was issued by the
government (Securities Commission) on 8 June 2009 does have a chapter on risk
management and internal control, they are merely set out as 'guidelines'. Apart from
that, the Bursa's Listing Requirements which governs the PLCs also does not
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specifically touch on ERM, despite the fact that it has a chapter on corporate
governance, where it covers areas relating to the setting up by the PLCs of audit
committee, internal audit and etcetera.
In comparison to other regulatory frameworks such as that of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (US and Japan) and AS/NZS 4360:2004 (Australia and New Zealand), to
name a few, it is apparent that the Malaysian regulatory environment's requirement
for ERM is lagging behind. Albeit so, given the findings derived from the ERM
penetrationand implementation intensity analyses, it demonstrates a rather extensive
adoption of ERM on the part of the Malaysian PLCs relative to the country's still
lagging regulatory requirement. This trend attests to the fact that the PLCs are
generally risk averse, risk-aware, and riskconscious. In otherwords, the risk culture
has somewhat inculcated within the PLCs' corporate culture. This phenomenon
perhaps has to do with the awful experience that the PLCs had recently gone through
in relation to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
5.5.3 Implication ofERM Value Maximization Theory ofERM
The tests on ERM value maximization theory through hypotheses H3, H5, H6,
H7, H8, and H9 (see section 3.3.4 and Table 4.24) have ascertained the notion that
value can be created in various forms of business performance through ERM
implementation. This business performance can be materialized in the forms of
reduced cost of financial distress and cost of external financing, improved firms'
credit rating, rewards by equity market through higher premium paid by investors
for company's shares, as well as reduced informational asymmetries and agency
problem in the firms.
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The findings simultaneously refute the supposition by the neo-classical
finance theory which postulates that managing firm-specific risk is futile. The
findings point out that managing firm-specific (unsystematic) risk through ERM
program is able to contribute positively to various forms of business performance as
mentioned above, hence creating value for the enterprises. This conclusion implies
that firms should not hesitate to commit and invest their time and resources, e.g. man
power, IT infrastructure, training, and etcetera, in instituting a formal and effective
ERM framework within their management structure. This is because such initiatives
are justifiable inmanagerial sense owing to their value creating capability.
5.5.4 Implication of the Strategic Conceptualization of Risk Premium Through
ERM
The results of the analysis demonstrate that the effect of ERM
implementation is significant in reducing firms' tactical and strategic risks as
defined in the strategic conceptualization of risk premium or the CLS model. As has
been defined in section 3.3.4, this study adopts the tactical and strategic risks of the
CLS model as a proxy for firms' cost of capital. Thus, reducing firms' tactical and
strategic risks implies the lowering of firms' cost of capital through reducing the
firms' riskpremium. These outcomes of analysis have also empirically validated the
posited ERM value creating transmission mechanism through the CLS risk premium
model for managing the tactical and strategic risks of the firms. In other words, the
empirical evidence proves that the value creation transmission effect of ERM is
significant for managing tactical and strategic risk of the firms. This revelation has
provided insights for another mean to aneffective capital management by the firms.
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The above implications are reflected in the evaluation criteria of credit rating
agencies in Malaysia such as that of the Malaysian Rating Agency or RAM in its
rating of firms' debt securities issuance (see also sections 3.3.4., 3.3.4.1, and 3.3.4.2
in Chapter 3). In making reference and equivalence comparison of CLS risk
premium model's value creating transmission mechanism to the RAM's rating
criteria for instance, it affirms that reducing firms' tactical risk encompasses RAM's
positive rating criteria for managing firms': (i) financial risk, i.e. profitability and
coverage, funding structure, capital leverage, cashflow stability and adequacy,
financial flexibility and liquidity; and (ii) corporate governance issues. Whereas
CLS model's proposition in managing strategic risk embraces RAM's favorable
rating for managing firms': (i) industry risk, i.e. growth potential, vulnerability to
industry factors, barriers to entry; (ii) business risk, i.e. market risk - basis of
competition, market position and size, product/service diversity, customer analysis;
operational risk - availability of raw materials, efficiency of assets, cost structure,
labor relations, credit controls, inventory management; and (iii) diversification
factor (RAM, 2006). Table 5.2 summarizes the equivalence comparison of the
dimensions and areas of risk management between the CLS strategic risk premium
model and the RAM's rating criteria (see also Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 for
comparison).
In a nutshell, the test results in examining the posited strategic
conceptualization of risk premium which is underpinned by the CLS model have
implied that Malaysian listed companies are poised to benefit from a favorable credit
profile rating from rating agencies such as RAM or the Malaysian Rating
Corporation Berhad (MARC) if they put in place an effective ERM program as
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proposed by our research framework. This is because the effect of implementing
ERM program will lead to lower risk premium and hence, reduced cost of capital
when firms attempt to raise fund withthe issuance of various debt instruments in the
capital markets.
As for the shareholders, a lower risk premium demanded for the firm's debt
instruments due to lower risk profile essentially means that equity-holders can avoid
sharing a bigger chunk of company's earnings with debt-holders for the latter's
required rate ofinvestment return in those securities. This leaves abigger portion of
the earnings to be made available for distribution to the equity-holders as dividend
payments. This has been made possible as a result ofbetter credit profile ratings due
to the ERM implementation, thus enhancing shareholders' value in the company.
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Table 5.2: Comparison of Risk ManagementAreas















• Profitability and coverage
• Funding structure
• Capital leverage
• Cashflow stability and adequacy
• Financial flexibility and liquidity
• Growth'potential
• Vulnerability to industry factors
• Barriers to entry
• Market risk
Basis of competition
Market position and size
Product / service diversity
Customers analysis
• Operational risk







5.5.5 Implications in Summary
In summary, the positive outcomes of analyses in (i) the causal relationship
offactors inthe ERM practical framework, (ii) the ERM value maximization theory,
and (iii) the CLS strategic risk premium model have far reaching implications to all
parties concerned with ERM practices, namely firm's managers, shareholders,
regulators, and researchers. To the firm's managers and industry practitioners, the
findings have substantiated the need and validated the value enhancing effect of
ERM implementation particularly in the areas of capital management and business
performance. To the shareholders and investors, the findings have alleviated their
doubt in welcoming firms to put in place such ERM initiatives and have reassured
them of thenetpresent value attribute ofinvesting in ERM program by the finns. To
the regulators, authorities such as the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia are
presented with empirical evidence of the efficacy of an effective ERM
implementation model and the causal relationship among all the pertinent factors
within a functional ERM framework. This serves as input for the authorities to
institute rules and regulations for a more robust ERM regulatory environment in
Malaysia. To scholars and researchers alike, the findings should serve as impetus
and reference for further research work in ERM in the quest for better insights in
proposing a more refined, sophisticated and yet productive ERM implementation
model to the benefit of all stakeholders especially to the corporate world.
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Although the principal theoretical underpinning of the research framework in
this study ofERM comes from the discipline of finance (e.g. classical finance theory
and neo-classical finance theory on corporate risk management), the interpretation
and generalizibilty of its empirical evidence may be interdisciplinary (e.g. strategy
and corporate governance). For example, the empirical findings of this study can
provide evidence and reference to the literature on corporate governance and the
cost ofcapital. Numerous literature define corporate governance as encompassing a
broad spectrum of risk management mechanism. To these literature, the ultimate aim
of this risk management mechanism is linked to creating value in the form of
reduction in the firm's cost of capital (Ramly & Rashid, 2010). This line of
argument is similarto those expounded by this study in ERM.
For instance, the empirical results of this study and their discussion shall
provide a valuable perspective to a study by Chen et al. (2003). Chen et al. (2003)
examined the effects of firm-level disclosure and corporate governance quality on
the cost of equity capital in emerging markets. We can interpret the firm-level
disclosure in the study of Chen et al. (2003) as an effortby firms to minimize firms'
idiosyncratic risk in the area of informational asymmetries as discussed in the thesis
and the effect of corporate governance quality as having similar effect to the ERM
implementation intensity explained by this thesis. Chen et al. (2003)'s study did not
find evidence thatdisclosure is systematically associated with the costof equity after
controlling for some typical risk factors such as beta, size, book-to-market and etc.
However, Chen et al. (2003) found that there was a significant negative effect of
corporate governance on the cost of equity capital. Other study such as John et al.
(2008) discussed the relationship between corporate governance with value-
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enhancing risk taking activities. John et al. (2008) argued that strong corporate
governance would better protect investors' interest which in turn would lead to firms
to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. This argument is in tandem
with the value maximization theory of ERM implementation in the area of reducing
agency problem in the firm.
The outputs of this study have contributed to the body of knowledge by
filling the gap of CAPM's challenge in the field of corporate idiosyncratic
(unsystematic) risk management. Specifically, the study has presented a robust ERM
implementation framework whose value-enhancing efficacy is linked to a strategic
model of risk premium. The findings will provide insights into validating and
vindicating the role of ERM in reducing firm-specific risk profile, hence, improving
corporate valuation through the reduction of the firm's cost of capital (risk
premium).
The factors that the strategic model of risk premium includes are
macroeconomic, tactical, strategic, and normative risks. In contrast, CAPM
recognizes only macroeconomic risk which is represented by a single market factor.
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) on the other hand, attempts to improve on the
CAPM model by incorporating multiple macroeconomic factors. Nevertheless,
similar to CAPM, APT omits unsystematic risk factors. The findings of this study
are significant contribution because the entire conceptual framework of value-
enhancing ERM as espoused by this study may provide strong foundation for further
discussion and research in the area of multi-factor unsystematic risk-return model.
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5.6 LIMITATIONS
The data collection process described in sections 3.4 to 3.6 is a feasible way
to gather data from public listed companies (PLCs) on Bursa Malaysia (Bursa) in
view of the budget, time available,population size, cost of sampling errors, nature of
measurement, and attention to individual cases (Malhotra, 2004, p.314-315). Of the
400 contacts made and 200 questionnaires sent out, 128 were returned and 122
accepted. The number of retained questionnaires used for analysis had satisfactorily
met the criteria for generalization of the sample since the size of the data set fell
within the recommended sample size of between 100 and 150 (Hair et al, 1998, pp
610-611) (see section 3.13.5).
The execution of the sampling process skewed toward top ranking PLCs on
the Bursa by market capitalization. Many of the respondents were PLCs in the top
100 list, coinciding with the same PLCs which made the componentmembers of the
once benchmark 100-stock Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) on the Bursa.
Notwithstanding the authors systematically believe that the respondents made a fair
representation of the whole PLCs on the Bursa, the authors nevertheless
acknowledge the fact that completely believing in a truly representative sample had
been selected in the survey without any reservation is erroneous.
Various factors that could have rendered biasness to the data collected might
have come to play in affecting the manner in which the respondents answered the
questionnaires. Among them could be that the questionnaires had been 'down-sent'
to the lower- ranked officials for answers, or respondents experienced pressure from
their top management to provide positive feedback, or that respondents felt anger
towards top management thus led to providing negative feedback, or faced time
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constraint to appropriately complete the questionnaires. Manifestation of these
problems during the survey process could be inevitable and this could affect the
representativeness of the sample in terms of the objectivity of the responses.
Nevertheless, the authors had strived to minimize the probability of
misrepresentations of the sample in the population by adhering to the specific
sampling techniques and approaches, as well as by paying closer attention to
individual cases to detect outlierand inconsistent responses.
The findings indicated that the proposed and modified SEM models could
adequately measure the improvements of an enterprise in its ERM implementation
intensity and perceived ERMbenefit measures, in the midstof some implementation
challenges. Nevertheless imposing forethought is in order. The predictions made by
the models were just recommended values. It is imperative to perceive them as
insights or guidelines but not "mandatory axioms" (Khong & Richardson, 2003).
Since the data collected was cross-sectional in nature, which took a snapshot of what
had transpired during the moment, the parameters derived in these models concluded
the conditions of the Malaysian corporate scene at that particular point in time. It
couldalso be that the dataofferreliability but not necessarily consistency.
We could conclude that the proposed and modified models fit the existing
observed variance-covarianee matrix well (SEM model) if they showed satisfactory
overall goodness of fit measures. Nonetheless, no extra conclusion should be
inferred out of that. Despite the above, the guidelines observed in developing the
two SEM models, i.e. the proposed and modified models, and the insights provided
by the data analysis servedas an important output in determining the impact of ERM
341
implementation intensity towards its perceived benefit measures in the midst of the
negative effect of some implementation challenges.
5.7 CONCLUSIONS
5.7.1 In the SEM model analysis, two dimensions of ERM implementation
intensity result in value creation to the enterprise by providing three areas of
perceived ERM benefit measures. In the meanwhile, some elements of
challenge during the ERM implementation process will impose a negative
effect on the ERM implementation intensity. Concluding the above argument
are two perceptual causal relationship models that have been developed in
relating the ERM implementation intensity, perceived ERM benefit
measures, and ERM Challenge. Thus the aims of this thesis are
accomplished.
5.7.2 The posited causal relationships among constructs and factors in the
proposed and modified SEM models indicate findings in the hypothesized
directions whereby all relationships are statistically significant (H0, H!A, H]B,
Hie, Hid, HiE, H]F, H2a, and H2b are accepted).
5.7.3 Two dimensions of ERM implementation intensity, namely (1) performance
and target setting and (2) business function and process integration, are
crucial areas in ensuring enterprises enhance their risk taking capability
and confidence building, facilitates effective communication between the
enterprises and their stakeholders, and boosts enterprise and managerial
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excellence. The latter factors (in bold) are building blocks for value creation
process in driving downthe enterprises' risk premium.
5.7.4 Implementation Challenges has a negative effect on the two dimensions of
ERM implementation intensity, namely performance and target setting
and business function and process integration.
5.7.5 The modified model had a better overall model fit measures than the
proposed model. The modified model incorporated a second-order factor
model explicitly linking the respective first-order factors to the relevant
higher-order factors, indicating the first-order factors' mutual correlations
with the respective second-order factors. The first-order factors were
otherwise regarded as separate factors in the proposed model. The modified
model did not alter the measurement model of the proposed model.
5.7.6 Since ERM implementation intensity could lead to perceived benefit
measures, and the latter is a building block for reducing corporate risk
premium, an effective implementation of ERM program can contribute to
value creation by the enterprises.
5.7.7 Hypothesis testing on the shareholders value maximization theory of ERM
implementation reveals that ERM implementation has a significant impact on
reducing the cost of financial distress of the firm.
343
5.7.8 However, similar test indicates that the effect of ERM implementation on
lowering the taxburden ofthe firms is statistically not significant.
5.7.9 Nevertheless, hypothesis testing reveals that an effective ERM
implementation has a significant impact on reducing firms' cost for external
financing.
5.7.10 A test result also indicates that ERM implementation is able to improve
firms' credit rating. This effect of ERM, however, albeit statistically
significant, is deemed to be mild.
5.7.11 Another test reveals a statistically significant result that implementing an
ERM program in the firms will be appreciated by the shareholders. Hence,
having such an effective program will be rewarded by theequity market.
5.7.12 Test on association between ERM implementation and its effect in reducing
informational asymmetries that may exist in the firms shows a statistically
significant correlation. The strength of this association, however, is mild.
5.7.13 The final test on the shareholders value maximization theory of ERM
implementation reveals that ERM implementation has a significant impact on
reducing agency problem in the firms. Securing the firms' earnings through
effective ERM implementation will boost managers' confidence of their own
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career future in the firms, hence minimizing the agency problem between the
managers and their principals.
5.7.14 Examination on the ERM value creation transmission mechanism through a
dynamic / strategic risk premium model reveals that an effective
implementation ofERM program can create value by way ofreducing firms'
tactical risk.
5.7.15 Similar analysis also indicates that the effective implementation of ERM
program can create value through reducing firms' strategic risk.
5.7.16 Further examination, however, reveals that similar value creation effect
cannot be attained by reducing firms' normative risk. In another
interpretation, ERM implementation has no significant effect in reducing
PLCs' normative risk.
5.7.17 The questionnaire used in the research is a reliable instrument to gauge the
causal relationships between ERM implementation intensity and perceived
ERM benefit measures as well as to determine the negative impact of ERM
implementation challenge on the implementation intensity. The results
predicted by the models will offer improved generalizability if certain
constraints encountered during the data collection process can be effectively
overcome.
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5.7.18 There should be no issue of under-sized study in terms of sample size since
the results of study have proven to be capable of producing useful results (i.e.
statistically significant results on hypotheses testing). Although there are
various guidelines or rules of thumb on the determination of sample size, one
should realize that a rule of thumb about sample size should be put in the
context of power. A rule about power simply says that one may be not
having much of a chance of finding a significant relationship unless one's
sample size is large enough. This is quite different from saying that one's
regression is illegitimate if a rule of thumb on sample size is violated.
5.7.19 Further research along the same trajectory should be undertaken. For one, as
has been mentioned in section 9.2 (see also Figure 9.2), further research
could extend the practical framework by covering the entire conceptual
framework to include the value creation transmission mechanism of ERM
implementation. Apart from that, further pertinent research can involve:
(i) Testing the feasibility of the two models for small and medium sized
enterprises (SME).
(ii) Further enhance the causal relationships of the two models by
incorporating additional factors, but with model parsimony kept in
mind,
(iii) Replicate and test themodels in other markets (countries).
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5.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED
The research objectives and aims of this study were first being defined in
section 1.10. The research methodology in these research objectives and aims to be
carried out was articulated in chapter 3. The findings of the analysis were then
presented in chapter 4. This study is proud to proclaim that all the research
objectives and aims being set out at the onset of this thesis have been successfully
achieved. Table 5.3 provides the summary for the research objectives and aims that
have been set out, their achievement status and the sections in which the findings of
the analysis for each of the research objectives / aims are being discussed.
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Table 5.3: Summary of Research Objectives, Aims, Achievement Status




to examine the depth of penetration of ERM
practices among the Malaysian public listed
companies
to investigate the causal relationship between
the factors of ERM implementation intensity
and the factors of perceived ERM benefit
measures in the proposed ERM framework
to investigate the causal relationship between
the factors of ERM implementation challenge
and the factors of ERM implementation
intensity in the proposed ERM framework
to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis
reducing the cost of financial distress
hypothesis
to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis
lowering the tax burden hypothesis
^l^^Q^i^^^^ '^^ T^r^i^fie^^6T" the proposed
^^H^^^l^^^^i^ey/or)?.'•; vis-a-vis
l?^^^S^K3ftS.^i^P?^^:hr"{!P^^n^V :^:.fin||t^crrig.,
to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis
improving the credit rating hypothesis
to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis















































to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis
minimizing the informational asymmetries
hypothesis
to scrutinize the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework vis-a-vis the
agency problem hypothesis
to examine the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework in relation to
reducing the firm's tactical risk
to examine the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework in relation to
reducing the firm's strategic risk
to examine the significance of the proposed
ERM implementation framework in relation to






























Who are conducting this research?
This is a research conducted by the Faculty of Business and Accountancy, University of Malaya and
the Department of Management and Humanities, Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS.
What are the purposes?
The purpose of this questionnaire is to investigate the impact and the degree ofsuccess ofenterprise
risk management (ERM) by the Malaysian public listed companies. It also attempts to examine the
penetration depth of ERM practices among the listed companies.
What is Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)?
ERM is defined as the process of identifying and analyzing risk from an integrated, company-wide
perspective. Its implementation entails a structured and disciplined approach in aligning strategy,
processes, people, technology and knowledge with a purpose of evaluating and managing the
uncertainties the enterprise faces as it creates value.
How will the data be used?
This data will be used to develop a predictive model to anticipate ERM successes. All information
collected in the course of this study will be regarded as STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Names of
enterprises will not be mentioned in any form of publication.
SECTION A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Please tick your answers in the boxes provided
1. a. Your company's name (will be kept strictly confidential):


















Information about company's listing






















4. Other (please specify)
Total years of risk management experience:
i. 1. Less than 1 year
2. One to three years
3. Three to ten years
4. Ten years and above
Your department / division
/ unit:











SECTION B - GENERAL INFORMATION ON ERM











Strongly disagree (Vaguely available)
Not applicable or no comment
The following statements describe the elements/impacts found in your company's risk
management process. Based on your understanding and experience of risk management in

















Description of Elements found in or Impacts resulted from your
enterprise's risk management process
Provides common understanding of the objectives of each ERM
initiative
Provides common terminology and set of standards of risk
management
Provides enterprise-wide information about risk
Integrates risk with corporate strategic planning
Reduces risk of non-compliance
Enables tracking costs of compliance
Quantifies risk to the greatest extent possible
Integrated across all functions and business units
Enables everyone understands his/her accountability
ERM strategy is aligned with corporate strategy
Identifies key risk indicators (KRIsI
Integrates risk with key performance indicators (KPIs)
Aligns ERM initiatives to business objectives
Provides the rigor to identify and select risk responses (i.e. risk-







The following statements describe the outcomes of risk management processes. Based on your






Description of Outcomes derived from ERM / corporate risk
management implementation
n/a 1 2 3 4 5
bl Enhances enterprise's ability to take appropriate risks in value
creation
b2 Strengthens management's confidence in business operations
b3 Creates smooth governance procedures
b4 Improves monitoring of enterprise performance
b5 Enriches corporate reputation
b6 Improves clarity of organization-wide decision-making and chain
of command
b7 Facilitates reporting to regulators
b8 Improves communicating to stakeholders / shareholders
b9 Enhances managers' ability to think entrepreneurially and
innovativeiy
blO Boosts enterprise's profitability
bll Assists in meeting enterprise's strategic goals
bl2 Reduces expected costs of financial distress
bl3 Protects company's investments
bl4 Reduces volatility of managers' bonuses and salaries
bl5 Reduces information gap between managers and investors
bi6 Managers are risk conscious
bl7 ERM implementation has a positive impact on enterprise's credit
rating
bl8 ERM helps our enterprise to be respected within the industry
bl9 ERM can minimize agency cost !
b20 Implementing ERM program will be rewarded by the equity
market
The following statements describe the challenges of risk management implementation. Based
on your understanding and experience of risk management in your organization, please rate




Description of Challenges in ERM implementation n/a 1 2 3 4 5
cl People is an area posing big challenqe
C2 Timeliness of information is a problem
c3 There is lack of information needed
C4 Over-requlation in organization hinder ERM implementation
c5 There is strong competition from other type of management
techniques to be implemented
C6 There is wide discrepancy between expectation and practices in
ERM implementation
c7 There is inadequate technoloqy support
c8 The organization structure deters ERM implementation
c9 There is insufficient necessary level of investment for ERM
implementation
- THANK YOU -
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. We really appreciate for your time spent in




Additional Questions in Batch 2 Questionnaire
5. The following statements describe the outcomes of risk management processes. Based on








Description of Outcomes derived from ERM / corporate risk
management impiementation
Reduces company's expected taxes
Reduces the cost for external financing
n/a
How do you rate the following situations that transpire in your company?















ERM implementation help reduce company's overall risk j
premium
There is minimum information friction between the
management and the shareholders
There is minimum gap of risk preference between the
management and shareholders of firm's investment
undertaking
There is satisfactory liquidity/free float of firm's shares traded"
in the stock exchange
Company uses hedging strategy heavily
Hedging strategy employed by firm is effectively meeting its
intended objectives
The use of real options (see Note1) to reduce firm's earning
surprises is effective and satisfactory
Management is effective in isolating firm's earnings from
market forces/uncertainty
Management is effective in shaping the firm to attain and
sustain its structural advantages (see Note2).
Management is effective in isolating its earnings from rivals
attacks through attaining structural advantages
Our enterprise has attained resource-based advantages (see
Note3).
Our enterprise's resource-based advantages has helped isolate
it from market pressures
Our enterprise has attained knowledge-based advantage
(i.e. attain superior information from competitors regarding














Our firm is able to absorb, interpret, and commercialize critical
information on a timely basis which has helped to isolate its
earnings from rival attack, market pressure, and technological
obsolescence
Our firm has attained strategic options advantages (i.e.
ability to diversify business line, expand market reach and
product offering, acquire key supplier)
Our firm possesses a portfolio of strategic options (i.e. ability
to diversify business line, expand market reach and product
offering, acquire key supplier) which has enabled it to mitigate
macroeconomic and industry disturbances risk.
Our enterprise is successful in complying with industry and
regulatory rules
Our firm will face higher risk premium if we fail to comply with
industry or institutional norms (i.e. those market rules expected
by investors, regulators, interest groups)
Our firm's competitive advantages achieved through
implementing strategic risk management (i.e structure,
resource, knowledge advantages) will be quickly matched by
our competitors.
Our firm's competitive advantages achieved through
implementing tactical risk management (hedging and
options) will be quickly matched by our competitors.
Note:
1Real option
Real options are contingent commitments made by a firm that grant it the right to secure
non-commodity resources at a later date.
2Structural advantage
Firm's market positioning in the industry resulting in advantages against its competitors in
areas such as supplier power, threat of substitutes, degree of rivalry, buyer power, and
barriers to entry.
3Resource-based advantage
Firm's strategy and competitive advantage in reducing demand- and supply- side risk.
Demand side risk - a firm strategize customer loyalty program such as offering better
quality good and services at lowercost than its rivals to ride through cyclical downturns.
Supply-side risk - a firm forges strategicalliances with its suppliers and manage its factors























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exploratory Factor Analysis - Rotated Component Matrix
Rotated Component Matrix3
Component














































Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 12 iterations.
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S.E.b C.R.C pd Label
.103 -5.444 $z S-i :•; par_9
.108
-5.607 *## par_ 10
.088 4.265 *** par_i 1
.123 3.582 *** par_I2
.080 5.196 *** par 13
.101 3.339 **# par_21
.107 3.393 *** par_25
.145 4.297 *** par_26
.200 4.832 *** par 1
.178 4.744 *#* par_2
.143 7.312 **# par_3
.134 7.103 *** par_4
.140 6.480 *** par_5
.216 4.864 *## par_6
.165 5.315 *#=h par 7
.153 5.856 **# par_8
.131 5.946 *** par_14
.174 5.892 *** par_15
.151 6.208 *** par_16
.165 5.731 #*# par_17
.118 6.059 *** parJ8
.120 7.420 *** par_19
.147 6.153 *** par_20
.113 8.127 *** par_22
.126 8.427 *** par_23
.116 7.238 *** par 24
.124 6.488 *** par 27
Note:
a = Estimate of regression weight
b ~ Standard error of regression weight
c = Critical ratio for regression weight
d = Level of significance for regression weight
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APPENDIX 7
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
1 Mim.iiL-
"1 : Jii'i
C K- Pd Label
l il.llicilLL* * * * par_28
I
MC 1 1 .32/ .u/9 <+. 148 *** par_29
seI2 .400 .079 5.052 *** par 30
seBl .104 .030 3.478 *** par 31
seB2 .218 .067 3.277 .001 par_32
seB3 .220 .072 3.064 .002 par_33
ec7 .747 .164 4.566 *** par_34
ec6 .482 .138 3.504 *** par_35
ec5 1.080 .169 6.379 *** par_36
eil .566 .082 6.933 *** par_37
eilO .268 .040 6.754 *** par_38
eill .339 .050 6.820 *** par_39
eiI2 .319 .052 6.089 *** par_40
eil3 .611 .089 6.850 *** par_41
ei!4 .423 .064 6.658 *** par_42
ei8 .225 .039 5.781 *** par_43
ei7 .730 .100 7.280 *** par_44
ci5 .419 .060 6.931 ##* par_45
ei4 .331 .050 6.637 *** par 46
ei3 .388 .060 6.476 ##* par 47
ei2 .402 .057 6.993 #** par_48
ebl .250 .038 6.491 *** par_49
eb2 .149 .028 5.414 *** par_50
cb3 .152 .026 5.842 *** par_51
eb4 .219 .033 6.570 #*# par_52
eb7 .279 .071 3.906 #*# par 53
eb8 .254 .076 3.349 *** par_54
cb9 .485 .077 6.308 *** par_55
eblO .594 .096 6.199 *** par_56
ebl 1 .192 .048 3.971 *** par_57
ei9 .505 .070 7.204 *#* par_58
***Significant at all levels
Note:
a = Estimate of regression weight
b = Standard error of regression weight
c = Critical ratio for regression weight





































































































































Output from AMOS of Full Path Diagram of The Modified Model
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